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Abstract 
This thesis empirically investigates the effect of managerial overconfidence bias on 
investment decisions, stock price crash risk and default risk. Overconfidence is manifested 
in an exaggerated sense of being attentive only to one’s own information, believing that they 
are better than the average person, and an inflated belief in their ability to control events. 
Following recent theoretical work, I propose three models. My first model proposes that 
overconfident managers overinvest when they have abundant internal funds or riskless debt 
but restrict investment when forced to issue equity or take on risky debt to raise funds. In the 
second model, I expect managerial overconfidence increases bad news hoarding, leading to 
increased stock price crash risk. The third model predicts that overconfident managers engage 
in exaggerated risk-taking activities, increasing the risk of default. Empirical testing is 
applied on all listed firms in the Egyptian and the UK market. The overconfidence measures 
are insignificant for Egypt across all three models. For the UK, the following results are 
found. In the first model, investment of overconfident managers is significantly more 
responsive to cashflow, particularly in firms that are financially constrained. In the second 
model, I find that managerial overconfidence does lead to an increase in stock price crash 
risk. In the third model, I find that, contrary to the hypothesis, there is a significant negative 
relationship between managerial overconfidence and default risk. The results are then linked 
to existing empirical evidence and several conclusions are drawn, particularly in relation to 
manager overconfidence in developing countries. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 1.1 Rational Economics versus Behavioural Finance  
Traditional research in finance and economics often conceptualizes a world populated by 
calculating, rational, unemotional optimizers. Researchers often make several assumptions 
about human nature that behavioural and psychological research suggests are often wrong. 
The standard economic model includes three unrealistic assumptions: agents have unbounded 
rationality, unbounded willpower, and unbounded selfishness (Conlisk, 1996).  
As far back as 1790, Adam Smith emphasised the importance of considering the psychology 
of an economic agent including concepts of self-interest and bias. He asserts that even a 
“perfectly virtuous” man with full knowledge of what is right and just, may be misled by his 
passions to violate all the rules that he approves of. However, it wasn’t until recently that 
researchers have started to focus on the behavioural biases that may drive how firms 
“actually” behave rather than how they are “expected” to behave (unbounded rationality). 
It becomes therefore important to consider the behavioural side of financial markets. The 
subject matter can be broken down into two main categories: behavioural biases that affect 
investors and behavioural biases that affect managers. Heaton (2002) maintains that research 
in behavioural finance remains relatively lacking and, while research into investor behaviour 
has recently picked up pace, research into behavioural corporate finance is still in its early 
stages of development (Baker and Wurgler, 2011). This thesis is an attempt to contribute to 
research in the latter direction. 
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1.2 Research Background  
In an effort to integrate behavioural finance with the traditional theories of finance, this thesis 
will focus mainly on the overconfidence bias. Malmendier and Tate (2015) assert that the 
overconfidence bias is the most prominent bias that could affect managerial decisions. They 
argue that this is because top management are often portrayed as “larger than life” by the 
media. As such, these managers will often have excess overconfidence in the way they 
operate their firms, and in their decision-making. Overconfident managers tend to over-
estimate returns while simultaneously underestimate risk (Heaton, 2002). This makes them 
more likely to take on greater risk. While overconfident managers are more likely to invest 
in more innovative projects, they may ignore negative signals that they receive regarding 
their investment decisions. This causes them to overinvest, often investing in negative NPV 
projects whenever there is excess internal cashflow (retained earnings) (Malmendier and 
Tate, 2005).  
While most research in corporate behavioural finance studies how behavioural biases impact 
managerial decision making, a small percentage of this research delves into what this means 
in terms of firm value or risk. In this thesis, I aim to narrow that gap. I start off by supporting 
the hypothesis that managerial overconfidence impacts decision making (specifically the 
impact of managerial overconfidence on investment sensitivity to cashflow ), then I move on 
to explore how overconfidence may affect firm risk, I define and measure risk in two different 
ways Stock Price Crash Risk (henceforth SPCR) and default risk. I particularly focus on how 
behavioural biases may be affected during periods of abnormal economic as well as political 
events. For this purpose, I investigate two specific case studies: the Egyptian market around 
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the period 2005 to 2018, which witnessed a big political unrest around 2011 and I compare 
this with the UK market, which apart from the global economic financial crisis of 2007- 2008, 
(the consequences appeared mainly in  2008-2009 in my study) and the Brexit referendum 
passed in 2016 (which was proceeded by much uncertainty and confusion) remained 
relatively stable.   
1.3 Research Aims and Objectives  
This thesis aims to extend the existing body of research on the psychological aspects of 
corporate finance during periods of abnormal events. The research can be divided into two 
main components. 
1. A theoretical component through which models are formulated followed by a 
statement of hypotheses. I start by reviewing the traditional theory of “rational” 
finance in Chapter 2 and justify the need to include the behavioural component. In 
Section 3.3 of Chapter 3, I present a comprehensive review of several behavioural 
biases likely to affect managers. However, this thesis focuses specifically on 
overconfidence bias, as it is recognized by researchers as one of the prominent biases 
that may play an important role in managers financing and investment decisions 
(Fairchild, 2005).  
2. A two-part empirical component, aiming first to test and support the understanding 
of how overconfidence affects firms’ investment decision and its sensitivity to 
cashflow. Then I go a step further in understanding and testing how these biases 
affect firm risk. Testing is performed on the Egyptian and the UK market 
simultaneously. The Egyptian market is an interesting case, considering the recent 
Egyptian political unrest, as I believe that behavioural biases are more likely to be 
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relevant during periods of instability. In addition, the study will also extend the 
empirical literature for the Egyptian market, as very little testing has been performed 
on the cognitive biases with respect to managers in the Egyptian market. Finally, the 
UK market is used as a comparative market. While Egypt is still an emerging market 
the UK is developed. However, while Egypt has endured periods of severe political 
turmoil, the UK has also experienced a period of economic instability following the 
Brexit referendum. Nevertheless, the UK is comparatively more stable politically. 
The contrast between Egypt and the UK markets should help us account for the 
moderating effect that market development (in terms of size, regulation, history, 
information, depth and liquidity) has on the impact of overconfidence on corporate 
finance. 
1.4 Briefing on Theoretical Background, Hypotheses, and Empirical Tests  
Managerial bias and firm bias are considered interchangeable, this is because the vital 
financial and investment decisions of a firm are made by the top management (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2005; 2008). Therefore, any biased firm decisions stem from the bias of its 
management. To measure managerial overconfidence, two main methods are used in this 
thesis. The first approach measures overconfidence through the exaggerated financing and 
investment activities of the firm, there are two alternative measures developed by Schrand           
and Zechman (2012) and Campbell (2014). The second measure utilises insider stock 
purchase information, this measure is proposed primarily by Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
and developed by Campbell et al. (2011). The latter measurement is applicable only for the 
UK, as the data required for it is not available for the Egyptian market. While there are several 
other measures of managerial overconfidence proposed in literature, data limitation of the 
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Egyptian market, constrains the methods of measurement. This limitation is discussed in 
detail in Section 4.6 of Chapter 4. The principal hypothesis is that managerial biases affect 
firm decisions, which may in turn influence the performance of the firm. The principal 
hypothesis is tested through the following three empirical tests: 
1.4.1 Study 1: Does managerial overconfidence affect investment decisions? (Justified 
empirical test is performed in Chapter 5)  
Previous research as Baker et al. (2004), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Ben-David et al. 
(2007), among others, showed that investment decisions of an overconfident manager depend 
largely on the source of funding. An overconfident manager seems to follow a pecking order 
method where he or she will overinvest when there is sufficient internal cashflow (retained 
earnings). Overinvesting means managers will choose negative NPV projects, but due to 
excessive optimism they believe them to be positive. Conditional on the ability to access the 
external market, an overconfident manager will prefer to issue debt. Once internal cashflow 
(retained earnings) and debt sources are depleted, an overconfident manager refuses to issue 
equity, turning down positive NPV projects, because he believes that the firm equity is 
undervalued by the public. In Chapter 5 the model developed by Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
is used to empirically test the Egyptian and the UK market to find out whether overconfident 
managers are likely to invest if there is an abundance of internal cashflow. The results from 
this model show that managerial overconfidence is insignificant to investment sensitivity to 
cashflow in the Egyptian market, however, are significant and positive for the UK market as 
predicted by the hypothesis. Further, the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) is used to test if an 
overconfident manager chooses not to invest if the firm is financially constrained, i.e. has no 
internal cashflow and has depleted its sources of riskless debt. The KZ index is a relative 
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measure of a firm’s reliance on external financing. Firm’s with higher KZ index scores may 
be more likely to experience financial difficulties when financial conditions tighten as they 
may have difficulty financing their ongoing operations. The KZ model is applied only to the 
UK market where significant results of overconfidence were achieved. The results show as 
predicted that the effect of managerial overconfidence on investment sensitivity to cashflow 
is especially significant in firms which are most financially constrained or have the highest 
KZ score. Finally, a conditional model for the Egyptian market is developed, to test for the 
effect of managerial overconfidence and investment sensitivity to cashflow during the years 
of political turmoil. The model includes a dummy variable 1 for years with political 
instability and 0 otherwise. The results of the model again indicate that there is no significant 
relationship between managerial overconfidence and investment sensitivity to cashflow. I 
conclude that this is due to the extreme level of political instability, where even overconfident 
managers with abundance in cashflow did not feel it was a safe environment to increase the 
level of their investments.   
1.4.2 Study 2: Does managerial overconfidence lead to increased stock price crash risk? 
(This empirical test is performed in Chapter 6)  
Several studies cite bad news hoarding as a key factor in the formation of stock price crash 
risk (Chang et al., 2017). Managers possess more private information about firm operations, 
asset values, and firm prospects than outsider investors. There may be several reasons why 
managers will choose to hide this information and not share it with the public immediately. 
However, there is only a certain amount of bad news that a manager is willing or able to 
withhold, before it is leaked to the public at once engendering crash risk. Overconfident 
managers are theorized to have increased bad news hoarding, leading to an increase in crash 
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risk (Kim et al., 2016). This is because an overconfident manager, even when operating 
negative NPV projects, has an optimistic outlook and believes that eventually the project will 
turn around and start to bring in positive returns. The bad news continues to stockpile until 
the overconfident manager cannot contain it any longer and will have to leak it to the public. 
In Chapter 6, the model developed by Chen et al. (2001) and Kim et al. (2016) is used to test 
whether managerial overconfidence leads to an increase in stock price crash risk in the 
Egyptian and the UK markets. The model employs three separate measures of Stock Price 
Crash Risk (SPCR). As with the results in the previous model, the effect of managerial 
overconfidence on SPCR was insignificant for the Egyptian market but was positive and 
significant for the UK market as hypothesized. I argue that the results for the Egyptian market 
may be due to the extreme level of political risk, where managerial overconfidence had little 
or no impact. Alternatively, I argue that, the Egyptian market being inefficient, may mean 
that investors do not react to excessive risk taking activities of overconfident managers.  
1.4.3 Study 3: Does managerial overconfidence lead to increased default risk? (This 
empirical test is performed in Chapter 7) 
There is empirical evidence that overconfidence influences managerial decisions, which 
alters managerial actions and impacts firm value and risk. In Chapter 7, I propose a method 
of measuring the influence of managerial overconfidence on risk. Focusing primarily on the 
risk of default as measured by the Merton Model discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Default 
risk is defined as the uncertainty regarding a firm’s ability to pay back its debts and 
obligations (Moody, 2002). The illusion of control and the above average effect 
consequential of overconfidence, means that overconfident managers have a tendency to 
overestimate return while simultaneously underestimating risk, they will ignore negative 
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signals and remain optimistic that events will get better and will continue to hoard bad news. 
Thus, instead of learning from past mistakes, overconfidence causes decision makers to fool 
themselves into believing that their decisions were right all along. To admit that the decision 
made is risky will threaten the agent’s positive self-image and create an uncomfortable self-
dissonance. He will thus manipulate his beliefs, telling himself that the decisions made are 
not that risky, hindering the agent from adjusting his behaviour appropriately. Chapter 3 
discusses several biased corporate decisions associated with overconfident managers 
documented in previous literature, that could lead to increased firm risk. I thus hypothesize 
that overconfidence in managers even in states of risk, as the state of political risk in Egypt, 
will continue to underestimate bankruptcy costs, make more risky decisions, and when 
presented with negative signals they will ignore them, leading to an increase in the probability 
of default. In Chapter 7, I use the Merton Model (MM) to test the effect of managerial 
overconfidence against both the probability of default, and the abnormal probability of 
default (adjusted for industry average). The results of the third model are insignificant for the 
Egyptian market, however, contrary to my hypothesis the empirical results of the UK market 
indicate a negative significant relationship between managerial overconfidence and 
probability of default. This implies that the risk-taking activities of overconfident managers 
may be beneficial for a firm. By creating more value for the firm, an overconfident manager 
may help move his/her firm away from default.  
1.5 Thesis Contribution 
The thesis compares the effects of managerial overconfidence on the Egyptian and UK 
markets. The Egyptian market is a particular market of interest as it recently suffered several 
episodes of political instability and is a relatively developing market, lacking information 
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efficiency. Therefore, I expected to see exaggerated effects of managerial overconfidence. 
This is in comparison to the UK market which is a more developed market and except for the 
Brexit referendum remains relatively stable throughout the study period. The results from 
this comparison hints that the impact of managerial overconfidence differs in relation to the 
degree of external (political risk). The conclusion mapped out in Figure 5.3, is that the impact 
of overconfidence on managerial decision making is concave to the degree of political risk. 
At zero or extreme levels of risk, the decisions made by overconfident and rational managers 
converge. However, I propose that there is an optimal level of risk, where managerial 
overconfidence will be most pronounced.  
Further, while there are several documented effects of managerial overconfidence on various 
financial decisions, there is an ongoing debate as to whether managerial overconfidence is 
beneficial or detrimental to the firm. The empirical results of the third model, which is a 
novel model in this thesis, shows that there is a negative relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and default risk. This implies that an overconfident manager is better able to 
create value for his firm and thus move the firm away from default. This might be particularly 
beneficial for firms when making hiring and firing decisions of firms. Certain firms, 
especially underinvested ones, might find it more beneficial to employ an overconfident 
manager who will follow optimal risky investment opportunities with a flatter compensation 
schedule. Furthermore, overconfidence commits a manager to exert more effort to gather 
information that improves the success rate and value of the firm’s investments (Gervais, 
Heaton and Odeon, 2011).  
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1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This chapter briefly reviewed the background of corporate behavioural finance and the 
importance of integrating psychological biases with traditional theories of finance to explain 
firm behaviour. It also provided a look ahead into the principal hypothesis, theoretical 
background and the separate empirical tests performed. The rest of the thesis is organised as 
follows. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review I. Traditional theory used to explain firm investment 
decisions and firm risk is presented. A summary of the previous literature findings, and the 
empirical research performed is given. I conclude the presentation of the chapter with a 
discussion of the pitfalls and/or inadequacies of traditional theory and the need to integrate a 
behavioural component. 
Chapter 3: Literature Review II. The failure of the models discussed in Chapter 2 to 
comprehensively explain firm behaviour justifies the need to incorporate behavioural finance 
into the analysis. A review of previous behavioural research will form a background of the 
theoretical framework on which I base my hypothesis for each model.  
Chapter 4: Research Methodology. The intended research strategy is concisely stated. The 
main methodology:  panel data analysis is discussed, along with a brief description of the 
methods of data collection and the intended period of study. I also justify the choice of the 
Egyptian market as the main market of choice for empirical testing. Through the course of 
the chapter, data limitations regarding the Egyptian market is discussed. Due to these 
limitations, the models had to be slightly altered from those used in previous research.  
11 
 
Chapter 5: Investment Decisions Findings and Analysis (Study I). This chapter reports 
the findings of the first model. The findings generally support the results found in the 
literature. Comparisons between the Egyptian market and the UK market are also presented.  
Chapter 6: Stock Price Crash Risk Findings and Analysis (Study II). This chapter tests 
the effect of managerial overconfidence on stock price crash risk. While there are some 
dissimilarities, the results are generally in support of the hypothesis and the literature.  
Chapter 7: Default Risk Findings and Analysis (Study III). This chapter will focus on the 
effect of overconfidence on both the probability of default and the abnormal probability of 
default for the Egyptian and the UK markets. The results of this chapter turned out different 
from the standard hypothesis, a discussion of the most probable reason for divergence is 
provided. 
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations. The final chapter will summarize the 
whole thesis and findings; restate the aims and objectives of this thesis, as well as re-iterate 
the main motivations for performing this research.  Finally, the chapter will outline the main 
conclusions and offer suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review I: Traditional Theories of Corporate Finance 
2.1 Introduction 
The pattern of corporate financial decisions is important for the financial success of firms 
(Singh and Luthra, 2013). Corporate financial decisions, directly or indirectly, affect various 
facets of corporate management, which will ultimately determine the wealth of investors. 
The financial strategy of a corporation is usually set by the management committee or above, 
at the Board level, and involves capital structure policy, dividend policy and investment 
policy.  
The aim of this thesis is to investigate how behavioural biases may have an impact on 
financial decisions, and how this will ultimately affect the level of corporate risk as measured 
by stock price crash risk and default risk. It is important to note that this thesis proposes 
integrating behavioural finance into the traditional theories of finance. Thus, before delving 
into the behavioural field this chapter will focus on the traditional theories of corporate 
finance. 
This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive insight regarding the prominent theories and 
factors used as basis for traditional corporate finance models.  The criticisms of traditional 
models are also discussed to justify the addition of new factors (behavioural factors) to 
enhance these models. This chapter consists of three main sections. In Section 2.2, I discuss 
key theories of investment decisions and how these decisions are affected by the sources of 
funds, in Section 2.3, the traditional theories of stock price crash risk are discussed and its 
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determinants, in Section 2.4, Default risk is defined and the different measures used in 
previous literature are discussed.  
2.2 Investment Decisions  
Capital expenditure (investment) is an important decision made by financial managers 
(Durnev et al., 2005). Capital expenditure is the process of determining which investment 
projects will lead to the maximization of shareholder value. Discounted cashflow (DCF) 
methods; the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), the Net Present Value (NPV) and the payback 
method are widely used to evaluate investment decisions in firms. Capital expenditure 
evaluation methods take into account the cost of a particular project, the cash inflows expected 
from the project, the residual value of the asset at the end of its useful life, and the riskiness 
of those cashflows. Under the NPV method, management first determines the cost of capital 
at which the cash outflows should be discounted, and then calculates the present value of 
expected cash outflows and compares it to the present value of cash inflows.  The IRR method, 
on the other hand, determines the rate at which the NPV will equal to zero, the higher the IRR 
the more desirable the project. Otherwise, the project is also considered acceptable if the IRR 
is greater than the cost of capital. The payback method calculates how long it takes a firm to 
recover the capital allocated into an investment. It can either use the cash inflow as is, or 
discounted.  
A second important decision that attains to corporate investment is a firm’s capital structure. 
Theories of corporate investment and capital structure are closely linked. Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) demonstrate that under certain conditions financial structure for real investment 
decisions are irrelevant, i.e. the value of the firm is dependent on its profitability rather than 
its capital structure. Thus, in a frictionless capital market, a firm’s financial structure should 
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not affect its market value. They argue that the proportion of debt and equity should not be a 
concern for management because in a perfect market any combination of debt and equity will 
be equivalent to any alternative combination. Their theory is further supported by Stizlitz 
(1969) who incorporated risky debt in his model and proved that firm value is not affected by 
capital structure. He holds that, in the absence of bankruptcy cost payments, it does not make 
any difference whether debt is risk-free or risky. Firm value, he emphasizes, is obtained by 
discounting expected cashflows from the firm investments. It should not therefore be impacted 
by whether these cashflows are financed by risky debt or risky equity.  
However, this theory is based on several restrictive assumptions, namely 
1. Firms operate in frictionless, competitive markets where there are no transaction costs; 
2. Firms are price takers; 
3. There are no taxes and no bankruptcy costs (i.e. a firm cashflow will not depend on its 
financial policy) and all agents have the same information level;  
4. Individuals and firms have the same costs of financial transactions.  
If these assumptions hold true a firm’s investment decision, motivated by the maximization 
of shareholder’s value, should be independent of financial factors such as liquidity, leverage, 
or dividend payments. However, this is not true in the real world. If these simplifying 
assumptions are not made, then the choice of capital structure becomes an important factor in 
determining the investment decisions made by a firm.  
More recent literature, however, suggests that capital markets are in fact imperfect. There are 
several reasons why firms may not invest at optimal levels that maximize shareholder value, 
leading to over or underinvestment problems. Information asymmetries and costly contract 
15 
 
enforceability generate agency costs that result in outside investors demanding a premium on 
the debt or stock issued by the firm. The resulting decrease in liquidity could cause a firm to 
reduce its scale of investment (Fazzari et al., 1987), and cause internal and external funding 
by the firm to be inequivalent substitutes (Hornstein and Zhao, 2011).  
Investment thus depends on financial factors (such as liquidity, leverage and dividend pay-
outs) and the availability of internal finance, ease of access to debt or new equity finance, or 
the efficiency of particular credit markets (Myers, 2001). Capital market imperfections will 
constrain capital expenditure and the mobilization of capital for investment and create a wedge 
between the costs of internal and external financing. In such situations, firms will prefer to 
finance investments with internal funds as external funds become more costly due to 
transaction costs, agency problems, and asymmetric information.  
2.2.1 How investment decisions are affected by capital structure 
Capital structure refers to how a firm uses debt and/or equity to finance its operations and 
growth. A managerial capital structure decision affects the value of a firm (Chowdhury and 
Chowdhury, 2010) by affecting the market value of shares, which in turn affects 
shareholders’ wealth. Any change in capital structure consequently influences the cost of 
capital and value of the firm. When firms decide to use debt financing, they are reallocating 
some expected future cashflows away from equity claimants in exchange for cash up front.  
In contrast to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theory, Ross (1977) notes that the irrelevance 
proposition assumes that the market knows the expected cashflow of a firm and its market 
value to determine firm value. He argues that the market firm value at the “perceived” stream 
of future cashflows may depend on the effect of capital structure signaling. With the choice 
of financial leverage, managers may send unambiguous signals to the outsiders about a firm 
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financial standing. For example, by choosing higher financial leverage, managers may signal 
that they are optimistic about the future of the firm, which will, in turn increase the perceived 
value of the firm. Changes in firm capital structure may change the market perceived risk 
classification of the firm, even though the firm’s actual risk classification may remain 
unchanged.  
Since then, several theories were suggested to explain the variation in capital structures 
across firms, and the link between the choice of capital structure and investment decision. 
This section discusses three main theories: the Trade-off Theory (TT), the Pecking Order 
Theory (POT), and the Market Timing Theory (MTT). 
(i) The Trade-off Theory 
The Trade-off Theory posits that the optimal capital structure is determined by the trade-off 
between the benefit and cost of debt. There are many ways to view these costs and benefits. 
According to the "tax-bankruptcy trade-off," firms balance the tax benefits of debt against the 
costs of bankruptcy. The primary version of this hypothesis was proposed by Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973).  
TT states that debt is considered beneficial because of the debt-tax shields that help to 
minimize the firm’s expected tax bills and maximize its after-tax cashflows. The optimal level 
of leverage is thus achieved by balancing the tax benefits of interest payments against the 
costs of issuing debt. Several researchers tried to identify the relevant costs associated with 
debt financing that firms trade off against this corporate tax benefit, and the two most popular 
of such costs include bankruptcy costs and agency costs. Other considerations that may also 
affect these costs include, market interaction and corporate control (Antwi et al., 2012). The 
Trade-off Theory predicts a positive relationship between earnings and leverage ratios 
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because, as mentioned earlier, interest paid on debt reduces the firm’s taxable income in 
contrast to dividends. However, most empirical research has found this relationship to be 
consistently negative (Myers, 1989). This means that the static trade-off is inadequate as a 
real-world description of capital structure.  
In an extension of trade-off theory, researchers considered the agency cost theory. The Agency 
Cost Theory states that the separation of ownership and control in firms creates conflicts of 
interest between the firm’s managers and its shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
The Agency Cost Theory reasons that managers will often indulge in investment activities 
that enhance their own personal benefits rather than maximizing the value of the firm. Stein 
(2001) explains this in light of several scenarios; managers may be empire builders, desiring 
to work in larger firms not necessarily profitable ones. Another possible scenario is referred 
to as “short-termism” where managers will indulge in activities that will improve their 
performance measures in the short-term, regardless of the long-term consequences. 
Furthermore, Stein (2001) provides that managers have reputation and career concerns that 
will cause them to act in a way that improves their reputation and ultimately their perceived 
value in the labour market. It thus stands to reason that firm managers will be less likely to 
give up control of the firm and will resist liquidation even when it is in the best interest of 
shareholders.  
Accordingly, firms should use more leverage in their capital structure and mitigate agency 
costs by regulating the choice of investment, the amount of risk undertaken, and the conditions 
under which the firm can resort to liquidation. This should constrain or encourage managers 
to act in the interests of shareholders, and consequently have a positive effect on firm 
profitability and performance (Jensen, 1999). However, while increased leverage may reduce 
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the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, it will also bring with it a 
commitment for future cash outflows resulting in higher expected costs of financial distress, 
bankruptcy and/or liquidation. As bankruptcy and distress become more likely, an increase in 
leverage can result in higher agency costs and thus reduce firm profitability and performance. 
Altman (1968) measures financial distress through a decline in a firm’s sales relative to others 
in its industry and/or a discrepancy between the firm’s actual and forecast earning.  Continued 
financial distress may lead to bankruptcy. Jensen and Meckling (1976), while acknowledging 
that the exact legal definition of bankruptcy is difficult to specify precisely, provide 
differentiating definitions for bankruptcy and liquidation. They define bankruptcy as the 
inability of a firm to meet a current payment on a debt obligation, or when one or more of the 
other indenture provisions providing for bankruptcy are violated by the firm. In the event of 
bankruptcy stockholders will have lost all claims on the firm and the remaining loss 
(difference between the face value of the fixed claims and the market value of the firm) is 
borne by debtholders. They define liquidation as occurring only when the market value of the 
future cashflows generated by the firm is less than the opportunity cost of the assets, i.e., the 
sum of all the values that could be realized if the assets were sold piecemeal. 
Financial risk is the result of the use of excess financial leverage that may affect the value of 
the firm and could lead to bankruptcy. The relationship between bankruptcy and financial 
leverage is not always specifically linear. If the level of leverage is low, and a firm increases 
its reliance on debt financing, this may not necessarily exert a significant effect on the 
likelihood of bankruptcy. However, an accelerated rate of increase of leverage beyond a 
certain threshold may cause an increase in bankruptcy costs, which could have a negative 
effect on the value of the firm and the cost of capital.  
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain that if both parties are utility maximisers, it is likely that 
the agent (i.e. the manager) will not always act in the best interest of the principal (i.e. the 
shareholders). They further establish that for the principal to limit this divergence he will have 
to incur some costs.1 Jensen and Meckling thus propose shared ownership, compensation 
schemes and other such devices to align the interests of managers with that of shareholders.  
There are different forms of costs associated with bankruptcy. There are direct (out of pocket) 
costs that include legal, administrative and advisory fees paid by the firm. There are also 
indirect costs, which arise because financial distress affects the company’s ability to conduct 
its business, which may be reduced sales or increased production costs.  
(ii) The Pecking Order Theory 
The Trade-Off Theory uses target adjustment models to measure the speed at which 
companies adjust toward their capital structure. On the other hand, the Pecking Order Theory 
studies the relationship between changes in leverage and companies' financing deficits (Frank 
and Goyal, 2003). The Pecking Order Theory prioritizes the allocation of funds among the 
three main sources: internal cashflow (retained earnings), debt and equity. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) explain the Pecking Order Model in light of a presence of asymmetric information 
between managers and less-informed outsiders. They show that the asymmetry leads a firm to 
prefer internal financing to external financing. They argue that if managers act in the best 
interest of shareholders, they will refuse to issue shares, to the extent that they may choose to 
 
1 Costs include monitoring costs designed to monitor and limit the aberrant activities of the agent. Bonding costs 
designed to guarantee that the agent will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or ensure that 
the principal will be compensated if this does happen. Residual losses this is the dollar equivalent of the reduction 
in welfare experienced by the principal as a result of the divergence between principal and agent. 
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pass up on good investment opportunities.  Further, they argue that when internal finance is 
exhausted and there is a deficit in funds a firm prefer safer debt to riskier equity. Firms will 
raise funds through issuing equity only after the capacity to issue debt has been exhausted. 
Thus, they provide that there exists a preferential financial hierarchy starting with internal 
funds, followed by external debt, and ending with external equity.  
They discuss that there is a serious adverse selection problem with equity as outside investors 
will view it as strictly riskier than debt. Thus, rational investors will devalue a firm’s securities 
when it announces a security issue by demanding a higher risk premium on equity. Conditional 
on issuing equity, this drop in the valuation of equity makes it look undervalued. Myers and 
Majluf assume that managers act in the best interest of existing shareholders and will refuse 
to issue undervalued shares under the assumption of rationality.   
This problem could be avoided by the use of retained earnings as a source of funding, where 
available. If retained earnings are inadequate, the firm will resort to using debt; while debt is 
still risky, it has a minor adverse selection problem. Shyam-Sunder (1991) explains that a 
rational manager who believes that the shares of their companies are undervalued will choose 
to issue debt rather than equity. A manager willing to issue equity will find no one to buy 
those shares as those will then be considered a “bad buy”. Shyam-Sunder believes that equity 
issues will only occur when the cost of issuing debt is too high, that is, if the company already 
has a high portion of debt and can foresee costs of financial distress. The firm will only use 
equity if they have depleted all other sources of funds. This theory of leverage does not adhere 
to the concept of an optimal leverage ratio as assumed by the TT. 
Myers (2001) criticizes pecking order models because it assumes that managers act in the 
interest of shareholders by trying to maximize the value of existing shares. It does not show 
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why, in the absence of explicit treatment of management incentives, they should care if newly 
issued stocks are undervalued or overvalued. Furthermore, even though the Pecking Order 
Theory does show how information differences can affect financing, it cannot explain the 
persistence of this unmitigated asymmetry. 
(iii) The Market Timing Theory 
The Market Timing Theory states that when managers need to raise funds, they will look at 
the current market conditions for debt and equity and will choose the more favourable option 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2002). If the current conditions are unusually favourable, funds may still 
be raised even if the firm has no current need for those funds, thereby suggesting that stock 
returns and debt market conditions will play an important role in the capital market decisions.  
Thus, it holds that capital structure evolves as the cumulative outcomes of past attempts to 
time the market.  
Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that under the equity market timing there are two versions of 
the theory that lead to similar capital structure dynamics. The first version involves rational 
managers and investors as well as adverse selection costs that vary across firms or across time. 
In this case information is usually first released to reduce asymmetry before equity 
announcements happen. In this version, variations in adverse selection is measured through 
temporary fluctuations in the market to book ratio. They observe that if the costs of deviating 
from an optimal capital structure is small compared to the resulting variation in issuing costs, 
then past variation in the market to book ratio can have long lasting effects. In the second 
version of the theory, they assume that investors and/or managers are irrational, and there are 
time varying mispricing, or perceptions of mispricing. They explain that managers will issue 
equity when they believe its cost is exceptionally low and repurchase equity when they believe 
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its cost is exceptionally high. They justify by stating that market to book ratios are well known 
to be inversely related to future equity returns, and that extreme values of market to book have 
been connected to extreme investor expectations. Thus, if managers are trying to exploit 
extreme expectation, net equity issues will be positively related to market to book ratio, which 
is proved through their empirical model. If managers believe that there is no optimal capital 
structure, they will not need to reverse decisions when the firm appears to be correctly valued 
and the cost of equity appears to be normal, this will lead to temporary fluctuations in market 
to book ratios having permanent effect on leverage.    
This section reviewed the most prominent theories of capital structure. This is particularly 
important because investment decisions are impacted by the source of funding available. The 
next section will discuss an important theory of corporate investment: the q-theory, which 
serves as a platform for the analysis of investment behaviour both theoretically and 
empirically (Blundell et al., 1992).  
2.2.2 The Q-Theory of Investment 
A dominant investment theory that is often used in the literature to measure the future 
investment opportunities of a firm is the “Q-theory” suggested by Tobin (Hayashi, 1982).  
The Q-theory approach was pioneered by Tobin (1969) where he used a straightforward 
arbitrage argument: the firm will invest if Tobin’s Q exceeds one, where Q is: 
 
𝑄 =
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
(2.1) 
The cost is defined as the replacement cost of physical assets, or equivalently, the 
replacement cost of the share of capital. The logic behind this is that if Q is greater than one, 
then the profits generated from the investment will exceed the cost of the firm’s assets thus 
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additional investment in the firm would make sense. However, if Q is less than one, the firm 
would be better off selling its assets instead of trying to put them to productive use.  
A related concept in this respect is the marginal Q. Lucas and Prescott (1971) require the unit 
cost of investment goods be compared to an expected marginal return, the ratio of which is 
termed the marginal Q.  In what follows, this ratio and its relation to Q is clarified. The cost 
of investment is defined as disruption costs that occur during the installation of any new or 
replacement capital plus the cost of learning as the structure of production may change. 
Disruption costs include delivery lags, time to install and cost of irreversibility that may occur 
due to lack of secondary markets for capital goods (Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006). The 
marginal adjustment and purchase costs of investment should equal the shadow value of 
capital. The shadow value of capital here is the firm manager’s expectation of the marginal 
contribution of new capital goods to future profit.  
,To summarize  
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑄 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛/𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡/𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡
 
                          =
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
 
(2.2) 
 
Hayashi (1982) simplifies this by showing that, if a financial market is efficient, then its 
valuation of the capital stock equals the manager’s valuation of the said stocks. Thus, with 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition, marginal Q should be equal to average Q.  
The Tobin’s Q ratio was later developed into a proxy for future firm investment opportunities 
by taking the ratio of a firm’s total market value to its book value (a rough proxy for Tobin’s 
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Q) (Fama and French, 2002).  Not only does the firm’s total market value measure the value 
of future investments but also the value of the assets in place. By including the market value 
of the firm, the Q ratio implicitly uses the correct risk-adjusted discount rate, imputes 
equilibrium returns, and minimizes distortions due to tax laws and accounting conventions. 
This definition has become an acceptable measure of firm performance or firm value in the 
literature. The Q-theory remains popular because of its intuitive appeal, simplicity and sound 
theoretical underpinnings.  
2.3 Stock Price Crash Risk 
Chen et al. (2001) state that cumulative stock market returns are asymmetrically distributed, 
and that this asymmetry is for the most part negative rather than positive. They argue that 
large movements in the market are usually melt downs rather than melt ups. For a long time, 
traditional financial theory relied heavily on the assumption that equity returns follow a 
normal distribution, however, there is sufficient evidence that this does not hold true in reality 
(Harris and Küçüközmen, 2001). Empirical evidence as far back as Fama (1965) show that 
daily stock returns display significant departures from normality, with a skewed or “fat tail” 
distribution. This is referred to as tail risk, i.e. the risk that an asset price will move more than 
three standard deviations away from the mean. While tail risk refers both to the left and right 
tails, financial analysts and researchers are concerned with the left tail signifying extreme 
downside risk or losses (Harris et al., 2019). This thesis is concerned with the risk of extreme 
loss in equity value of individual stocks.  
Stock Price Crash Risk (SPCR) is defined by Chen et al., (2001) and Kim et al. (2011) as the 
negative skewness in the distribution of individual stock returns. Hong and Stein (2003, pg. 
487) define a stock crash as an “unusually large movement in stock prices that occurs without 
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a correspondingly large public news event” and this movement is negative. Stock price crash 
risk is normally captured through the higher moment of extreme negative stock return as 
variance, skewness and kurtosis (discussed in more detail in Chapter 6). In what follows I 
will review literature on the underlying economic mechanism that these asymmetries reflect.  
The determinants of SPCR vary. One strand of literature focuses on investors and their 
behaviour. Cao et al. (2002) argue that after recent price run-ups, stock returns are negatively 
skewed, causing a large drop in stock prices. They reason that this could be due to 
“information blockage”. They explain that as favourable information is released, informed 
investors will immediately act on this information and engage in active trading. However, 
the sidelined (less informed) investors will not act immediately. As the latter investors start 
to trade, they push prices up. However, this distribution of returns is now a function of past 
information with no additional news. This movement will then have to correct itself causing 
the price to fall. Similarly, Hong and Stein (2003) argue that differences of opinions among 
investors may drive prices down, the opinion of bearish investors may signal private 
information, which would cause other investors to sell. This fall in stock prices is further 
exasperated by short sales (Hutton et al., 2008).  
Another traditional theory on the determinant of stock price crash risk is based on leverage 
effects. While this theory is based on a drop in price, raising operating and financial leverage 
which increases the volatility of subsequent returns, Habib et al. (2018) argue these leverage 
effects are not found to have sufficient quantitative importance to explain the data. They 
argue that, if one were interested in explaining returns asymmetry at a relatively high 
frequency as in daily data, it would be very difficult to link the volatility of a certain day to 
an increase in leverage from the same day.  
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On the other hand, Habib et al. (2018) argue that another determinant of SPCR may stem 
from industry related factors. They reason that the fundamental nature of the stocks and the 
environment they operate in may engender them to higher probabilities of crash risk. For 
example, the collapse in the price of oil in 2014 happened to the whole industry irrespective 
of any individual firm.  Alternatively, stock price crashes may be the result of a stochastic 
bubbles, as the dotcom crisis of 2000, whereby a massive growth in the market was the result 
of excessive market valuation and stock overvaluation, once this bubble burst, stock prices 
start to move towards true fundamental value which causes the market to crash.  Harris et al. 
(2019) argue the importance of considering a component in the tail risk of individual assets 
being a result of systematic or market wide factors. 
2.3.1 SPCR and managerial bad news hoarding 
One of the more prominent theories regarding the determinants of SPCR, is that managers 
tend to withhold bad information, and release it all at once causing the stock to crash (Kim 
et al., 2011). The factors involved in managerial hoarding of negative information are many. 
Jin and Myers (2006) explain managerial bad news hoarding in light of the agency theory. In 
the presence of asymmetric information between managers and external stakeholders, 
managers are better able to hide bad news for an extended period, to protect themselves from 
any negative repercussions. However, once the bad news accumulates, it becomes more 
difficult for managers to continue to hide it and eventually leak all that information out at 
once causing a crash.   
Certain factors such as financial reporting opacity (Francis et al., 2014) accounting 
conservatism (Kim and Zhang, 2016), and tax avoidance (Kim et al., 2011) can exaggerate 
managerial bad news hoarding. The agency theory literature suggests that the reasons 
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managers choose to hoard bad news may arise due to personal managerial incentives, such 
as career concerns, desire to appear successful in front of peers, or equity based incentives 
that entice managers to continue with negative NPV projects to protect their incentive 
packages. Alternatively, managers may manipulate earnings and conceal negative firm-
specific information to avoid paying taxes. These manipulation techniques are designed to 
hide bad news and mislead investors.   
Other research, such as Callen and Fang (2015), argues that religion can effectively curb bad 
news hoarding. They perform their test on different counties in the US with varying degrees 
of religiosity, and find that firms headquartered in counties with higher levels of religiosity 
exhibit significantly lower levels of future SPCR. Further, Cao et al. (2016) argue that social 
norms have a strong influence on human behaviour. Firms that operate in environments 
where there is strong social trust are less likely to experience SPCR. They believe that 
whether the managers themselves are honest or not, if they operate in a high social trust 
environment, they are under pressure to alter their behaviour positively. Thus, rather than 
hoarding bad information, managers will release any bad information as it occurs reducing 
the chances of SPCR.  
The next section will discuss the probability of default risk faced by a firm, which is typically 
affected by the decisions of financial managers. The question to be addressed is how 
decisions made by managers increase or reduce default risk. The key observation here is that 
a firm’s choice of financing should be determined largely by the nature of the cashflows on 
its assets (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). To achieve the goal then, a firm should match its 
financing choices to asset characteristics. As will be discussed in the next section, how a firm 
chooses to finance its assets may increase the probability of default. 
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2.4 Default Risk 
A firm is said to default when it fails to meet its debt or other financial obligations. Default 
probability is the probability that a firm will fail to service its obligations (Moody’s KMV, 
2003). Default risk induces the lender to demand a higher spread from the borrower over the 
risk-free rate of interest. The higher the probability of default, the greater the required spread. 
Thus, required rate of return is an increasing function of probability of default (Vassalou and 
Xing, 2004).  
As default is a result of loss of credit, different approaches are used to define and measure 
credit loss. Among them are the default-model paradigm, where a credit loss arises only if a 
borrower defaults within the planning horizon, and the mark-to-market paradigm, where credit 
deterioration short of default is also incorporated in the definition (Basle, 1999). 
Prominent methods for calculating default risk include external rating services provided by 
organizations such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch, as well as financial statement 
analysis models such as the Altman Z-score and Moody's RiskCalc. Other techniques such as 
the VaR (Value at Risk) model measure the probability of default by measuring expected 
losses over a given period of time at a given tolerance level. In this section, the relative merits 
of the different techniques used to measure default risk are discussed. 
2.4.1 External rating services 
Rating agencies such as Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch, among others, provide a 
forward-looking opinion about the creditworthiness of an obligor and their probability of 
default. In the financial context, an obligor is a bond issuer, debtor, insurer or other party 
who has an obligation to repay back all principal payment plus interest on debt. When setting 
29 
 
their ratings, they consider factors such as environmental conditions, competitive position, 
management quality, and the financial strength of the business. They also take into account 
the currency in which the obligation is denominated. Ratings provide the rating agency’s 
opinion of the obligor’s capacity and willingness to meet its financial commitments as they 
fall due. They may also assess terms such as collateral security and subordination, which 
could affect ultimate payment in the event of default. 
Table 2.1 Rating schemes of the different credit rating agencies 
S&P 
Rating 
Moody’s 
Rating 
Fitch 
Rating 
  
AAA Aaa AAA Highest quality, lowest credit risk 
AA+ Aa1 AA+   
AA Aa2 AA   
AA- Aa3 AA-   
A+ A1 A+   
A- A3 A-   
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+   
BBB Baa2 BBB         Credit quality diminishes as ratings diminish. 
BBB-   Baa3 BBB-   
BB+ Ba1 BB+   
BB- Ba3 BB-   
B+ B1 B+   
B- B3 B-   
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+   
CCC- Caa3 CCC-   
CC Ca CC   
C C C   
D    D Issuer is in default 
  
Table 2.1 provides a mapping of the different ratings provided by the most prominent rating 
agencies. The ratings shown move from the strongest capacity to meet financial 
commitments, through to the highly vulnerable in meeting financial commitments, down to 
firms in default. They provide a relative ranking of one entity (firm) to another such that the 
lower the rating, the greater the probability of default. Rating agencies expressly state that 
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their ratings only provide relative opinions about the creditworthiness of the issuer and cannot 
be used as a guarantee of credit quality (Standard and Poor’s, 2011). They rate the 
creditworthiness of the issuer’s position as a whole, and not on a particular debt issue, using 
the likelihood of default as the single most important driver of the rating. One of the 
advantages of credit ratings is that they are formulated through a comprehensive analysis of 
an entity’s business as well as economic environment risk. Further, ratings are available for 
use by banks and researchers, allowing them to save the time of producing their own credit 
risk model. However, one downside to credit ratings is that they do not fluctuate with market 
conditions.2  
2.4.2 Financial statement analysis models 
Financial statement analysis models are used to calculate the probability of default based on 
the analysis of various financial items and ratios for the individual borrower. In his seminal 
work on credit risk analysis Altman (1968) uses multiple discriminant analyses (MDA) to 
study whether financial ratios could be used to determine whether a firm falls into a 
potentially bankrupt or non-bankrupt category. From an original list of twenty-two ratios 
studied in the literature he finds that profitability, liquidity, and solvency prevail as the most 
significant predictions of bankruptcy. He developed a 𝑍-score that calculates the risk of 
default based on balance sheet risk indices and historical probabilities of default. His 𝑍-score 
reads: 
 𝑍 = 0.012𝑋1 + 0.014𝑋2 + 0.033𝑋3 + 0.006𝑋4 + 0.01𝑋5 (2.3) 
 
2 Allen and Powell (2011) find that even though the impaired assets of Banks in Australia increased fivefold 
over the global financial crisis period, there was a negligible change in the underlying ratings of firm credit risk 
over the same period. 
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Where 
𝑋1 = Current Assets/Total Assets 
𝑋2 = Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
𝑋3  = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets 
𝑋4 = Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities 
𝑋5 = Sales/Total Assets 
𝑋1  is a measure of liquid assets in relation to firm size, i.e. it measures liquidity. Generally, a 
firm experiencing consistent operating losses will suffer falling current assets in relation to 
total assets. It was found that net working capital/total assets was more effective when 
compared to liquidity and quick ratio.   
𝑋2 is a measure of the firm’s leverage. Firms with high 𝑋2 ratios finance their assets through 
the retention of profits and do not utilize as much debt. The retained earnings account reports 
the total amount of reinvested earnings of a firm.  
𝑋3 is a measure of the true productivity of the firm assets, before any tax or leverage factors. 
A firm’s ultimate continuation as a going concern is based on the earnings power of its assets. 
Insolvency, in a bankruptcy sense, occurs when the total liabilities exceed the fair valuation 
of the firm assets, with the value of the firm assets determined by the earnings power of the 
assets.  
𝑋4 is a measure of how much the firm assets may decline in value before the liabilities exceed 
the assets and the firm becomes insolvent.  
𝑋5 is a measure of the sales generating ability of the firm assets.  
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The coefficients in the 𝑍-score are values that were found by Altman as he studied 66 publicly 
held US manufacturing firms with comparable industry size over the period 1946-1965, half 
of which had declared bankruptcy and half of which survived. The results of the study also 
show that 𝑋1 through 𝑋4 are significant at the 1% level, indicating an extremely significant 
distinction in these variables between the two groups. Variable 𝑋5, however, was insignificant 
between the bankrupt and survivor firms.  
Altman finds that all variables have positive weights. Thus, a higher value of the Z-score 
indicates a higher probability of survival and a lower value indicates a higher probability of 
bankruptcy. He divides the 𝑍-score into three zones of discrimination: 
Z > 2.99 is considered “safe zone”  
1.81 < Z < 2.99 is considered “grey zone” and  
Z < 1.81 is considered “distress zone”. 
Altman (2000) later revised his model for non-manufacturing firms, and in emerging markets 
for wider applicability. He removed 𝑋5, reasoning that the effect of asset turnover was unlikely 
to be important in the non-manufacturing industry and arrived at a new 𝑍-score with different 
zones of discrimination.  
Altman et al. (2017) study the performance of the 𝑍-score model for primarily non-financial 
firms from 31 European and 3 non-European countries. Since the accounting legislation and 
practice, creditor rights, investor protection, judicial efficiency, corporate governance, 
bankruptcy protection, insolvency management, and risk taking differ in different markets, it 
is natural to test the international applicability of the bankruptcy prediction model across 
different types of markets. The non-European countries include the US, as this is the country 
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where the Altman model first originated and has the largest market capitalization in the world. 
They also choose China and Colombia, which represent two culturally and institutionally 
different emerging markets. Their results conclude that the Z-score model performs very well 
in an international context. They determine that while the original 𝑍-score performs well in 
an international context it may be beneficial to include a set of additional background variables 
that are specific to each country. They believe that adding country specific estimators will 
help boost the classification accuracy of the model to a much higher level.   
Another financial statement model which predicts the probability of default for private, middle 
market companies, is developed by Moody’s KMV (2002), and modified in 2004. The earlier 
model includes only financial statement variables, while the later model adds further financial 
statement variables as well as industry adjustments, blending market-based information with 
firm specific financial statement information. The list of financial statement ratios includes 
profitability, leverage, debt coverage, growth variables, liquidity, activity ratios, and size, with 
the exact list employed differing from one country to another. The data used is from the Credit 
Research Database, which is a database gathered from portfolios of banks and corporate 
lenders from North America.  
The model assists institutions and investors in determining the risk of default, missed 
payments, and other credit events. It defines default in terms of the following insolvency-
related events: receiverships, winding-up petitions, moratoriums, and liquidations.  
Although the above-mentioned models are the most prominent amongst financial statement 
analysis models, researchers have introduced other variants. The popularity of these financial 
statement models stems from their simplicity and ease of use. In most cases, a researcher 
simply calculates the ratios and plugs the financial statement figures into the model. However, 
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because the variables used in the Altman model and other balance sheet models are designed 
for use in specific industries, the applicability of the model to other industries is questioned. 
The variables used in the Altman model are indiscriminate in the case of financial companies, 
as they depend more on off-balance-sheet items. Thus, they are not recommended for use 
within the financial industry.  
Vassalou and Xing (2004) voice concerns regarding the use of accounts-based (or 
spreadsheet) models in estimating default risk. They point out that accounting models use 
information derived from the financial statements, and as such, they are inherently backward 
looking because those statements report the firm’s past performance rather than its future 
prospects. They contrast accounts-based models to the Merton (1974) model, which uses the 
market value of a firm equity in calculating its default risk, and further estimates the market 
value rather than the book value of debt. Vassalou and Xing justify that since market prices 
reflect investor’s expectations about a firm’s future performance, the Merton model is 
forward-looking, and better suited for calculating the likelihood of default. Further, Vassalou 
and Xing argue that accounting models imply that firms with similar financial ratios should 
have similar likelihoods of default, this is in contrast to the Merton model where firms may 
have similar levels of equity and debt, but have different likelihoods of default, if the 
volatilities of their assets are different. Thus, Vassalou and Xing support the Merton model, 
which implies that the volatility of firm assets provides crucial information about its 
probability of default.  
2.4.3 Structural models 
Structural models as the Merton Model measure changes in default probabilities based on the 
distance to default, which is a combination of asset values, debt, and the standard deviation of 
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asset values. Moody’s KMV (2003) specify three main measures that would determine the 
default probability of a firm: 
(i) Market value of assets: Measured by the present value of the future free cashflows produced 
by the assets. It represents the firm’s future prospects and incorporates relevant information 
about the firm’s industry and the environment economy.  
(ii) Asset risk: The assets value is an uncertain estimate and thus should be understood in the 
context of the firm’s business or asset risk. It measures the firm’s business and industry risk.  
(iii) Leverage: Measures the extent of the firm’s contractual liabilities. It is measured as the 
book value of the firm’s liabilities relative to the market value of its assets.  
When the asset value of a firm lies somewhere between short-term liabilities and total 
liabilities, it is called a point of default. Pareek (2010) highlights the importance of noting that 
in the KMV a firm does not have to default the moment its asset value falls below the face 
value of debt. That is, a firm may not default even if the value of assets has fallen to less than 
the total debt. It is the current cash needs, driven by short-term debt that can cause default. A 
firm may have enough cash to keep paying all liabilities as they come due even if the total 
liabilities are greater than the total assets.  
Moody’s (2003) model essentially follows three steps to determine the default probability of 
a firm:  
(i) estimate the asset value and volatility (these are estimated from the market value and 
volatility of equity) and the book value of debt;  
(ii) calculate the distance to default: calculated using step (i); and  
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(iii) calculate the default probability: determined directly from step (ii) and the default rate for 
given levels of the distance to default.   
Asset risk is measured as asset volatility, i.e. the standard deviation of the annual percentage 
change in the asset value. The greater the volatility of the assets the closer the entity moves to 
default. Asset volatility is magnified by a firm’s leverage. Industries with high asset volatility 
tend to take on less leverage than industries with low asset volatility, thus asset volatility is 
related to the size and nature of the firm’s business.  
The market value of assets, business risk, and leverage can be combined into a single measure 
of default risk. This measure is referred to as the Distance to Default (DD), which compares 
market net worth to the size of a one standard deviation move in the asset value. More 
explicitly, 
 
DD =
(Market Value of Assets) − (Default Point)
(Market Value of Assets)(Asset Volatility)
 
(2.4) 
If the probability distribution of the assets is known, or equivalently, if the default rate for a 
given level of distance to default is known, the default probability can then be computed from 
the distance to default. In this case the default probability would simply be the likelihood that 
the final asset value was below the default point.  
 𝑃𝐷 = 𝑁(−DD) (2.5) 
However, since this is not the case in practice, and assumptions of normal or lognormal 
distributions cannot be used, Moody’s KMV first measures the distance to default (DD), 
which represents the number of standard deviations from default, and then it uses empirical 
data to determine the corresponding default probability.  
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To compute the default probability of a publicly traded firm, there are three key pieces of 
information required: financial ratios, market prices of the firm’s debt and equity, and 
subjective appraisals of the firm’s prospects of risk. Market prices represent the combined 
willingness of many investors to buy and sell, and thus prices embody the synthesized views 
and forecasts of many investors, allowing the model to be inherently forward looking. 
Moody’s KMV (2003) state that the most effective default measurement derives from models 
that utilize both market prices and financial statements. Market prices are thus used in the 
determination of default risk because prices add considerable predictive power to the estimates 
of default risk.  
Equity has limited liability and is the residual claim on assets after meeting all obligations of 
the firm (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1985). Limited liability means that equity holders have the 
right but not the obligation to pay off debt holders and takeover the remaining assets of the 
firm. The option nature of equity can then be exploited to relate the market value of equity 
and book value of debt to determine the implied market value of assets. As the Merton Model 
is the measure of default used in this thesis, the estimation techniques are detailed in Chapter 
7.  
In contrast to other models, structural models have a major strength as they incorporate market 
data as a key component in the model, making it more responsive to changing market 
conditions (Allen and Powell, 2011).  
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter starts out by discussing traditional theories of the main models in this research. 
First, the traditional theories of financial decision making are reviewed, followed by an 
examination of the traditional theories on the causes of stock price crash risk, finally, 
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concluding with traditional theories of causes of firm probability of default. There are two 
main reasons to review the traditional theories. First, this will help in integrating traditional 
models with behavioural models for empirical testing. Further, despite the many theories used 
to explain financial decisions of managers, or the causes of increased firm risk, researchers 
still know relatively little about how firms actually behave (Jahanzeb et al., 2014). There 
remains a gap between theories of how firms should behave, and empirical evidence that 
shows a distortion from expectations. The next chapter will consider a set of behavioural 
factors that may affect the financial decisions of managers.  
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Chapter 3  
Literature Review II: Behavioural Theories of Corporate Finance 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The discussion of Chapter 2 suggests that most traditional theories of corporate finance have 
one thing in common: they assume that skills, expertise and personalities of managers 
themselves do not matter. The theories focus largely on firm and industry factors, while 
ignoring the personalities and biases of the agents who run those firms. However, research 
on the cross-sectional determinants of capital structure, for instance, shows that a large 
amount of variation of actual debt/equity levels remains unexplained after controlling for 
firm and industry level characteristics proposed in the theoretical models. It becomes 
important to consider whether manager personalities, as opposed to market factors, can 
account for these unexplained variations.  
Traditional finance theory assumes that individuals are rational and ignores individual 
decision maker personality. However, behaviourists tend to stress the importance of bounded 
rationality due to cognitive limitations, leading us to the science of Behavioural Finance. 
Behavioural finance is a paradigm where financial markets are studied using models that are 
less narrow and restrictive than those based on the Von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) 
expected utility theory and arbitrage assumptions. The Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
theory shows that under certain axioms of rational behaviour, a decision-maker faced with 
risky (probabilistic) outcomes of different choices will behave as if he is maximizing the 
expected value of some function defined over the potential outcomes at some specified point 
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in the future. Thus, a rational decision maker chooses between risky or uncertain prospects 
by comparing their expected utility values (a sum of utility values of outcomes weighted by 
their respective probabilities). However, this elementary and straightforward decision rule 
does not explain adequately the empirically observed decision-making process.  
Traditional financial theory focuses on the effects of agency problems and information 
asymmetry on investment and financing decisions. Research into behavioural corporate 
finance, however, is still relatively young. Researchers in the study of behavioural corporate 
finance increasingly recognize that the psychological biases that affect investors may also be 
widespread amongst corporate managers. Behavioural finance uses models in which agents 
are considered not to be fully rational, either because of preference or because of mistaken 
beliefs (Ritter, 2003).  
This thesis studies the effect of behavioural biases on the decisions of managers and its effect 
on firm risk. In this respect it deals with behavioural corporate finance, one of the branches 
of behavioural finance. Financial managers acting on behalf of shareholders and investors 
are also economic agents, this topic thus falls under the branch of behavioural economics as 
well. This thesis is thus a hybrid of two recently growing topics of interest, and so the 
assumptions and criticisms of both topics will be tackled in the forthcoming sections. 
This chapter will look at a range of manager and investor biases considered in the literature, 
focusing on the most common managerial biases relevant for this study, justifying the need 
of a more comprehensive favouritional theories of decision making in to depart from trad 
theory  that incorporates behavioural factors. 
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3.2 Departure from Traditional Theories of Finance  
Economics traditionally conceptualizes a world populated by calculating, unemotional 
maximisers labelled “Homo Economicus”. Cartwright (2018) describes Homo Economicus 
as individuals who are rational, calculating and selfish, with unlimited computational 
capacity and never making systematic mistakes.  
One of the earliest critics of unbounded rationality is Simon (1995) describing bounded 
rationality as a more realistic conception of human nature. Simon argues that under the 
standard model of rational choice, a decision maker is assumed to have almost complete, 
clear and voluminous knowledge of his environment. The individual is also assumed to have 
computational abilities that allow him to simultaneously evaluate and choose among 
alternative courses of action the course with the highest attainable point on his preference 
scale. However, Simon emphasizes that under these assumptions, whenever researchers try 
to examine the behaviour of individual actors in more details, problems start to arise. Instead, 
Simon brings forward the idea of bounded rationality.  He states that the ability of the human 
mind to formulate and solve complex problems is very small compared with the size of the 
problems required for objectively rational behaviour in the real world.  
Simon (1995) finds that, in the natural environment, people tend to make quick decisions 
under pressure, and from a small amount of information. To make these quick decisions, 
individuals use mental shortcuts referred to as rules of thumb or heuristics. Decision makers 
will almost always halt their decision process when a satisfactory solution is found, and long 
before all alternatives have been examined. The goal of behavioural finance is to investigate 
behaviourally grounded departures from these assumptions that seem economically relevant 
(Rabin, 2002).  
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Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) argue that people, even when they know what is best, 
sometimes fail to choose it for self-control reasons, as presented by people smoking or 
drinking. While people know that smoking and drinking present a health hazard, they are 
unable to control these unhealthy habits. Mullainathan and Thaler also maintain that people 
are boundedly selfish.  
Upon reviewing the differences in literature between bounded rationality and behavioural 
economics Mallard (2016) finds that although both disciplines are concerned with studying 
the decision-making process at a lower level, their specific focuses are different. Mallard 
finds that works of bounded rationality focus on the wider economic consequences of 
decision-making. Bounded rationality focuses on situations in which the decision maker is 
unable to act according to the standard model of rational choice, due to his limited cognitive 
abilities and the complexity of the decisions he faces. In contrast, research of behavioural 
economics tends to focus on the precise cognitive processes and influences involved in 
decision making, including the nature of people preferences and the way in which their 
decision making can be manipulated. Thus, while the works of bounded rationality are largely 
abstract analysis of theoretical models of decision-making, the works of behavioural 
economics focus on experimentation and an observation of how subjects respond to different 
kinds of information. Mallard (2016) stresses the importance of both works being combined 
to form a unifying framework, which could be used across different situations.  
3.2.1 Modifying unrealistic assumptions 
In this sub-section we will look at some of the unrealistic assumptions made in the field of 
corporate finance. Financial markets have been based on conventional assumptions of 
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rationality of profit maximization and informational efficiency (efficient market hypothesis) 
and use of complex econometric models.  
Traditional corporate finance theory also assumes that both managers and investors act 
rationally, assuming efficient financial markets. According to the Agency Theory, investors 
assume that managers are intentionally self-serving and thus should be provided with 
incentives to bring the interests of managers in line with the shareholders’ interests as 
explained in Chapter 2. However, researchers need to focus more on unintentional value 
reducing decisions that occur due to psychological reasons, to allow such mistakes to be 
avoided through the implementation of management training and education.  
Managers must make several financial and non-financial decisions. The psychological biases 
of managers do not necessarily result in decisions that are consistent with the expected 
preference of investors. The behavioural analysis considers the human element that goes into 
any decision, including the human perception and evaluation of outside situation and events, 
and more importantly, the emotions associated with any financial decision. This relatively 
new field of modern finance emphasizes that the motivations, emotions, and feelings are 
indispensable to any human decision, including financial ones (Mitroi and Oproiu, 2014).  
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) argue that the neoclassical view of corporate decisions assumes 
that top managers are homogeneous and selfless. They argue that this is a "narrow view" 
where managers are regarded as perfect substitutes for one another, and top managers are not 
related to what is going on within a firm.  Executives do differ in their preferences, risk 
aversion or skill levels. However, under the neoclassical assumption, this will not translate 
into actual corporate policies if a person cannot easily affect these policies. Under the 
neoclassical assumption firms within the same industry, facing identical market conditions, 
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and that share similar technologies and processes, should make similar choices, regardless of 
the management team. 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) study managerial fixed effects on corporate policies. Managerial 
fixed effects include variables such as age, gender, education, and cultural background. The 
specific corporate variables they study are related to investment policy (capital expenditures, 
investment to Q sensitivity, investment to cashflow sensitivity and acquisition policy), 
financial policy (financial leverage, interest coverage, cash holdings, and dividend pay-outs), 
organizational strategy (R&D expenditures, advertising expenditures, diversification policy 
and cost cutting policy) and performance.  
They find that there are significant managerial fixed effects in performance that are 
statistically related to some of the fixed effects in corporate practices. Particularly, they find 
that managerial fixed effects are especially important in acquisitions or diversification 
decisions, dividend policy, interest coverage and cost-cutting policy. They are able to link 
differences in behaviour across managers to two main managerial characteristics, namely age 
and degree level, showing that older generations of managers are financially more 
conservative, while managers who are MBA holders follow more aggressive strategies. 
Where managers engaging in a higher amount of external acquisitions and diversification 
also display lower levels of capital expenditures and R&D. Furthermore, managers who have 
high investment to Q fixed effects rank lower in their investment to cashflow sensitivity, 
implying that managers may differ when making their investment decisions.  
Their results indicate that top executives vary considerably in what they refer to as 
"management styles", suggesting a need for a more novel approach in the study of corporate 
financial research. They stress the need to study why managers behave so differently in 
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similar economic conditions, and whether these differences can be related to preferences, 
absolute or relative skill, or opinion. 
Models that allow managers to differ in their preferences, risk aversion, skill levels or 
opinions will allow for differences in corporate practices. Thus far, there are two main 
interpretations as to how these managerial differences translate into corporate choices. The 
first interpretation allows managers to impose their own idiosyncratic style on a company if 
the corporate control is poor or limited. Thus, as internal and external control weakens, there 
is an expected increase in managerial impact. The second interpretation implies that a firm 
purposefully chooses managers because of some specific attributes. Thus, managers do not 
actually impose their idiosyncratic style on the firm. 
3.3 Documented Behavioural Biases  
There are several recorded biases in literature that are found to affect a person’s decisions 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Weinstein, 1980; Odean, 1998; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; 
Moosa and Ramiah, 2017).3 The most popular biases in behavioural finance include, but are 
not limited to:  
• Confirmation bias, which refers to a person’s tendency to pay close attention to 
information that supports his hypotheses or beliefs while ignoring information that 
does not.  
• Anchoring bias, which theorizes that people anchor their decisions on pre-existing 
information or first data points received.  
 
3Most of the biases presented, are discussed hypothetically in relation to crisis periods or public events, but little 
empirical studies have been performed, partly due to the difficulty of measuring the above biases in a corporate 
setting. 
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• Loss aversion bias, which is a person’s inclination to try to avoid losses on the 
grounds that grief from a loss is greater than happiness from an equivalent gain. This 
explains why people sell their gains fast but hold on to their losses for a longer period 
in hopes that the situation may reverse.   
• Availability bias, which refers to people’s likelihood to base their decision on 
information that is widely available, thus over weighing information that is more 
readily available and under weighing information that is not.  
• Representativeness bias, which refers to people using heuristics or mental short cuts 
to arrive at a decision. While this method may be faster, it may also come at the cost 
of making the correct decision. 
• Hindsight bias, which is a person’s belief that they were able to predict an event when 
it occurred. Hindsight bias can lead to an increase in overconfidence and reduce a 
person’s ability to consider the impact and implications of an event subjectively. 
• Panic, which can best be described as a sudden and uncontrollable feeling of fear that 
leads to rushed and unthought of behaviour. Panic can lead to both bubbles and 
crashes. Bubbles are created when there is an uncontrolled amount of buying leading 
to an exaggerated price, while crashes occur when there is collective selling that can 
lead to a crisis. 
• Herd behaviour, which refers to people mimicking the actions of others believing that 
they have superior information than themselves. Herding is typically associated with 
periods of financial crisis, as investors follow the majority view and act accordingly, 
causing both bubble and crash. 
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• Overconfidence and optimism bias, this bias makes people think they are 
invulnerable. They create errors in judgment since they are unrealistic: people believe 
that, compared to the population, negative events are less likely to happen to them 
and positive events are more likely to happen to them.   
The most popular bias tested in a corporate setting is the overconfidence/optimism bias 
(Malmendier and Taylor, 2015), largely due to its intuitive appeal. The next section will focus 
mainly on the overconfidence/ optimism bias, as it the main bias of interest in this thesis.  
3.3.1 Overconfidence and optimism 
Most researchers do not distinguish between overconfidence and optimism and often use the 
terms interchangeably. In the psychology literature, overconfidence has several 
manifestations4: miscalibration, the above-average effect, and the illusion of control. 
Miscalibration is defined as excessive confidence about having precise information (Gervais 
and Odean, 2001, Shefrin, 2005). Miscalibrated decisions means that people tend to 
overestimate the precision of their own forecasts or underestimate the variance of risky 
processes. The above-average effect is defined as the tendency of individuals to believe that 
they are better than their peers within a particular group (Weinstein, 1980). Finally, the 
illusion of control is defined as the tendency of individuals to overestimate their ability to 
control events over which they have limited influence (Langer, 1975). These unrealistic 
biases can affect the decision of financial managers as they are deeply embedded in applied 
work pertaining to risk perception and risk behaviour (Harris and Hahn, 2011).  
 
4 The distinguishing feature between the agency theory and overconfidence bias is that under the agency theory 
managers know what they are doing but do it anyway to reap private benefits, overconfidence however is a 
subconscious bias that skews a manager’s perception of return and risk.  
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Overconfidence is closely related to narcissism.5 Daniel et al. (1998), Benos (1998) and 
Odean (1998) argue that overconfidence may be interpreted as agents overestimating the 
precision of their information, thereby giving greater importance to private information 
versus public information. Skala (2008, p.38) adds, “people tend to have an unrealistically 
positive view of themselves. Most people, when comparing themselves to a group (of co-
students, co-workers, random participants), believe themselves to be superior to an average 
representative of that group in various fields”.  
Overconfidence will lead an agent to believe that they can make an efficient decision with 
minimal time and energy. This may also lead to a systematic overestimation of probabilities 
associated with current events, and a systematic underestimation of the probabilities 
associated with rare and severe events. This bias causes the decision maker to be 
overconfident in their ability to predict a phenomenon and overestimate his/her ability to 
provide an accurate forecast. Overconfidence cannot be explained by the classical norms as 
it represents irrational behaviour, and most economic agents are found to be overconfident, 
causing the rationality of their decision to be either limited or non-existent (Jarboui and 
Boujelbene, 2012). 
Optimism deals with humans tending to have an overly optimistic view of reality, or the 
refusal to believe that objective probability distributions apply to them, and this is often 
referred to as “unrealistic optimism”. Under unrealistic optimism, agents tend to perceive 
their own future as more positive than the average person. Specifically, people rate negative 
(positive) future events as less (more) likely to happen to themselves compared to the average 
 
5 Schrand and Zechman (2012) explain narcissism as an extreme form of overconfidence. They argue that 
narcissism is distinguished with an extreme “self-love” or need for attention that would cause them to put their 
egomaniacal needs and beliefs before the needs and interests of the firm and its shareholders.  
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person, thus limiting the rationality of their decisions, and impeding the placement of 
necessary preventative steps as they underestimate the chance of negative events (Harris and 
Hahn, 2011). This may have a perverse effect on economic decisions, feeding unrealistic 
expectations or causing an inability for a person to realize the risk of loss (Jarboui and 
Boujelbene, 2012). This should call for further development in the role of behaviour in 
decision-making.  
Optimism is sometimes distinguished from overconfidence in that optimism is usually 
modeled as an overestimation of the mean ability or outcome, while overconfidence is 
usually modeled as an underestimation in variance (Baker and Wurgler, 2011). In contrast to 
optimism, overconfidence bias reduces the level of perceived risk or increases the risk-taking 
capacity of the individual. Baker and Wurgler further stress the importance of focusing on 
these particular biases in a managerial setting, as such biases are strong and robust, and are 
often fairly easy to integrate into existing models. 
3.4 Overconfidence Bias and Cultural Dimensions 
This thesis makes a comparison of the impact of managerial overconfidence in the Egyptian 
and UK market. The chosen markets are not only different in stages of development and 
informational efficiency but will also differ in cultural aspects (more on market efficiency 
and political instability in Chapter 3). Moore et al. (2018) maintain that there exists 
differences in overconfidence across populations and cultures, and that these differences may 
be as a result of the costs and benefits created by the specific physical and social 
environments in which the individuals live and interact. This section will discuss how 
managerial overconfidence may be affected by cultural dimensions. 
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Li and Tang (2013) maintain that executive characteristics are subject to social stimuli, and 
thus overconfidence and other hubris may differ regarding social context. The culture in 
which managers work may influence how they behave by providing stimuli to shape their 
thoughts and behaviours.  
Hofstede (1983) defines culture along six dimensions 1) individualism vs. collectivism 2) 
power distance 3) uncertainty avoidance 4) long-term orientation 5) masculinity versus 
femininity 6) indulgence. The most frequently studied cultural dimension in relation to 
overconfidence is individualism vs collectivism. Several authors have found that social 
stimuli play a more important role in a culture that emphasizes individualism vs. collectivism. 
Individualism and collectivism describe ways in which individuals think and behave in 
relation to one another and in relation to their society. Differences between these two groups 
stem from attitudes toward motivation, wants, needs and social status (Antoncyzk and 
Salzmann, 2014). Individualism is associated with an “I-consciousness”, where individual 
goals and rights are stressed. In an individualistic society, people work in autonomy, they set 
personal goals and objects, and are motivated by personal rewards and benefits. In contrast 
collectivism is associated with a group context. Individuals in a collectivist culture are 
motivated by group goals thus the happiness of the group is considered more important than 
the happiness of the self. Individualistic cultures exhibit more optimism/overconfidence than 
collectivist cultures. As persons in an individualist culture are self-dependent, this tends to 
enhance a positive self-view and inflate perceptions of competence. Persons in a collectivist 
culture on the other hand are more self-critical and exhibit more self-discipline. Empirical 
research by Ferris et al. (2013) shows that this holds true even in the field of corporate 
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finance, where CEOs situated in an individualistic society display more overconfidence than 
those in a collectivist.  
Cultural differences and their impact on psychology may also be different due to the 
educational system, the masculinity of the group or the age. Similar to the notion of 
individualism vs. collectivism, cultures where the educational system focuses on analytical 
thinking and analysis are likely to have more overconfident individuals than educational 
systems where viewpoints are challenged much less (Margolin, 2013). Further the level of 
education in a population may affect the amount of overconfidence. A person who is more 
educated and more competent becomes more confident in their abilities and their level of 
perceived accuracy. The empirical results that education increases overconfidence and its 
effect on financial decisions is supported in empirical research as Malmendier and Tate 
(2005) and Ben-David et al. (2006). Gender could also be an important factor of difference 
from one culture to another. In a culture where masculinity is prevalent, overconfidence is 
expected to be more pronounced as men are stereotypically considered to show more 
overconfidence than women. In a study, Barber and Odean (2001), base their measure of 
overconfidence on the trading volume of an individual. They analyse the trading activity of 
male and female investors and find that male investors trade 45% more than women. They 
emphasize that overconfidence in males is particularly more exaggerated in areas of finance. 
Another determinant of cultural differences may be explained by age. Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003) show that older managers are more conservative, while younger managers are more 
confident and take on increased levels of risk. Thus, in a culture dominated by an older 
population of managers we would expect to find decreased overconfidence and risk-taking 
activities than a younger population of managers.  
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3.5 Overconfidence Bias and Corporate Decisions 
Previous research in the area of corporate finance found that managerial overconfidence and 
optimism affects a broad set of corporate decisions as financial and accounting policies, 
capital budgeting, capital structure, and mergers and acquisitions. This section will review 
some of the documented effects of managerial overconfidence on corporate decisions, 
forming a foundation for upcoming hypotheses.  
Theoretical models developed by Hackbarth (2008) distinguish between optimism and 
overconfidence in that they define optimistic managers as overestimating the mean of their 
firms’ cashflows (referred to as growth perception bias) while overconfident managers 
underestimate the volatility of their firms’ future cashflows (referred to as risk perception 
bias). He notes that managers with growth perception bias believe that their firm is more 
profitable than it actually is, and therefore less prone to suffer financial distress. They 
overestimate the profitability of the firm and prefer debt to equity, as they perceive their firm 
equity as severely undervalued. Managers with risk perception bias believe that the volatility 
of the firm cashflow is lower than it actually is and therefore underestimate the expected cost 
of bankruptcy causing them to take on more debt. The author finds that biased managers 
select dynamically higher debt levels leading to costly distortions of capital structures.  
Baker et al. (2004) review the theories, empirical challenges, and evidence pertaining to 
managerial biases and financing decisions. Regarding investment decisions, they find that 
“entrepreneurial start-ups are generally made under a halo of overconfidence and optimism” 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2011, pg. 390). Entrepreneurs think that their start-up is more likely to 
succeed than comparable enterprises, while also underestimating the task of starting up a 
business. The actual performance of start-ups is a lot worse. Only half of all start-ups survive 
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the first 3 years. Further, they find that optimism also appears to influence investment in more 
mature firms. Optimism biases, they find, are strong in project cost forecasts, whereas the 
actual costs are typically more than twice as much as the initial estimates, causing managers 
to overinvest. They establish that optimistic CEOs complete more mergers.   
Barros and Silveira (2007) assert that managerial biases should be ranked among “the 
potential determinants of capital structure”. They find that a wide range of literature is 
dedicated to the empirical investigations of determinants of capital structure, resulting in 
discarding or confirming the relevance of different theoretical approaches and guiding the 
development of new theories. However, none of these works considers any argument based 
on the effect of cognitive biases of managers, although the literature of behavioural theory 
strongly suggests that the degree of optimism and overconfidence of managers can 
significantly influence the debt/equity choice.  
Barros and Silveira (2007) maintain that there is one theoretical result related to capital 
structure decisions that is compatible with all available models and emerges as the central 
prediction in the body of theoretical work. This result establishes that managers who are 
cognitively biased towards optimism and/or overconfidence will choose to issue more debt 
than their rational peers. In accordance with Hackbarth’s (2008) model, this occurs because 
biased managers believe that the firm is less likely to experience financial distress than it 
actually is. The manager will thus underestimate the expected cost of bankruptcy and will 
take on more debt to exploit its tax benefits (or other benefits discussed under the Trade-off 
Theory).   
Hribar and Yang (2010) use popular press characterizations of the CEO as their measure of 
overconfidence. They use the same classification of Malmendier and Tate (2008), classifying 
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a CEO as overconfident if he/she is more frequently described as “confident” and 
“optimistic” relative to descriptors such as “frugal, conservative, cautious, practical, reliable 
or steady”. Hribar and Yang maintain that overconfidence manifests itself either as excessive 
optimism about future firm performance or an underestimate of the variance underlying 
future performance. They provide evidence that overconfident managers issue upwardly 
biased forecasts, and this has two implications. First, overconfident CEOs are more likely to 
miss their own forecasts after controlling for other predictors of ex-post forecast accuracy 
such as accounting flexibility, litigation costs, forecast horizon and growth prospects. 
Second, overconfident managers are associated with the use of aggressive accounting 
policies subsequent to the forecast.    
Similarly, Ahmed and Duellman (2012) argue that managerial overconfidence will affect 
both short term and long-term accounting policies of a firm that may lead to decisions that 
could destroy firm value. They hypothesize that overconfident managers will overestimate 
future returns from their firm projects and hence will be more likely to delay recognition of 
losses and less likely to use conservative accounting policies. They expect overconfident 
managers to use overly optimistic estimates in determining asset values (as inventory, 
receivables or fixed assets) which again will lead to lower levels of accounting conservatism. 
They also expect that overconfident managers will undervalue their liabilities. As an 
overconfident manager will tend to overestimate the probability of the collection of accounts 
receivables, he/she will consequently understate the allowance for bad debts thereby 
overstating net receivables. They study S&P 1500 firms from 1993 to 2009 and find evidence 
of a significant negative relationship between both conditional and unconditional accounting 
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conservatism. Furthermore, they find that changes in managerial overconfidence are 
negatively related to changes in accounting conservatism following a CEO change.   
Cronqvist and Yonker (2012) attempt to explain corporate capital structure based on CEOs 
personal behaviour and debt tolerance through past personal leverage choices. Their study 
focuses primarily on the "Behavioural Consistency Theory" which states that individuals 
behave consistently across situations. This led the researchers to believe that the debt 
tolerance of CEOs should be consistent in the firms they lead as well as in their personal life. 
This allows CEO personal behaviour to, in part, predict the corporate financial behaviour of 
the firms they manage. They choose the financing of the CEOs’ primary homes, as it relates 
to the domain of debt decisions. They view that the purchase of a home is an important 
decision, and the mortgage debt tends to be the most important source of debt, even if not a 
measure of total personal indebtedness.  
Cronqvist and Yonker (2012) regress corporate leverage on personal home leverage and find 
a statistically positive relationship. The more conservative a CEO personal leverage is, the 
more conservative his firm capital structure is. They provided two mechanisms that can 
explain a positive relation between personal and corporate leverage. One mechanism is the 
CEO-firm matching mechanism, whereby firms systematically replace a CEO with one with 
a similar personal debt preference. An alternative mechanism is that CEOs imprint their 
personal preferences on the capital structure of the firms they manage, whether optimal or 
not, this is particularly true for firms with weaker corporate governance. Either way, there is 
an ideal matching where CEOs who are willing to bear more financial risk match better with 
firms for which more financial leverage is optimal.   
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Malmendier et al. (2012) study and differentiate the effect of overconfidence on the decisions 
of two most prominent managerial positions: CEO and CFO.  They use overconfidence and 
optimism interchangeably as they define overconfidence as people who are likely to be 
“optimistic” about the outcomes they can control. They expect that overconfident managers 
will overestimate the outcomes of the decisions under their control. They combine several 
data sources on option holding to construct a panel of 1,156 firms from the S&P 1500 index 
from 1996 to 2010 and use it to test the impact of CEO and CFO overconfidence on both 
financing and non-financing decisions such as investments, acquisitions, and innovations.  
They find that overconfident CEOs and CFOs are significantly more likely to issue debt when 
accessing external capital market than their non-overconfident peers. However, they find that 
only overconfident CFOs use significantly more debt financing when the financial deficit of 
the firm is high. Likewise, overconfident CFOs are significantly less likely to issue equity 
when using external capital and use less equity financing to cover their financial deficits. 
Both decisions do not hold true for overconfident CEOs. Furthermore, they find that 
overconfident CEOs significantly increase investment cashflow sensitivity and cashflow and 
R&D expenditure. Overconfident CEOs in firms with abundant cash or low book leverage 
were also found to spend significantly more on acquisitions, which does not hold true for 
overconfident CFOs.  Further, they find that the most debt conservative overconfident CEOs 
are also equity-conservative, i.e. they are least likely to issue equity. Moreover, they do not 
substitute equity for debt, confirming their preference to avoid public markets. Malmendier 
and Tate (2008) further find that since overconfident CEOs over-estimate their ability to 
generate returns, they overpay for target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers. 
This effect is found to be particularly strongest if a firm has access to internal financing.  
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Graham et al. (2013) use a new form of psychometric personality tests to provide new insight 
into the CEOs characteristics and the processes behind the corporate decisions. Their survey-
based approach is used to gauge risk-aversion and measure other behavioural phenomena 
and relate them to firm-level policies such as leverage policy, debt maturity, and acquisition 
activity. They administer these surveys to CEOs and CFOs of private and public firms, in the 
US and outside, to identify whether there will be a significant difference in attitudes. Their 
results show that the personality traits of executives, as optimism and risk aversion, are 
significantly related to corporate financial policies. For example, they find that CEOs who 
are more risk tolerant initiate more mergers and acquisitions, and CEOs who are optimistic 
use more short-term debt than their less optimistic counterparts. They also find evidence that 
male CEOs are more likely to have higher debt ratios, specifically short-term debt ratios, than 
their female correspondents. Furthermore, CEO's with past experience in 
financing/accounting use significantly more total debt. They also relate firm traits to CEO 
traits, finding that firms with high historical or future growth rates are more likely to be run 
by risk tolerant CEOs. These CEOs are likely to be younger, and more likely to be taller than 
average, suggesting a higher level of overconfidence. 
Although the findings of Graham et al. (2013) prove a significant relationship between CEO 
characteristics and company characteristics, they cannot determine the direction of causality. 
For example, they find that risk tolerant CEOs are more likely to be found in growth firms. 
They are not able to determine whether managers self-select into growth companies, or 
whether companies hire managers with the "right personality", that is, a firm becomes a 
growth firm as a result of hiring a risk tolerant manager. 
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In this section, a portion of documented effects of managerial overconfidence on corporate 
decisions was discussed, this will be used with additional literature to form the hypotheses in 
the next three subsections.  
3.5.1 Overconfidence, source of funds and investment 
Chen and Lin (2013) find that a firm with a highly optimistic CEO will invest more than 
firms whose CEOs have lower levels of optimism. Further, they find that an under-invested 
firm with an optimistic CEO improves the firm’s investment efficiency by reducing the 
amount of underinvestment, thereby increasing the value of the firm. However, they were 
unable to find evidence for the alternate scenario, i.e. for an over-invested firm, CEOs with 
a lower level of managerial optimism do not appear to effectively improve the firm’s 
investment efficiency and increase firm value by reducing the value of overinvestment. 
Finally, they find that overconfident CEOs in financially constrained firms are still willing 
to increase their capital expenditure, leading to an increase in firm value.  
Campbell et al. (2011) use a theoretical model to show that a moderate level of optimism 
causes a CEO to invest at the first best level (investment level that maximizes firm value). 
While optimism levels below (above) the interior value-maximizing level of optimism lead 
the CEO to underinvest (overinvest), thus proving that firm value is concave in CEO 
optimism. Concluding that if the board wants to maximize firm-value they should observe 
CEO optimism prior to hiring or correct their mistakes later through firing decisions. They 
further empirically prove that both low-optimism CEOs and high-optimism CEOs do not 
maximize firm value and are thus subject to higher forced turnover.  
Thus, while some research finds that overconfident managers will tend to overinvest (whether 
this investment is beneficial to firm value or not) a large body of literature links this over or 
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under investment levels of overconfident managers to a firm’s current capital structure and 
to the source of funding available.  
Heaton (2002) adopts a behavioural approach in simple corporate finance models and 
examines its implications in the free cashflow debate. He contends that managerial optimism 
leads managers to believe that an efficient capital market undervalues their firm securities, 
leading optimistic managers to prefer internal funds.  On the other hand, optimistic managers 
dependent on external finance may sometimes also decline projects with positive net present 
value, as they believe that the cost of external finance is simply too high. Optimistic managers 
will want to undertake more projects. However, this investment is highly dependent on the 
source of funding where more optimistic managers are the less likely to invest if they are 
forced to finance these projects externally. This underinvestment will be more costly to 
shareholders.  
Thus, free cashflow can be valuable. It can prevent social losses from under-investment, 
where biased managers would have otherwise normally declined a positive net present value 
project because of an incorrect perception of high external financing cost. Conversely, 
managerial optimism causes systematically upward biased cashflow forecasts and causes 
managers to overvalue a firm investment opportunity. In this case, free cashflow may be 
harmful as it alleviates the need to obtain external financing and makes it easier to take 
negative net present value projects mistakenly perceived to be positive net present value 
projects. Managerial optimism theory thus links the benefits and costs of free cashflow to 
two variables, the level of managerial optimism and the investment opportunities available 
to the firm. Heaton concludes that whether savings in preventing bad investment outweighs 
the social cost of underinvestment will likely vary by firm. He argues that if all managers are 
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optimistic and markets are efficient, then shareholders may prefer large amounts of free 
cashflow to be retained by firms with good investment opportunities.  
Overconfidence, thus, can be defined as the overestimation of the quality and precision of 
information available to the individual, and the underestimation of the volatility of the 
processes involving uncertainty.  The model offered by Heaton (2002), described above, is 
in line with the Pecking Order Theory, where optimistic managers believe that the projects 
available to their firms will have higher expected returns than will be true. They thus believe 
that the securities issued by the firm, whether bonds or stocks are systematically undervalued 
by outside investors. As stocks are the securities most subject to the perceived 
undervaluation, consequently, the firm will prefer to fund its investment projects with 
internally generated resources followed by issuing debt security, leaving the issuance of 
stocks only as a last resort. Thus, this type of model predicts that the pecking order type of 
behaviour will be more pronounced with more optimistic managers.  
Malmendier and Tate (2005) findings also uphold the Pecking Order Theory, where they 
relate measures of overconfidence and formative past experiences to corporate financial 
policies. They measure overconfidence using data on CEO option holding. They consider 
CEOs who hold non-tradable in the money executive stock options until expiration rather 
than exercise them after the vesting period. This delay in exercise does not yield abnormal 
returns over a simple strategy of exercising and diversifying. They thus interpret this delay 
as the CEO overestimating the mean of their firms' future cashflows. They supplement their 
data with personal information about the CEOs’ educational background and employment 
history. 
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Malmendier and Tate (2005) first use a theoretical model6 to show that overconfident CEOs 
are likely to increase their investment levels with the availability of internal cashflow 
(retained earnings). Conditional on accessing external funding they will prefer to raise more 
debt. Such CEOs are significantly less likely to issue equity, as they believe (incorrectly) that 
the public underestimates the present value of their investment returns, thus if they issue 
shares, they will be diluting the claims of current shareholders. This proves that overconfident 
managers view external financing as unjustifiably costly and prefer to use cash or riskless 
debt. In their empirical model, they regress investment level against cashflow, managerial 
overconfidence, and an interaction term of cashflow with managerial overconfidence. Their 
results show that the interaction term is statistically significant and positive. They conclude 
that overconfident CEOs have a heightened sensitivity of corporate investment to cashflow, 
and this is particularly true among equity dependent firms.  
Following the above discussion, it can be deduced that investment levels of overconfident 
managers are largely dependent on the source of funding available. Overconfident managers 
will overestimate the returns to their investment projects, which would normally lead them 
to overinvest. However, they view external funds, particularly share issues, as costly as shares 
are undervalued by the public. Thus, overconfident CEOs will overinvest if they have 
sufficient internal funds or access to riskless financing, i.e. untapped sources of debt. An 
overconfident CEO, however, does not necessarily overinvest, and may even underinvest if 
internal or riskless financing is insufficient for the desired investment. This is because 
overconfidence also implies a misperception of the cost of external financing. Thus, the 
 
6 The theoretical model developed by Heaton (2002), Baker and Wurgler (2013) and Malmendier and Tate 
(2005) is provided in appendix A3A. 
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degree of investment will depend on the availability of financing and its perceived value. 
Based on this argument the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H1: managerial overconfidence increases investment decision sensitivity to cashflow. 
3.5.2 Overconfidence and stock price crash risk 
The previous section discussed the effect of overconfidence bias on firm investment level. 
This section will consider the effect of overconfidence on Stock Price Crash Risk. Section 
2.3 discussed bad news hoarding as one of the most prominent determinant of SPCR. While 
the aforementioned section discussed several reasons for bad news hoarding including 
managers trying to avoid taxes or to reap private benefits, this section argues that managerial 
overconfidence may be one of the reasons managers choose to hoard bad news. 
 In the only paper that studies the relationship between SPCR and managerial 
overconfidence, Kim et al. (2016) argue that there should be a positive relationship between 
SPCR and managerial overconfidence. They stress that their argument is different to the 
rational agency problem, where managers are empire builders and choose to hoard bad news 
for private benefits. Instead, they build their argument on two main facets, the better than 
average effect and the interpretation bias. The better than average effect means that 
overconfident managers overestimate their capabilities, they are very optimistic regarding 
the returns on their projects, and they underestimate the risk involved. Interpretation bias 
means that overconfident managers perceive negative feedback as uninformative or 
inaccurate and are likely to ignore negative signals regarding their investments and stick only 
to the positive signals. In fact, this interpretation bias is likely to increase post decision, as a 
manager subconsciously tries to defend the investment choice made. Thus, even when the 
returns on current investment projects seems modest, they will ignore any negative signals. 
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They will hold from informing the public about this news and will persevere with their 
negative NPV projects all the while overestimating their ability to change the current 
situation into a more favourable one. When faced with the inevitable loss of their project, 
they leak this information at once creating a SPCR. Unlike the moral hazard problem, 
overconfident managers’ interests are perfectly aligned with outside investors, they are not 
trying to reap private benefits but believe that they are acting in the best interest of 
shareholders.  
Kim et al. (2016) study the constituent companies of the S&P 1500 between 1993 and 2010 
and find a strong positive relationship between CEO overconfidence and stock price crash 
risk. Further, they find that this relationship changes with CEO turnover and changes in 
overconfidence, and that the impact of CEO overconfidence on crash risk is less pronounced 
for firms with stronger and more conservative accounting. Finally, they find that differences 
of opinions between investors are likely to exacerbate the effect of overconfident CEOs. They 
explain this as overconfident CEOs being less likely to listen to signals from investors if they 
are not providing a united front. 
Based on the above argument this thesis seeks to complement the work of Kim et al. (2016) 
and propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: there is a positive relationship between the level of managerial overconfidence and SPCR.  
3.5.3 Overconfidence and default risk  
Milidonis and Stathopoulos (2014) argue that risk-averse CEOs, faced with increased career 
concerns, will proactively reduce risk, even in the presence of strong-risk taking incentives. 
They further hypothesize that this should be particularly true for firms that are highly levered 
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and firms with high default probability. They test their hypothesis using all firms covered in 
the Standard & Poor ExecuComp database for the period 1992-2005. They group their firms 
into firms with high probability vs. low probability of default (against the industry average) 
and use it to study the effect of managerial risk aversion against the distance to default. Their 
results show a negative and highly significant relationship between managerial risk aversion 
and firm risk in firms with high probability of default. Where a one standard deviation 
increase in vega (their measure of risk aversion) is associated with a reduction in total firm 
risk by 1.5%. They find no relationship between vega and firms with low probability of 
default. They conclude that CEOs operating in firms with high probability of default can 
reduce firm-specific risk, even when the firms’ shareholders increase the CEOs’ risk-taking 
incentives.  
I argue that the opposite should hold true for overconfident managers. Overconfident 
managers with an inflated sense of narcissism, will underestimate bankruptcy costs, ignore 
negative signals and take financial decisions that increase corporate risk. This should hold 
true even for firms with increased external or systematic risk, as with the state of political 
instability in Egypt7. In fact Adam et al. (2015) using a sample of 92 gold mining firms in 
North America included in the Gold and Silver Hedge Outlook (a quarterly survey of 
derivatives activities) conducted from 1989 to 1999, find that managerial overconfidence 
leads managers to increase their level of speculative activities using derivatives following a 
speculative gain, but do not similarly reduce their speculative activities following speculative 
losses.   
 
7 The exact dates and events that occurred in Egypt are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
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Ben-David et al. (2010) use surveys that require CFOs to predict one year of ten stock returns, 
as well as the tenth and ninetieth percentiles of the distribution of market returns of the 
S&P500, to test for overconfidence. They label a CFO as overconfident if his prediction of 
the confidence interval for the probability distribution of stock returns is too narrow. They 
find that CFOs are on average severely miscalibrated, with only 40% of stock market 
realizations falling within the 80% confidence intervals provided by company executives. 
Further, they find that confidence intervals are wider in periods of high market-wide 
uncertainty, but over these periods, CFOs are even more miscalibrated. They argue that 
miscalibration depends on personal traits (skills) in addition to company characteristics. They 
find evidence that CFO over-precision appears to be related to corporate decision-making, 
investing more, and engaging in more acquisitions. They also find modest evidence that firms 
with miscalibrated executives have on average higher debt leverage, rely more on long-term 
debt, and pay fewer dividends. Miscalibrated executives repurchase more shares after a 
decline in share price but issue fewer shares following price run-ups. Finally, the authors find 
that executive compensation in firms with overconfident CFOs is performance-based. 
The empirical results of Skala (2010), show that the influence of increased risk taking, driven 
by overconfidence, may be positive in the short-term, but is likely to be negative in the long-
term. Overconfidence may result in bank managers taking greater risk because they 
overestimate their future performance and believe they will be able to cope with future risk 
better than peers. They may also wrongly assume that they are capable of controlling external 
events and are inclined to see the future as unrealistically bright. Expected losses take more 
time to materialize, thus the adverse consequences of their decisions will likely appear in 
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future performance. This is because overconfidence is likely to generate profits in the short-
term but is likely to adversely affect the future performance of firms. 
Other authors, such as Baker et al. (2004), Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Campbell et 
al. (2011) Kim et al. (2016) find that managerial optimism and overconfidence lead a 
manager to overestimate the returns on their investment projects. A manager who hand-picks 
an investment is more likely to believe that he can control its outcome and is also more likely 
to underestimate the likelihood of failure (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). Overconfidence will 
lead a manager to invest free cashflows more rapidly, initiate more mergers, invest in more 
novel projects, stick with an unprofitable investment policy for too long (Gervais, 2009) and 
use less conservative accounting. This is because overconfident/optimistic managers will 
tend to overestimate project cashflows.  If there are no corporate governance mechanisms to 
control managerial bias, such managers will overvalue their own projects, overinvest, invest 
earlier than their rational counterparts, and may even invest in projects with negative NPV 
(Oran, 2013). In fact, Goel and Thakor (2008) theorize that governance boards favour an 
overconfident manager as managers choose riskier projects making them are likely to be 
promoted than rational managers. They argue that merit-based promotions make an 
overconfident manager more likely to be appointed as CEO as said manager has the highest 
perceived ability. They further stress that a moderate degree of overconfidence may actually 
be beneficial to shareholders, however, it is exaggerated overconfidence that will lead 
managers to make value destroying investments.   
The above findings lead us to confer that as overconfident managers take on increasingly 
risky decisions, there should exist a relationship between managerial overconfidence and 
total firm risk as measured by the risk of default. Following the logic of Milidonis and 
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Stathopoulos (2014), I hypothesize that overconfident managers will not work towards 
proactively reducing firm risk, rather they take on decisions all the while underestimating the 
risk of bankruptcy. An overconfident manager believes that he/she is working in the best 
interest of shareholders, and thus is not trying to reap private benefits based on career 
concerns, they are simply skewed in their view of projected returns and risk. This means that 
overconfident managers are more likely to increase total firm risk regardless of the 
managerial incentives. I thus hypothesize that the relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and default risk is likely to be positive, and thus propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and probability of 
default. 
It may be necessary to point out that while H1and H2 are taken from existing models and 
applied to the Egyptian and UK markets for meaningful comparisons. To my knowledge, H3 
is a novel hypothesis that has not been studied before.  
3.6 Conclusion 
Traditional theories and determinants of financial decisions related to capital structure and 
firm investment level, stock price crash risk, and the degree of default risk were discussed in 
the previous chapter. As these theories were built on strict assumptions that may not hold 
true in reality and were found not to fully explain the variation in models, other determinants 
had to be considered. This chapter focused on the departure from the traditional determinants 
of financial decisions, incorporating behavioural determinants into the managerial decision-
making process. It focused on the two most prevalent documented biases, overconfidence, 
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and optimism, and reviewed findings in the literature regarding how these biases affect 
managerial financial decisions and firm risk. The main conclusions found are that 
overconfident CEOs are more likely to: miss their own forecasts; overestimate return while 
underestimating risk, use aggressive accounting; and hoard bad news. Overconfident 
managers also tend to overinvest, invest cashflows more rapidly and initiate more mergers 
and acquisitions. Finally, conditional on the level of access to the external markets, 
overconfident managers tend to use more debt financing as they view their firms shares as 
undervalued by the public. 
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Chapter 4  
Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the main methodological concepts that will be used to test the 
behavioural model. Specifically focusing on the overconfidence/optimism bias. Barros and 
Silveira (2007) state that while optimism and overconfidence may be treated separately for 
analytical purposes, psychological and behavioural research reveals that these biases are 
closely related and thus do not need separate proxies to distinguish between them. As such 
this study will not differentiate between the two metrics.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides justification for 
choosing the Egyptian market as the primary market for model validation. However, the UK 
market is also included in this study for comparative purposes. Section 4.3 provides a 
conceptual model of the study and re-states the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3.  The main 
method of model estimation, namely panel regression, is summarized in Section 4.4. Section 
4.5 provide details about the data used in the study. Finally, Section 4.6 discusses the proxies 
used to measure overconfidence. 
4.2 Behavioural Finance in Catastrophic Events 
This study is based particularly on firms within the Egyptian market as a case study. In this 
section I justify the choice of the Egyptian market as the primary market of interest in my 
thesis.  
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Long before behavioural economics and finance were formed, Keynes (1936) highlighted the 
role of psychology in economics. He maintains that sentiment reflected in unrealistic 
optimism or pessimism leads to booms and busts. He noticed that securities often diverge 
from their intrinsic values, and explored the implications of such divergence for employment, 
income, and money.  
Barberis (2011) argues that the greatest contributing factor to financial crises is excessive 
risk taking due to biased beliefs. A financial crisis is normally discussed in terms of the real 
estate “bubble” where, due to irrational thinking, real estate prices are pushed to 
unsustainably high levels. Barberis (2011) defines a bubble as an episode in which irrational 
thinking or friction causes an asset price to rise to a level higher than it would otherwise be. 
He further explains that this price level is such that a rational observer, armed with the 
necessary information, would forecast a low long-term return on the asset. Barberis (2011) 
argues that even though traders on mortgage desks are vaguely aware that their business 
model may entail serious risks, they manipulate their beliefs by deluding themselves that 
their business models were not risky but worth pursuing. This self-manipulation could be 
explained in terms of the several biases discussed in Section 3.3, among which is the 
overconfidence bias. Yu (2014) supports this view and explains the financial crisis of 2008 
in the wake of CEOs overconfidence and earnings manipulation. Recent studies have taken 
a behavioural approach to analyse the global crisis of 2008, which can be conceptualized as 
a series of catastrophic events. Such studies aim to acquire a better understanding of what 
must be changed in the society’s economic thinking whether in principle or approach in order 
to avoid similar scenarios in the future.   
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While most studies focus on the effects of overconfidence leading up to the financial crisis 
period, the empirical literature on whether those biases continued during the crisis period is 
limited. Eisenbach and Schmalz (2018) argue that decision makers bias is heightened during 
times of volatility. They maintain specifically that people with access to the best information 
about risk level and those who make decisions are systematically the most biased. They use 
a theoretical economic model to show that agents will especially be biased during times when 
risks are high. Their model describes overconfidence resulting from the choice to ignore risk 
signals. They theorise that this heightened risk taken by decision makers at times of volatility 
is due to the fact that an agent’s beliefs are driven by personal prejudice rather than by the 
reality of the situation. They refer to this as an intra-personal manipulation game, where 
agents try to convince their later selves that risk levels are lower than they are. Furthermore, 
self-incentives will result in the agents choosing to forget any additional information about 
risk.  
Perhaps this increase in overconfidence during periods of increased volatility can be 
explained by the illusion of control. As explained in Section 3.3, the illusion of control refers 
to people tending to believe that they are in control or at least can influence an event that is 
uncontrollable. The illusion of control will lead people to ignore external clues received when 
things are less under their control than they believe (Moosa and Ramiah, 2017).  
4.2.1 Behavioural finance in emerging markets 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) has been, for a long time, central to finance. The term 
efficiency is used to describe a market where all relevant information is reflected in the price 
of financial assets (Shiller, 2003). Malkiel (2013) interprets the EMH as a consequence of 
the random walk theory. He explains that, as, by definition, news is unpredictable; price 
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changes must also be unpredictable and random. Therefore, prices will fully reflect all known 
information, and even uninformed investors holding a diversified portfolio will obtain a rate 
of return as generous as that achieved by experts. The random walk theory provides that an 
efficient market that trades on available information will fail to provide abnormal profits.  A 
market will thus be deemed efficient only if we can posit a model for returns.    
The EMH argues that there could not be abnormal returns, as competition among investors 
seeking abnormal profits should drive prices up to their correct value. Although the EMH 
does not assume all investors are rational, it assumes that markets are rational. The EMH also 
assumes that markets make unbiased future forecasts. However, the EMH is often unable to 
explain the excess volatility present in the market. Shiller (2003) argues that excess volatility 
may sometimes be better explained by “sunspots” or “animal spirits” or mass psychology 
rather than fundamental reasons. In contrast, behavioural finance assumes that in some 
circumstances financial markets are informationally inefficient and its participants are not 
always rational (Ritter, 2003). Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) also conclude that in a world 
with costly information, it is impossible for markets to be informationally efficient.  
Thus, the less the availability of information in a market, the greater the inefficiency is. Since 
lack of information is caused in part by behavioural factors, it becomes necessary to 
incorporate such factors when studying inefficient markets. In their description of the 
Egyptian Stock Exchange (ESE),8  Mauro and Sourial (1999, p.48) emphasize that “ESE 
stock returns are characterized by a distribution departing from the normal one, and by 
volatility that tends to change over time and be serially correlated … in turn implying the 
existence of deviations from market efficiency in the price of equities”. This suggests that 
 
8 Currently abbreviated EGX. 
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the Egyptian market is highly susceptible to behavioural factors. 
Furthermore, most of the finance and economic behavioural models to study the decision 
making of investors, economic agents, or financial managers are based largely in the US and 
other developed countries. Such research focuses fundamentally on what we understand 
about the US investor/agent and how they make their decisions. However, the US has a 
developed economy, and the findings there are likely to be both psychologically and 
culturally inappropriate for exact interpretation on emerging markets such as the ESE. 
4.2.2 Political turmoil in Egypt 
Vasile et al. (2011) argue that studying any crisis from a behavioural perspective allows us 
to understand how human psychology drives the financial actors’ decisions. They note that 
success can be systematically compromised when anxiety, emotional pain, and other 
behavioural biases interfere with judgments and decisions about risk and reward.  
Egypt has recently endured major political changes, starting with the removal of President 
Husni Mubarak in January 2011, to the presidential elections in June 2012, when Mohamed 
Morsi was elected President, to his removal from office in July 2013, and the election of 
current President El Sisi in June 2014. During this period the country suffered significant 
public disorder, sometimes involving bloodshed, putting severe stress on the economic and 
financial stability of the country and giving rise to behavioural and psychological impacts on 
decision makers as they struggled to understand, cope with and anticipate the implications of 
these political changes. The country also suffered from severe devaluation of the EGP in 
November 2016. While this may not be considered a crisis in the sense of political turmoil it 
still put a severe strain on the economy and may have affected managerial perception.  
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The crisis of 2008 and the turmoil in Egypt are similar in that they constitute a series of 
catastrophic events. Motivated by this similarity, this thesis investigates how the behavioural 
aspect, overconfidence/optimism (see Chapter 3), affected the managers decision-making 
during the period of Egyptian upheaval from 2011 to 2017, which I also posit can lead to an 
increase in default risk. 
4.3 A Conceptual model for the study 
The Egyptian turmoil of 2011 is a crisis that resembles the financial crisis of 2007-2008 in 
that there was severe instability and panic of big financial corporations collapsing. It stands 
to reason that all the psychological effects apply to the turmoil situation. As it was just 
discussed, most of the analysis that was done to study the financial crisis consider over 
confidence/optimism as the primary bias of interest. In particular, an overconfident individual 
remains overconfident even in a state of turmoil since uncertainty or volatility becomes 
heightened. In fact, as provided by Ben-David et al. (2013) and Eisenbach and Schmalz 
(2018) overconfidence becomes more pronounced during times of increased uncertainty or 
volatility having various effects on a firm.  
Other biases in relation to the crisis period were also studied, such as herding, loss aversion, 
and panic. However, most of these managerial biases were discussed in a theoretical setting 
with little to no proxies provided for empirical testing (Malmendier and Taylor, 2015). The 
empirical testing of investor bias is a lot more widespread. The most popular method for 
measuring other biases in the literature is through the distribution of questionnaires or 
conducting interviews over an extended period. This method, however, is unsuitable for this 
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research, as questionnaires and interviews should have been performed during the 
catastrophic events to measure the effects of volatility on managerial biases as in Ben-David 
et al. (2013). Shortcomings of the use of questionnaires in this research is discussed in more 
detail in section 4.5.1. Overconfidence/optimism remains the most widely tested bias in a 
corporate setting (Fairchild, 2005). Malmendier and Taylor (2015) explain that this is 
because overconfidence is the most damaging of all biases that can affect any decision maker.  
The crucial financial and investment decisions of a firm are made by its top managers 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 2008). Thus, firm financial decisions biases are in reality the 
biases of its managers. Chapter 3 discussed the implications of managerial overconfidence 
on corporate financial decisions found in the literature. Some of the implications that stem 
from being overly optimistic about the future, and an illusion of control, means that an 
overconfident manager overestimates return, underestimates volatility, and even when 
presented with negative feedback will ignore negative signals. This causes them to overinvest 
when there is an abundance of internal cashflow (retained earnings) or riskless debt, continue 
in negative NPV projects believing that circumstances will get better, initiate more mergers 
and acquisitions that are sometimes damaging to the firm, and hoard bad news.  
The principal hypothesis of behavioural finance is that there may be irrational biases that 
affect the decision making process of managers and, in turn, affect the decisions and value 
of a firm as measured by: i. a manager’s decision to invest and the sensitivity  of that bias to 
the availability of cashflow, ii. stock price crash risk, iii. and default risk. The latter measures 
are conceptualized as dependent variables, which are affected by managerial overconfidence 
(the primary independent variable). Additionally, a set of idiosyncratic and systematic control 
variables should also be considered, to test for the effect of the aforementioned variables net 
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the effect of any outside factors. Finally, it is intended that this behavioural model will be 
integrated in other traditional non-behavioural models to study firm risk during catastrophic 
events in particular. 
Based on this discussion and the literature review in Chapters 3, this thesis uses a behavioural 
model to test the following hypotheses: 
H1: managerial overconfidence increases investment decision sensitivity to cashflow. 
H2: there is a positive relationship between the level of managerial overconfidence and SPCR.  
H3: There is a positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and probability of 
default.  
The thesis introduces those biases on all listed firms in the Egyptian and the UK Market.  
4.4 Data Estimation Techniques 
The models are estimated through regression analysis. Regression analysis is a statistical 
technique in which a possible relationship between a dependent variable and one or more 
independent variables is sought. The establishment of such a relationship can then be used to 
predict values of the dependent variable corresponding to given values of the independent 
variables. Thus, the objective of regression analysis is both scientific description and 
prediction (Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011). Under regression analysis there are different estimation 
techniques, in the following sections I will discuss the techniques relevant to this study. 
4.4.1 Panel data analysis 
To test the hypotheses outlined above, panel data analysis techniques are adopted. Panel data 
allow for the analysis of a number of firms over time, providing multiple observations on 
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each firm in the sample. One of the major advantages of panel data is that it is two 
dimensional (cross-sectional and longitudinal). It employs a large number of data points, 
thereby increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing collinearity among explanatory 
variables (Hsiao, 2003). Furthermore, by allowing time or firm specific effects in the 
specification of panel data, the bias resulting from omitted variables is reduced through 
differencing. Panel data can either be balanced or unbalanced. Unbalanced data is actually 
very common in general. Given the nature of the data, I expect to have an unbalanced data 
model as it is extracted from financial statements and trading activity. Reasons for missing 
data include later entry into the stock market, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy among 
others.  However, the degree of imbalance should have little impact on estimation accuracy 
for most methods of panel regression (Flannery and Hankins, 2013).  
The two main panel data analysis models, namely fixed effects and random effects models, 
will be discussed briefly in the next two subsections, stating the advantages and 
disadvantages of each model.  
As for notation, the subscript 𝑖 is used to indicate a firm index, the subscript 𝑡 to indicate a 
time step or instant, the letter 𝑥 to refer to explanatory, or independent vector variables, the 
letter 𝑦 to indicate a dependent variable, the letter 𝑢 to indicate random market effects, the 
parameter 𝛼 to gather all effects not explainable by the independent variables and the 
parameter 𝛽 to indicate the weight of contribution of the independent variable in explaining 
the outcome.  The number of firms being studied is denoted by 𝑛 while the number of time 
steps is denoted by 𝑇. For clarity of discussion, we assume here that we have balanced data. 
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4.4.1.1 Fixed Effects Model (FE) 
The fixed effects model captures all variables that vary across firms but remain constant 
across time, thus allowing for heterogeneity across firms by including a different intercept 𝛼𝑖 
for each firm. The regression model under the FE model is given by:  
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽1 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, (4.1) 
where 𝛽0 is the firm specific intercept, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of explanatory variables and 𝛽1 is a 
parameter vector, 𝛾𝑖
′ is a vector of time invariant unobserved heterogeneities across firms.  
There are several methods for parameter estimation in the literature, either using OLS of the 
dummy regression model, or OLS using firm demeaned data: 
1. The least squares dummy variable (LSDV). Two main methods of LSDV are used in the 
literature:  
a. The first method adds a dummy variable (usually binary) equivalent to the number 
of firms, for all time invariant variables i.e., variables that change across firms but 
remain constant over time. More explicitly, the data model (4.1) and individual level 
model takes the form 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽1 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0𝑖𝑘 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽1 + 𝐸𝑖𝛾𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 , 
where 
𝐸𝑖 = 𝑖𝑘, 
while the full model takes the form 
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 𝑦 = 𝛽0𝑖𝑘𝑛 + 𝑋𝛽1 + 𝐸γ + 𝑢, (4.4) 
where 
𝑬 = blockdiag(𝑬𝟏, 𝑬𝟐, … , 𝑬𝒏), 
𝛄 = [𝜸𝟏 𝜸𝟐 … 𝜸𝒏]′. 
The columns of the 𝑇𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix 𝐸 are called dummy variables. The vector γ is a 
parameter vector that can now be approximated by least squares if desired. 
Equation (4.4) is also called the one-way model since we allow only cross-sectional 
effects to be present. 
b. Alternatively, we could also add longitudinal dummy variables. The model (4.1) in 
this case becomes 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖𝑘𝑛 + 𝑋𝛽1 + 𝐸γ + 𝐹𝛿 + 𝑢, (4.5) 
where 
𝑭 = [𝑰𝑻, 𝑰𝑻, … , 𝑰𝑻]
′, 
𝜹 = [𝜹𝟏 𝜹𝟐 … 𝜹𝑻]
′. 
The columns of the 𝑇𝑛 × 𝑇 matrix 𝐹 are time dummy variables. The vector δ is a 
parameter vector that can also be estimated by least squares if desired. 
Equation (4.5) is also called the two-way model since we allow cross-sectional as 
well as longitudinal effects to be present.  
2. The within transformation, which is done by subtracting the time mean of each entity 
away from the variables in Equation 4.1 to arrive at demeaned variables. Thereby 
dropping 𝛽0 and 𝛾𝑖, giving us: 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 = 𝛽1(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ − 𝑥 ′̅𝑖) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖, 
3. The between estimator, which runs a cross sectional regression on the time averaged 
value of variables, thereby dropping any variables that are constant overtime, giving us:  
?̅?𝑖 = 𝛽1𝑥 ′̅𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖 
4. The first difference estimator, where the first difference is taken from each variable, 
thereby dropping any variables that are constant overtime, giving us: 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1∆𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ + ∆𝑢𝑖𝑡 
The choice between different estimators will depend on the data characteristics. For example, 
if errors are serially correlated, then first differencing estimators or within estimators may be 
appropriate. This is because while the errors themselves are serially correlated the first 
differenced errors will be uncorrelated.  
LSDV method may not be appropriate when 𝑛 is very large as the number of parameters that 
need estimation would now be 𝑛 + 𝑘. Where n is the number of firms, and k are the 
parameters of other explanatory variables included in the model.   
4.4.1.2 The Random Effects Model (RE) 
Also known as the error component model. Here the market effects variable 𝑢𝑖𝑡 in model 
(4.1) is written as 
 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜀𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡, (4.6) 
where 𝜀𝑖 is a random intercept which measures the random deviation of each entity’s intercept 
from the global intercept 𝛼0. Under the random effect method, the component 𝜀𝑖 cannot be 
correlated with the explanatory 𝑇 × 𝑘 matrix 𝑋𝑖. However, as the model still suffers from 
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serial autocorrelation, generalised least squares (GLS) should then be used instead of OLS 
for the transformed data.  
While RE model produces more efficient estimates, these estimates may be biased if the 
assumptions do not hold true. The main assumptions are: 
I. 𝜀𝑖 has a zero mean, 
II. 𝜀𝑖  is independent of 𝑣𝑖𝑡, 
III. 𝜀𝑖 is independent of 𝑥𝑖𝑡, 
IV. 𝜀𝑖 has a constant variance.  
To test whether to use the FE or the RE method the Hausman (1978) test is usually performed. 
Its 𝜒2 distributed test statistic is  
 𝐻 = (?̂?𝐼 − ?̂?𝐼𝐼)
′
[var(?̂?𝐼) − var(?̂?𝐼𝐼)]
−1
(?̂?𝐼 − ?̂?𝐼𝐼), (4.7) 
where ?̂?𝐼 , ?̂?𝐼𝐼 are the estimated parameters using FE and RE methods, respectively. The null 
hypothesis for the Hausman test is that the FE method is not appropriate. A 𝑝 value is 
calculated and if  𝑝 > 0.05, then RE is more appropriate, and if 𝑝 < 0.05, then FE method 
is more appropriate.  
4.4.2 Dynamic panel data 
Based on model characteristics, we may sometimes need to use the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) as an estimator for panel data models. GMM is considered one of the most 
popular estimation methods in applied econometrics (Hansen, 2014). In this section I will 
briefly discuss dynamic linear models estimated by GMM. 
The dynamic model with lagged dependent variables can be stated as: 
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 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑣𝑡
′𝛾 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.8) 
𝑣𝑡
′ are a set of variables that vary with time but are constant across firms, 𝑢𝑖 is the individual 
effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error.   
Equation (4.8) can be re-written as: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑤𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜌 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (4.9) 
 
Where           
 𝒘𝒊𝒕 = (
𝒚𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝒙𝒊𝒕
𝒗𝒕
) ,   𝝆 = (
𝜹
𝜷
𝜸
) , (4.10) 
 𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁, 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇,     𝑘 = 1 + 𝑘0 + 𝑑.  
We assume that the errors 𝑢𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are mutually independent and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are serially 
uncorrelated with mean zero. Our model is an AR(1) (Autoregressive) as 𝑦𝑖𝑡 depends on just 
one lag value of itself. In order to deal with the fixed effects in equation (4.8) the within 
transformation is applied to eliminate the individual effects 𝑢𝑖 . Then we have: 
 Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = Δ𝑤𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜌 + Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡. (4.11) 
However, the transformation introduces endogeneity 
 𝐸(𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡𝛥𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2)(𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1) (4.12) 
= −𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡−1𝜀𝑖𝑡−1) = −𝜎𝜀
2  
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violating the assumption of independence and producing estimates that are inconsistent when 
𝑇 is finite.  
To deal with this problem, Instrumental Variables (IV) are introduced. Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982) were the first to suggest the choice of 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 as an acceptable IV as it is correlated with 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 yet uncorrelated with 𝜀𝑖𝑡. While this choice of an IV was considered a breakthrough, it 
relies on two critical assumptions. The first assumption is that the dynamics are correctly 
specified so that 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is serially uncorrelated. Thus for example if an AR(1) model is used, and 
the true model is an AR(2),  𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 would not be a valid IV as it will be biased. Furthermore, 
this choice of IV requires that 𝐸(𝑦𝑖∆𝑦𝑖2) ≠ 0 which can also prove to be problematic. These 
assumptions can thus affect the validity and accuracy of the estimators and thus the Arellano-
Bond Estimator was introduced in 1991. 
4.4.2.1 Arellano-Bond estimator 
The transformed individual level and full models are, respectively: 
 Δ𝒚𝒊 = Δ𝑊𝑖𝜌 + Δ𝜺𝒊 (4.13) 
Δ𝒚 = Δ𝑊𝜌 + Δ𝜺  
As discussed in the previous section, the model is endogenous and instruments variables are 
needed. The instruments introduced by Arellano and Bond have the following form: 
The instruments introduced by Arellano and Bond have the following form: 
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𝒁𝒊𝒕 =
(
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝒚𝒊𝟏
𝒚𝒊𝟐
⋮
𝒚𝒊𝒕−𝟐
𝒙𝒊𝟏
⋮
𝒙𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝒗𝟏
⋮
𝒗𝒕−𝟏)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
,    
𝒁𝒊
′ = (
𝒁𝒊𝟑 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎
𝟎 𝒁𝒊𝟒 ⋯ 𝟎
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝒁𝒊𝑻
). 
Observe that the number of rows in  𝑍𝑖𝑡 is 
𝑛𝑡 = (𝑡 − 2) + 𝑘0(𝑡 − 1) + 𝑑(𝑡 − 1) 
= (𝑘0 + 𝑑 + 1)𝑡 − (𝑘0 + 𝑑 + 2) 
= 𝑘𝑡 − (𝑘 + 1). 
Thus, 𝑍𝑖
′ has a number of rows ℓ = (𝑇 − 2) (
𝑇+1
2
𝑘 − 1). To show this, we note that the 
number of rows in 𝑍𝑖
′ is the sum of the number of rows in 𝑍𝑖3, 𝑍𝑖4, … , 𝑍𝑖𝑇. We calculate 
ℓ =∑𝑛𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=3
 
=∑[𝑘𝑡 − (𝑘 + 1)]
𝑇
𝑡=3
 
= 𝑘∑𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=3
− (𝑘 + 1)(𝑇 − 2) 
=  𝑘
(𝑇 + 3)(𝑇 − 2)
2
− (𝑘 + 1)(𝑇 − 2) 
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= (𝑇 − 2) ((
𝑇 + 3
2
− 1) 𝑘 − 1) 
= (𝑇 − 2) (
𝑇 + 1
2
𝑘 − 1).  
Furthermore, the number of columns in 𝑍𝑖
′is (𝑇 − 2). In other words, the dimension of 𝑍𝑖
′ is 
ℓ × (𝑇 − 2). 
The moment conditions are: 
 
𝐸(𝑍𝑖
′(Δ𝒚𝒊 − Δ𝑊𝑖𝜌)) = 0. 
   
(4.14) 
There are ℓ equations for the 𝑘 parameters of 𝜌. Obviously, ℓ > 𝑘 for 𝑇 > 2. 
In this case, we have an overdetermined system so that GMM must be used to estimate 𝜌. 
4.4.2.2 Efficient Estimators 
The GMM method amounts to minimizing a weighted norm of 𝑍𝑖
′(Δ𝒚𝒊 − Δ𝑊𝑖𝜌). Efficient 
estimators set the norm weight, 𝑤 = Ω−1, where 
 Ω = var(𝑍𝑖
′Δ𝜺𝒊) = 𝐸(𝑍𝑖
′Δ𝜺𝒊Δ𝜺𝒊
′𝑍𝑖). (4.15) 
The resulting estimate is: 
 ?̂?𝑔𝑚𝑚 = (Δ𝑋
′𝑍Ω−1𝑍′Δ𝑋)−1(Δ𝑋′𝑍Ω−1𝑍′Δ𝒚) (4.16) 
 
When 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are homoscedastic, then  
 Ω = E(𝑍𝑖
′𝐻𝑍𝑖)𝜎𝜀
2 (4.17) 
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𝑯 =
(
 
 
𝟐 −𝟏 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎
−𝟏 𝟐 −𝟏 ⋯ 𝟎
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝟎 ⋯ −𝟏 𝟐 −𝟏
𝟎 𝟎 𝟎 −𝟏 𝟐 )
 
 
. 
The variance matrix Ω is yet to be estimated. There are several ways to estimate it. The first 
estimate is known as the one step GMM Arellano-Bond estimator.  
 
?̂?1 =∑𝑍𝑖
′𝐻𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (4.18) 
So that, 
 ?̂?1 = (Δ𝑊
′𝑍Ω̂1
−1𝑍′Δ𝑊)−1(Δ𝑊′𝑍Ω̂1
−1𝑍′Δ𝒚) (4.19) 
The Var (?̂?1) is estimated by: 
Var (?̂?1) =  (Δ𝑊
′𝑍Ω̂1
−1𝑍′Δ𝑊)
−1
(Δ𝑊′𝑍)Ω̂1
−1(𝑍′Σ𝑍) 
                      Ω̂1
−1(𝑍′Δ𝑊)(Δ𝑊′𝑍Ω̂1
−1𝑍′Δ𝑊). 
In case of homoscedasticity it reduces to: 
 ?̂?1
0 = (Δ𝑊′𝑍Ω̂1
−1𝑍′Δ𝑊)−1?̂?𝜀
2, (4.20) 
where 
 
?̂?𝜀
2 =
1
𝑛
∑Δ𝜺𝒊′̂
𝑛
𝑖=1
Δ𝜺𝒊,̂      
Δ𝜺?̂? = Δ𝒚𝒊 − Δ𝑊𝑖?̂?1. 
A two-step method is given by: 
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 ?̂?1 = (Δ𝑊
′𝑍Ω̂1
−1𝑍′Δ𝑊)−1(Δ𝑊′𝑍Ω̂1
−1𝑍′?̂?2Z?̂?1
−1𝑍′Δ𝑊)(Δ𝑊′𝑍Ω̂1
−1𝑍′Δ𝑊)−1 (4.21) 
Where  
 
?̂?2 =∑𝑍𝑖
′
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝛥𝜺?̂?Δ𝜺𝒊′̂𝑍𝑖  
?̂?2 = (Δ𝑊
′𝑍Ω̂2
−1𝑍′Δ𝑊)−1(Δ𝑊′𝑍Ω̂2
−1𝑍′Δ𝒚) 
Equation 4.21 is known as the two step GMM Arellano-Bond estimator. An appropriate 
robust covariance estimator is given by: 
 
?̂?2 = (Δ𝑊
′𝑍Ω̂2
−1𝑍′Δ𝑊)−1(Δ𝑊′𝑍Ω̂2
−1?̂?3Z?̂?2
−1𝑍′Δ𝑊)(Δ𝑊′𝑍Ω̂2
−1𝑍′Δ𝑊)−1 
  
(4.22) 
where 
 
?̂?3 =∑𝑍𝑖
′
𝑛
𝑖=1
Δ𝜺?̂?Δ𝜺𝒊′̂𝑍𝑖,     
Δ𝜺?̂? =  Δ𝒚𝒊 − Δ𝑋𝑖?̂?2. 
4.4.3 Data with binary outcome 
The estimation methods discussed in the previous section are useful for variables that are 
continuous. However, one of the SPCR models used in this thesis has a dependent variable 
that takes a value of either 1 or 0, the appropriate estimation techniques for models with 
binary outcome is the Logit or Probit model.  
4.4.3.1 The Logit and Probit Model 
The Logit model applies the transformation: 
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 𝜋𝑖(𝛽) =
𝑒𝑥𝑖
′𝛽
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑖
′𝛽
, 
 
   
(4.23) 
thus producing values in the range (0,1). The Probit model applies the transformation: 
 
𝜋𝑖(𝛽) = ∫ 𝜙(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
𝑥𝑖
′𝛽
−∞
, 
  
(4.24) 
where 𝜙(⋅) is the joint probability density function for 𝑥𝑖. Both transformations are nonlinear 
and ordinary least squares methods are very difficult to apply for parameter estimation. 
Instead, maximum likelihood estimations are used.  
Both models produce very similar results, and there is no definite rule to choose between 
them.  I will use the Logit model, following (Kim et al., 2016). The likelihood function for 
𝑛 independent binomially distributed variables is 
 log 𝐿(𝛽) =∑{𝑦𝑖log (𝜋𝑖) + (𝑛𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖)log (1 − 𝜋𝑖)}.  (4.25) 
This model allows us to interpret the sign of the coefficients but not the magnitude of change 
as with the linear regression model. Instead we can interpret the results in terms of marginal 
effects. Marginal effects, however, depend on a specific value of 𝑥. We may choose the mean 
value of 𝑥, or we may also view the partial effects for discrete variables, which predict 
probabilities for the two discrete value of variables (overconfident vs. non-overconfident) 
and record the differences.  
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4.4.4 Additional testing 
When examining data, one must consider two important problems that may affect the results, 
namely outliers and multi-collinearity (Alexander, 2008). Outliers can significantly influence 
regression results by moving the regression line either up or down. To check for outliers, the 
minimum and maximum values of each variable are calculated to determine if unexpectedly 
high or low values occur. Researchers frequently consider values more than three standard 
deviations away from the mean as potential outliers (Leys et al., 2013). Outliers may also be 
observed using a scatter plot to determine if there are any extreme values.  To avoid model 
bias, the outliers are removed, and the model is run without those observations.  
Multicollinearity is present when two independent variables are highly correlated. One way 
to identify multicollinearity is to create a correlation matrix and try to identify which 
variables are strongly correlated. Another way to identify multicollinearity is to calculate the 
tolerance, or its reciprocal, the variance inflation factor (VIF). VIF values above 10 indicate 
the existence of multicollinearity (Voss, 2004). Remedies for multicollinearity include the 
removal of one of the variables and then running a revised regression model or transform one 
of the variables by taking its log form (Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011).  
The investment sensitivity to cashflow model has an interaction variable, where it is 
hypothesized that the managerial overconfidence will affect the magnitude of cashflow effect 
on investment. This poses a problem however, as by construction the interaction term may 
be highly correlated with either managerial overconfidence or cashflow. One way to remedy 
this is to demean the interaction term.  
Finally, it is important to check for the stability or the internal validity of the regression model 
by splitting the data into two parts (called split-sample validation) and running the regression 
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model again on each subset of data (Steyerber et al., 2001). Using such an approach, 
approximately 70% of the data are randomly chosen to estimate the regression model and the 
rest are used for comparative purposes. If the new regression produces similar effects, with 
the overall relationship between the dependent and independent variables being statistically 
significant, the 𝑅2 within 5% (plus or minus) the 𝑅2 for the tested model, and the results of 
the statistical significance tests for the coefficients of the independent variables for both 
analyses are the same, it may be concluded that the model is stable. Thus, in different models 
we may choose to re-run the model over a certain period of time to check for internal validity. 
External Validity, on the other hand, is more difficult to test, it measures the generalizability 
of the results. Generally, a strong referencing system of the model used in the study will 
support the external validity as the model will have been tested and the findings supported 
by other authors repeatedly. 
4.5 Data 
The research is conducted primarily by means of a behavioural model applied to listed firms 
in Egypt and the UK from 2005 to 2018. The Egyptian political unrest started in January 
2011 and ended with the presidential election of El Sisi in 2014, followed by a devaluation 
of the Egyptian pound in November 2016, thus the data covers the effects before the events, 
during the events, and till stability is restored, roughly in 2018.  The start date was chosen as 
2005 to control for any effects that may have been caused by the global financial crisis of 
2008.  
There are 162 firms listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) and the Nile Stock 
Exchange, excluding firms from the financial sector. However, my total population consists 
of only 102 firms for which there were complete records (from 2005-2018). Similarly, 
91 
 
complete data for the UK was available for 777 firms from the total population. Data were 
collected from financial statements of the constituent firms for both Egypt and the UK from 
Bloomberg. Data analysis is performed using MATLAB and Stata. MATLAB is used to 
organize the data, and for variable measurement (as SPCR and PD discussed in more detail 
in Chapters 6 and 7), all regressions are then run on Stata. Missing data are treated in two 
ways. In case where there is a linear trend, as in the case of missing returns data used to 
calculate SPCR or PD, linear interpolation is used. Linear interpolation is a curve fitting 
method which establishes a linear relationship among known data points, and then uses this 
relationship to estimate unknown or missing values. However, where there is missing 
financial statement data within our sample, Stata automatically discards the row, giving us 
fewer observations. Following Malmendier and Tate (2005), and to ensure that outliers do 
not contaminate our results we trim our data at 1% level. Outliers are removed and left blank, 
i.e. treated as missing observations.  
4.6 Overconfidence Proxies   
Most existing studies examine overconfidence9 in terms of shareholder behaviour. The 
empirical tools used to study overconfidence (in terms of overly tight probability 
distributions, underestimation of price volatilities, and/or overvaluation of own trading 
performance in relation to the average market return) are not easily transferrable into 
corporate settings. Several researchers, such as Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) and 
Huang et al. (2013) among others, use option exercise behaviour as a proxy for 
 
9 Theoretical models distinguish optimism and overconfidence, where optimism is modelled as an 
overestimation of return while overconfidence modelled as an underestimation of risk. However, psychological 
and behavioural research reveals that these biases are closely related and thus do not need separate proxies to 
distinguish between them for empirical testing. Overconfidence and optimism are thus used interchangeably in 
this thesis.  
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overconfidence. It is not possible though to use this proxy in the Egyptian market since it 
does not have an option market. Further, there are several reasons why the Malmendier and 
Tate (2005) option-based measure may not be appropriate for the UK as well. There is a 
significant difference in the structure of executive remuneration between the UK and the US. 
Option grants of UK CEOs account for only a small portion of their total portfolio compared 
to the US CEOs (Conyon and Murphy, 2000), thus managers have a less pressing need to 
diversify by exercising their options early. Further, data availability of the portfolios of CEOs 
in the UK is not widely accessible as it is in the US. 
Another popular method to measuring optimism in the literature is the distribution of 
questionnaires in a timely manner (Ben- David et al. 2008; Azouzi and Anis, 2012; 
Mohamed, 2012). This approach, however, is also not feasible for this study, because of the 
extreme reluctance by Egyptian CEOs to participate in a survey due to the political instability 
that the country has witnessed during the past 10 years. Furthermore, the response rate to 
questionnaires in Egypt was found to be low (Dennis, 2003), with only a 25 per cent response 
rate in a study by Hatab and Hess (2013). Further, this study aims to study the effect that 
external instability may have on managerial overconfidence, questionnaire analysis would 
have been possible in this thesis only if questionnaires were distributed during the period of 
the turmoil and not in the aftermath.  
4.6.1 Overconfidence measure based on financial and investment activities of the 
manager 
Given the relative shortage of the data available in the Egyptian market, the measure of 
overconfidence used in this study will be based on the exaggerated activities of the manager 
as proposed by Schrand and Zechman (2012) and Campbell et al. (2011). 
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Our first proxy for overconfidence is obtained from the work of Schrand and Zechman 
(2012). Their proxy is measured as a firm-specific score calculated from the investing and 
financing activities of the firm. They justify the choice of this proxy as investment and 
financing activities have been consistently found to be related to managerial overconfidence 
as presented in Chapter 3.  The first component of the score is based on investment level, 
calculated as total asset growth on sales growth. The firm will be given a score of 1 in a given 
year if the firm investment level is in excess of the industry median level for the same year. 
Overconfident managers are more likely to overestimate the returns from investment while 
simultaneously underestimating risk, causing them to overinvest, particularly when there is 
an abundance of internal cashflow / retained earnings (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). The 
second component is the net dollar acquisitions made by the firm. The firm will be given a 
score of 1 in a given year if its net dollar acquisitions are greater than the industry median 
level for the same year. Acquisitions are taken as the net value of acquisitions obtained from 
the statement of cashflows. Malmendier and Tate (2008) and Ben-David et al. (2010) among 
others, find that overconfident managers engage in more mergers and acquisitions,  and may 
even overpay for their acquisitions to the point where it may be damaging for the firm. The 
third component is the firm debt to equity ratio. The firm will be given a score of 1 if its debt 
to equity ratio is greater than the industry median level for a given year. An overconfident 
manager views firm equity as undervalued by the public, when there is a financing deficit, 
an overconfident manager will be more likely to take on more debt rather than issue 
undervalued stocks (Heaton, 2002). The fourth component is based on whether the firm uses 
convertible debt or preferred stock; the firm will be given a score of 1 if the firm uses either 
convertible debt or preferred stock. Schrand and Zechman explain that overconfident 
94 
 
managers will choose risky debt, where risky debt is measured as a debt with longer duration. 
If a firm totals a score of 2 or higher in a given year, its manager will be considered 
overconfident. This measure of overconfidence is denoted  SZOC1𝑖𝑡.  
Schrand and Zechman further expand their measure by including a fifth component which is 
dividend yield, they give the firm a score of 1 if its dividend yield is equal to zero. This is 
due to an overconfident manager unwillingness to payout dividends and preserve cash for 
future investment opportunities. Finally, if the firm totals a score of 3 or more, its manager 
is considered overconfident. It may be argued that dividend policy could proxy for firm 
characteristics rather than managerial overconfidence. For example, a new firm with more 
investment opportunities, may be unlikely to pay out dividends and preserve cash for 
investments compared to a well-established firm requiring less investment needs. Therefore, 
Schrand and Zechman separate dividend policy in a new measure. They further state that 
while the same issue may be argued under the debt/equity ratio, the latter has shown a 
tendency to follow the industry norm. I denote this second measure of overconfidence as 
SZOC2𝑖𝑡. Furthermore, we may notice that Schrand and Zechman prefer to use a binary 
measure of overconfidence based on several investing and financing activities found to be 
related to managerial overconfidence in literature rather than a comprehensive score. This is 
because while one activity may be related to firm policy, firm characteristics, or previous 
history, and not conclusive of managerial overconfidence. A composite of several activities 
being exaggerated at the same time is more likely to be due to the consistent impact of an 
overconfident manager. 
Schrand and Zechman (2012) argue that while the above proxy for overconfidence may be 
associated with weaker governance, the latter gives a greater propensity for overconfidence 
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bias to be pronounced. Finally, their proxy was found to have significant correlation with the 
option exercise-based proxy proposed by Malmendier and Tate (2005).  
One criticism of this proxy is that it can be related to decisions taken by previous CEOs. For 
example, capital structure and dividend policies are usually considered sticky, and thus the 
observed level in the current period may be related to the decisions made by a previous CEO. 
I will thus use another measure of overconfidence introduced by Campbell et al. (2011) 
which focuses solely on the investment levels observed in relation to industry mean. 
Investment policies are arguably less sticky than capital structure and dividend policies (Kim 
et al., 2016). 
Campbell et al. (2011) propose a measure of CEO optimism that is not directly related to 
compensation. Their model predicts a theoretical link between CEO optimism and the firm 
investment level, and they argue that the CEO investment choice decreases with risk aversion 
and increases with optimism.  A risk averse CEO with low optimism underinvests, i.e. 
chooses investment below the level that maximizes firm value. Meanwhile, a moderately 
optimistic CEO will choose to invest at a level that maximizes shareholder value. Thus, the 
firm investment level will increase as CEO optimism increases, offsetting the 
underinvestment from CEO risk aversion characteristic. Optimism levels below (above) 
value-maximizing level of optimism leads the CEO to underinvest (overinvest), causing firm 
value to be concave in relation to CEO optimism. They thus propose a measure of CEO 
optimism based on the ratio of capital expenditure CE𝑖𝑡 to beginning of year net property, 
plant and equipment PPE𝑖,𝑡−1.  
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OPT𝑖𝑡 =
CE𝑖𝑡
PPE𝑖,𝑡−1
 (4.26) 
Campbell et al. (2011) specifically classify a CEO as highly optimistic if the firm industry-
adjusted investment OPT𝑖𝑡 in Equation (4.26) is above the 80
th percentile of all firms for two 
consecutive years. The reason for specifying two consecutive years is that investment can be 
“lumpy” in time, and they do not wish to classify a CEO as highly optimistic simply for 
choosing to bunch investment in a particular year. Conversely, they classify CEOs as having 
low optimism if the firm industry-adjusted investment is below the 20th percentile of all firms 
for two consecutive years10. The CEOs that do not fall into these two categories, are classified 
as moderately optimistic. Their measure of overconfidence is denoted as OPT80𝑖𝑡 and 
OPT20𝑖𝑡 respectively.  
4.6.2 Overconfidence measure based on insider trading 
I will add a third measure of CEO overconfidence for the UK market; the net stock purchase 
measure, denoted PURCHASE𝑖𝑡. Data for this measure is not available for the Egyptian 
market and therefore is not applicable there. This measure was introduced by Malmendier 
and Tate (2005) and developed by Campbell et al. (2011).  The logic behind this measure is 
that overconfident CEOs may think a firm's value perceived by the market is much lower 
than the value perceived by themselves, so they have greater propensity to purchase stocks 
as net buyers. By increasing the net purchases of their firm’s shares, they are putting 
themselves at a greater risk as they fail to diversify their idiosyncratic risk. This measure is 
also in line with the investor bias discussed by Odean (1998a, 1998b) where overconfidence 
 
10 Note that OPT20 is not a measure of overconfidence, rather a measure of the “lack of confidence” or 
pessimism of the manager. 
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in investors can lead to higher trading volume in financial markets. Odean argues that 
overconfident investors will trade more aggressively and hold less diversified portfolios 
leading to a lower expected utility than the rational trader. The same logic can be applied to 
overconfident CEOs. The measure employed is based on insider trading activity of a firm.  
Stock purchase measure may be specifically appropriate for the UK market for several 
reasons. First, regulations of insider trading are much stricter in the UK than it is in the US. 
This makes it very difficult for managers to benefit from purchasing stocks based on insider 
information. Further, data for this measure is widely available making it a convenient 
measure to use. 
Following the work of Malmendier and Tate (2005), Campbell et al. (2011) and Ahmed and 
Duellman (2012) I will define net purchases as stock purchases minus stock sales, both 
defined in units of stocks. The stock purchase measure of overconfidence is classified as a 
dichotomous variable where PURCHASE is set to equal one if the CEO’s net purchases are 
in the top 80th percentile of net purchases by all CEOs in that year and must increase the 
CEOs ownership of the firm by 10% during the fiscal year, zero otherwise. This measure 
labels a manager as overconfident if the amount of net purchases is large in absolute terms 
and substantially increases the CEOs ownership in the firm.  
The conditions for the PURCHASE measure may be a bit restrictive. Therefore, an 
alternative measure to stock purchases will also be used, which is the net purchase ratio NPR 
(Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Billet and Qian, 2005; Ataullah et al., 2017). This is a relative 
measure, and so is relatively logical and simple, calculated as: 
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 NPR=
insider purchase - insider selling
insider purchase + insider selling
 (4.27) 
The NPR ranges from -1 to 1, where a higher value of NPR implies that managers are buying 
more shares and thus have more overconfidence. Similar to the PURHCASE method, NPR 
purchases and sales are both defined in units of stock.  
4.6.3 Overconfidence proxies’ descriptive statistics 
All the overconfidence proxies used in this thesis, except NPR, are dichotomous variables 
with a value of 1 for managerial overconfidence and 0 otherwise. Similarly, OPT20 is a 
variable that measures pessimism or under confidence. OPT20 is also a dichotomous 
variable, where 1 signifies managerial pessimism and 0 otherwise. NPR is a relative measure 
of overconfidence with a value ranging from -1 to 1, with positive values closer to 1 
signifying increased managerial overconfidence and negative values closer to -1 signifying 
decreased confidence. The descriptive statistics for the overconfidence variables are 
presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Overconfidence proxies’ descriptive statistics 
 Egypt UK 
Variables Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Min Max Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
SZOC1 0.066 0.248 0 1 0.410 0.492 0 1 
SZOC2 0.039 0.193 0 1 0.289 0.454 0 1 
OPT80 0.126 0.333 0 1 0.184 0.388 0 1 
OPT20 0.349 0.982 0 1 0.154 0.361 0 1 
PURCHASE - - - - 0.144 0.351 0 1 
NPR - - - - 0.181 0.923 -1 1 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the overconfidence proxies used in this study. 
SZOC1, SZOC2, OPT80, PURCHASE and NPR are measures of overconfidence. 
OPT20 is a measure of pessimism.  
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As we can see from Table 4.1 the mean value of overconfidence proxies SZOC1, SZOC2 are 
6.6% and 3.9%, respectively, for the Egyptian market. These percentages are significantly 
lower than 41% and 28.9% for the UK market. The mean value of SZOC1 and SZOC2 for 
the Egyptian market are also significantly lower than those reported by Schrand and Zechman 
(2012) of 61% and 53% for the US. The low mean value of overconfidence for Egypt may 
be justified as due to the ensuing political instability, where managers were pessimistic rather 
than optimistic. However, also also note that the Schrand and Zechman (2012) measurement 
of overconfidence is biased towards a developed market. For example, in my data sample for 
the Egyptian market, there were no companies with net acquisitions greater than zero, there 
were no companies that used convertible debt, and even the issuance of preferred stock is not 
a common practice in the Egyptian market. Thus the mean values of SZOC1, SZOC2 being 
very low for the Egyptian market may be as a consequence of the nature of the measurement 
being created for more developed markets.  
 Similarly, the mean value of the proxy of high optimism OPT80 for the Egyptian and the 
UK market at 12.6% and 18.4%, respectively, are lower than the value reported by Campbell 
et al. (2011) of 35.5% for the US market. Meanwhile, the value of low optimism OPT20 of 
34.9% for the Egyptian market, is comparable to that of Campbell et al. of 34.7%, but remains 
lower for the UK market with 15.4%. The mean value of PURCHASE measure of 
overconfidence is 14.4% which is lower than the 26.1% reported in the US market by Ahmed 
and Duellman (2012). Finally, the mean value for NPR 0.181, although close to 0 remains a 
positive average figure, signifying that on average managers in the UK were more confident 
than pessimistic.   
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Figure 4.1 shows the average value of the overconfidence proxy for each industry in the 
Egyptian market. I require there to be at least five companies in an industry to be able to 
make meaningful comparative measures of overconfidence with industry average. There are 
industries in the Egyptian market specifically where there are just one or two companies, 
those companies (industries) were thus dropped11. The first thing we notice is that managerial 
pessimism, as measured by OPT20, was higher for all industry groups than managerial 
overconfidence. This is logical as the mean OPT20 was generally high compared to other 
overconfidence measures. Meanwhile, OPT80 generally has a higher mean overconfidence 
value than either SZOC1 or SZOC2. This makes sense as the Schrand and Zechman (2012) 
measures of overconfidence, SZOC1 and SZOC2, are a composite score, requiring several 
criteria to be met and is thus a more stringent measure of overconfidence. The industry with 
the highest average overconfidence is the healthcare industry according to SZOC2 and 
OPT80 measures of overconfidence. While the mean values of pessimism are relatively close 
across all industry groups, the industry with the highest pessimism is the consumer 
discretionary industry. This further supports the argument that, due to the political instability 
in Egypt, average values of managerial pessimism increased across the market approximately 
equally.  
 
11 Energy, information technology and utilities industry were excluded.  
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Figure 4.1 Mean overconfidence per industry in Egypt 
10 – Energy      35 - Healthcare 
15 – Materials      45 – Information Technology 
20 – Industrials      50 - Communication Services   
25 - Consumer Discretionary    55 - Utilities 
30 - Consumer Staples     60 - Real Estate   
 
Next, I present a trend of the average overconfidence measures per year for the Egyptian 
market, to form a clearer picture of whether the political turmoil could have influenced 
managerial overconfidence. The results are presented in Figure 4.2. As we can see, the 
overconfidence proxies, follow a similar trend, perhaps most apparent from SZOC1 and 
SZOC2. Managerial overconfidence was on an increasing trend until 2011 and then started 
to decrease onward until 2018. Similarly, we can see that the measure of pessimism OPT20 
was on a downward trend until 2011 and started to increase after that. These results imply 
that the political turmoil and instability in Egypt, which started in early 2011, likely resulted 
in increased managerial pessimism rather than increased overconfidence. This contrasts the 
hypotheses by Ben-David et al. (2013) and Eisenbach and Schmalz (2015) where they 
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theorize that managerial overconfidence increases during times of instability rather than 
decreases. 
 
Figure 4.2 Mean overconfidence per year in Egypt 
Figure 4.3 presents the average overconfidence proxy broken down by industry for the UK 
market. We can see that the mean value for SZOC1, SZOC2 and OPT80 usually follow a 
similar trend. Further, we can see that, the OPT80 and OPT20 Campbell et al. (2011) 
measures of overconfidence, show that on average OPT80 (measure of overconfidence) was 
greater than OPT20 (measure of pessimism) in most industries except for the energy and 
utilities industry, where managerial pessimism had a higher mean value than managerial 
overconfidence.  The measure of overconfidence with the lowest mean across all industries 
is the PURCHASE measure. This is expected, because there are several conditions that need 
to be fulfilled for a manager to be considered overconfident under the PURCHASE measure, 
making it the most restrictive measure of the overconfidence considered in this study. The 
major discrepancy one can note is related to the NPR measure of overconfidence; we can 
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note that mean value of overconfidence is negative for the consumer staples. This indicates 
that this is the industry with the lowest average managerial overconfidence. This does not 
necessarily hold true for other measures of overconfidence. Nonetheless, most measures of 
overconfidence are closely related, with all measures of overconfidence positively correlated 
together, and negatively correlated with OPT20 (the measure of pessimism). 
 
Figure 4.3 Mean overconfidence per industry in the UK 
10 – Energy      35 - Healthcare 
15 – Materials      45 – Information Technology 
20 – Industrials      50 - Communication Services   
25 - Consumer Discretionary    55 - Utilities 
30 - Consumer Staples     60 - Real Estate   
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Information on data, including the time period and markets used for analysis, and where the 
data is collected from is detailed. The different overconfidence proxies used in the literature 
are discussed, followed by a justification of why some proxies may be inapplicable for this 
study. Finally, a detailed discussion of the overconfidence proxies used in this study is 
provided, as well as an analysis of the descriptive statistics and trends noticed in the 
overconfidence studies for Egypt and the UK  
The information regarding the estimation method, data collection and overconfidence proxies 
discussed above will be applied to three separate models to identify whether there is an effect 
of behavioural biases of agents on decision-making and firm risk during catastrophic events. 
In the upcoming empirical study chapters, I will start with a brief introduction of the relevant 
model, re-state the hypotheses, present the model and discuss the factors used to control for 
external and internal environment followed by an analysis of the results. 
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Chapter 5  
Managerial Overconfidence and Investment Decisions 
5.1 Introduction 
Previous studies have considered several motivations that cause investment distortion across 
firms. In Chapter 2, I discussed the traditional theories used to explain investment distortions 
which stemmed mainly from firm or industry characteristics. One of the main factors that 
may constrain investment is the amount of funding available. Amongst those the most 
prominent theories are that managers follow a Pecking Order, discussed in detail in Chapter 
2, whereby managers prefer to finance their investments internally (through retained 
earnings) than external financing. However, if they must access the external market for funds, 
they prefer debt over equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984). While empirical evidence confirms 
the existence and robustness of investment-cashflow sensitivity after controlling for 
investment opportunities, explaining this sensitivity solely in terms of capital market 
imperfections remains controversial (Myers, 2001; Malmendier and Tate, 2005). 
Researchers look at alternative explanations that focus on managerial characteristics as a 
reason for investment discrepancies. Those managerial characteristics can be broken down 
into three main categories: agency theory, asymmetric information between corporate 
insiders and the capital market, and managerial overconfidence. Under asymmetric 
information, managers acting in the interest of shareholders will not invest unless there is 
sufficient cashflow; they try to restrict external financing so as not to dilute the shares of the 
company. Under the agency theory, there is a misalignment of managerial and shareholders 
interest (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers may overinvest to 
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serve their personal interest, such as the privileges of being in large empires. As the capital 
market and firm regulations may limit managerial access to external financing, 
overinvestment of self-serving managers increases with the increase in cashflow. On the 
other hand, overconfident managers overestimate returns on investment while 
simultaneously believing that their firm is undervalued (Hackbarth, 2008). Given sufficient 
internal cashflow they will overinvest, but when these funds are depleted, they will be 
reluctant to tap the external market, believing that any new equity issued will be undervalued 
by the market even when these investments are desirable. Thus the main difference between 
the agency theory and managerial overconfidence is that under the agency theory a manager 
is consciously overinvesting to reap private benefits while an overconfident manager 
overestimates the value of a project and thus will overinvest believing that he is acting in the 
best interest of shareholders. However, once in need of external funding, overconfident 
managers will be least willing to issue new equity and may even choose not to invest in 
positive NPV projects believing that they will undervalue the firm.  
Thus, overconfident managers will be more likely to overinvest when there is excess internal 
cashflow (retained earnings). Further overconfident managers view their equity as being 
undervalued by the market and may forgo investment if internal funds or debts are not 
available. This means that investment sensitivity to cashflow is likely to be exacerbated in 
equity dependent firms.  
Following the work of Malmendier and Tate (2005) I will test my prediction using a 
regression model. The next section presents the regression model followed by a brief 
discussion of the descriptive statistics and a more detailed analysis of the results. Empirical 
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testing will be done on both the Egyptian and the UK market to allow for better comparison, 
as discussed in Chapter 4.  
5.2 Regression model 
Following Malmendier and Tate (2005) the following regression model will be tested: 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑂𝐶′𝑖𝑡−1𝛽3 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡. 𝑂𝐶′𝑖𝑡−1𝐵6 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵7 
 
       (5.1) 
where  
𝐼𝑁𝑉 is investment; measured as capital expenditures normalized by the beginning of the year 
property plant and equipment. 
𝐶𝐹 is cashflow before extraordinary items plus depreciation; normalized by the beginning of 
the year PP&E, we expect to find a positive relationship between cashflow and investment, 
where increased internal cashflow will allow firms to take advantage of investment 
opportunities. 
𝑄 is the Tobin’s q-ratio; measured as market value of assets over book value of assets. Market 
value of assets is defined as total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of 
equity. Book value of assets is the total assets obtained from the balance sheet. Tobin’s Q 
here is an approximate measure of firm performance, firms that are performing well are 
expected to have increased levels of investment.  
𝑂𝐶 is the vector of overconfidence measures (see below). As mentioned in section 5.1, 
overconfidence in managers causes them to overestimate returns while simultaneously 
underestimating risk, this will cause managers to overinvest. 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of additional control factors which include: 
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Firm size, denoted SIZE𝑡, calculated as log of market capitalization. Larger firms are expected 
to have better investment opportunities, and thus I expect a positive relationship between 
firm size and investment.   
Return on assets, denoted ROA𝑡, calculated as net income divided by total assets. I expect a 
positive relationship between ROA and investment as firms with higher ROA, are performing 
better, and thus more likely to be able to invest.  
Leverage, denoted LEV𝑡, calculate as total debt divided by total assets. I expect a negative 
relationship between leverage and investment, where firms with high levels of debt may be 
financially constrained and thus unable to increase investment. 
 Finally, I will also add firm fixed effects, year fixed effects and the interaction of cashflow 
with industry (the effects of year fixed effects and industry are explained in more detail 
below).  
OC is a vector of overconfidence measures that includes SZOC1, SZOC2, OPT80, OPT20, 
PURCHASE and NPR. The model hypothesis is that an overconfident manager’s decision to 
invest is altered by the amount of internal cashflow (retained earnings). Therefore, an 
interaction term, CF.OC, cashflow multiplied by overconfidence is included in the model. I 
expect a positive relationship between the interaction term, CF.OC and investment.  Further, 
cashflow is expected to have a moderating effect on other variables as well, thus the model 
also includes interaction terms between cashflow and the other variables.   
SZOC1 and SZOC2 are the Schrand and Zechman (2012) measures of overconfidence. They 
measure overconfidence based on a composite score calculated from different firm-specific 
activities. In regard to SZOC1, a manager is considered overconfident if any two of the 
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following four requirements holds true: the rate of investment, or volume of acquisition, or 
debt to equity ratio, are greater than the industry median for that year, or if the firm uses 
convertible debt or preferred stock. In regard to SZOC2, a manager is considered 
overconfident if any three of the following five components holds true: the rate of investment, 
or rate of acquisition, or the debt to equity ratio, are greater than the industry median for that 
year, or if the firm uses convertible debt or preferred stock, or if the dividend yield is greater 
than 0. OPT80 and OPT20 are the Campbell et al. (2011) measure of overconfidence and 
pessimism or “under confidence”. Regarding OPT80, a manager is considered as 
overconfident if their investment activities are above the 80th percentile of all firms, within 
the same industry, for two consecutive years. Similarly, regarding OPT20, a manager is 
considered as pessimistic if their investment activities are below the 20th percentile for all 
firms for two consecutive years. 
PURCHASE and NPR are based on the stock purchase activities or insider trading of the 
firm. Under the PURCHASE measure a manager is considered overconfident if net 
purchases, defined in units of stocks, are in the top 80th percentile of net purchases by all 
CEOs in that year. Further, those purchases must increase the CEOs ownership of the firm 
by 10% during the fiscal year. The NPR is a measure of overconfidence with a value that 
varies from -1 to 1 and is calculated as     
NPR= (insider purchase - insider selling)/ (insider purchase + insider selling) 
The method of measuring overconfidence and a few control variables are different from 
Malmendier and Tate (2005). I had to slightly alter my model due to data unavailability in 
the countries chosen for empirical testing. Malmendier and Tate (2005) perform their test on 
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the US market, and have detailed information about personal CEO data, this data is not 
available in the Egyptian market or the UK market.  
I use a fixed-effects Panel regression. Serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are dealt with 
by clustering observations by firm in order to produce robust standard errors that control 
serial correlation. I also include an interaction term between industry dummy and cashflow, 
to capture any change in effects after considering the effects of the industry group. The 
reasoning for including year fixed effects and industry interaction with cashflow is explained 
in more detail in Section 5.3.   
The overconfidence measures here are lagged by one year for two main reasons. First, this 
will allow a year for overconfidence bias to influence investment decision of managers. An 
additional important consideration is reverse causality. It may be argued that firms with 
higher risk or lower firm value tend to employ overconfident CEOs, whereby increase in 
investment may be a result of firms trying to improve firm value. That is firms with low firm 
value and have several investment opportunities available to them, may hire an overconfident 
manager to mitigate this problem. Further as in Malmendier and Tate (2005), Tobin’s Q is 
also lagged, this is because Tobin’s Q is an approximate measure of firm performance. Firm’s 
that perform better in the previous year 𝑡 − 1 are likely to increase investment in current 
period 𝑡. 
Regression for the Egyptian market is performed in EGP and equivalent USD. With the start 
of the Egyptian revolution in 2011, inflation was at 11.09% as measured by the average 
consumer price index and remained relatively stable during the period 2012-2016. However, 
during the period 2005-2016 the EGP was on a managed float. In November 2016, the Central 
Bank of Egypt (CBE) decided to allow the Egyptian pound to float freely which led to the 
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devaluation of the Egyptian pound by 32.3% and caused inflation to soar 23.53% in 2017. 
To counter the effects of expected inflation, the CBE raised interest rates by 300 basis points 
to encourage people to save more and spend less. I expect that firm investment decisions may 
have been affected in 2017-2018 and while investment levels in EGP amount may have 
remained the same, or decreased slightly, their equivalent in dollar amount would have 
significantly decreased. Therefore, regression for the Egyptian market is performed both in 
EGP and equivalent USD to control for the combined effects of currency devaluation and 
inflation. The main conclusions for both regressions remain very similar in terms of variable 
significance and signs of coefficients. Results presented here are in USD, regression results 
for the Egyptian pound are included in Appendix A5C. The focus of my analysis will be the 
results of the regression done in the USD.  
5.3 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide summary of the descriptive statistics for the model variables in 
Egypt and the UK respectively. The values presented are similar to the results presented by 
Malmendier and Tate (2005). The UK is a larger, more developed, economy and as such the 
mean value of investment at 245.05 (in GBP Million), is expectedly higher for the UK than 
for Egypt at 142.41 (in GBP Million), even when normalized by capital. It might be important 
to note that the descriptive statistics included in Table 5.1 and 5.2 are for the final sample 
that goes into the model regression, rather than the total available sample12. Thus, variable 
statistics change slightly with change in sample size than the statistics discussed in section 
4.6.3. However, conclusions remain where the mean value of the different overconfidence 
 
12 Missing observations are removed as mentioned in Section 4.5. 
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proxies is normally higher for the UK than for the Egyptian market. This might be due to the 
time of political instability where managers became increasingly pessimistic rather than 
overconfident.  This is specifically true for SZOC1, SZOC2 where their values of 7.1% and 
4.2%, respectively, for the Egyptian market is significantly lower than 47.4% and 34.8% for 
the UK market. However, here the mean value of the proxy of high optimism OPT80 for the 
Egyptian market, 13.1%, is lower than the UK market with 19.5%. Finally, the value of low 
optimism OPT20 is 27.5% for the Egyptian market, significantly higher than the UK market 
with 18.2%. All the above discrepancies point to an increase in managerial pessimism in the 
Egyptian market relative to the UK market. It is also interesting to note that the minimum 
ROA for the UK is significantly lower than that of Egypt, signifying that in the UK sample 
there is a firm with significantly low earnings (losses). Finally, although the minimum for 
Size comes out as negative, this is only due to the way size is defined as log of market capital, 
whereby the log of any number less than 113 is negative.  
 Table 5.3 shows a more detailed summary of investment and cashflow, tabulated by the 
different overconfidence measures.  Investment and cashflow, in Table 5.3, are normalized 
by capital. As we can see, for both Egypt and the UK, the mean value of normalized 
investment is always much higher for the group of firms with overconfident managers than 
that of non-overconfident ones. For example, under the SZOC1 measure of overconfidence 
the mean level of investment for the overconfident group for Egypt and the UK is 0.364 and 
0.371 respectively, while the mean value for the non-overconfident group is 0.146 and 0.069 
respectively. While this is not enough to conclude a true causal relationship between 
 
13 Data procured from Bloomberg is given in millions, i.e. firms with equity size less than one, would be 
indicative of an equity value less than one million.  
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overconfidence and increased investment, it provides initial hints in support of previous 
literature (Hirshleifer and Luo, 2001; Baker et al., 2004; Malmendier and Tate, 2005). The 
mean value of normalized earnings is not necessarily higher for overconfident firms. These 
results make sense since investment decisions are made by top management and thus these 
decisions can be affected by personal psychological biases. Earnings, on the other hand, 
depend on numerous factors, some of which cannot be influenced by managers.  
Correlations are shown in Table A5A1 and Table A5A2 of Appendix A5A. As expected, the 
correlation between investment and cashflow, Q, and the overconfidence measures are 
positive, although not highly correlated. Investment and cashflow are highly correlated at 
0.799 for the UK while having a more moderate correlation of 0.584 for Egypt. Meanwhile 
Tobin’s Q is more highly correlated for Egypt at 0.618, while being only weakly correlated 
at 0.139 for the UK.  We can see that the overconfidence variables are all positively correlated 
with each other, and negatively correlated with OPT20 (the measure of pessimism). The 
highest correlations of overconfidence exist between SZOC1 and SZOC2, at a value greater 
than 0.7, for both the Egyptian and the UK markets; this is reasonable as they are both from 
a similar composite score. I intend to remedy this problem by always including only SZOC1 
or SZOC2 in my model. We can see that none of the other variables are highly correlated, so 
there is no concern about perfect multicollinearity.  
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Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics for Egypt 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Assets  1,321 2734.674 6902.850 22.842 94952 
PP&E 1,321 1173.674 2969.217 0.520 28753 
Investment 1,321 142.409 564.094 0 0 
Investment normalized by PP&E 1,321 0.123 8.016 0 291 
Investment normalized by assets 1,321 0.046 0.107 0 0 
Cashflow 1,321 296.214 1972.183 -4849.400 66944 
Cashflow normalized by PPE&E 1,321 0.102 0.161 -1.048 2.339 
Cashflow normalized by assets 1,321 0.160 1.461 -37.288 6.994 
Q 1,321 1.599 1.729 0.284 40.768 
SZOC1 1,321 0.071 0.257 0 1 
SZOC2 1,321 0.042 0.200 0 1 
OPT80 1,321 0.131 0.422 0 1 
OPT20 1,321 0.275 0.380 0 1 
Size 1,321 6.371 1.720 1.546 11.661 
LEV 1,321 0.483 0.383 0.005 5.856 
ROA 1,321 6.961 13.574 -15.214 16.857 
Monetary amounts are in EGP(Million). 
Assets is the book value of total assets. Investment is defined as capital expenditure. Cashflow calculated as 
earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q is the market 
value of assets divided by the book value of assets. SZOC1, SZOC2 and OPT80 are measures of 
overconfidence. OPT20 is a measure of pessimism. Lev is leverage or total amount of debt divided by total 
assets. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income divided by total assets. Size is calculated as the log of 
market value of equity.  
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Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics for the UK 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Assets 8586 3940.330 26384.130 0.073 748808 
PP&E 8586 1565.962 13572.360 0 695081 
Investment 8586 245.052 2250.417 0 78355 
Investment normalized by PP&E 8586 1.935 50.639 0 3175.482 
Investment normalized by assets 8586 0.045 0.075 0 1.904 
Cashflow 8586 338.151 2747.406 -19270.640 45046.950 
Cashflow normalized by PP&E 8586 -7.850 347.134 -7875.556 16303 
Cashflow normalized by assets 8586 0.002 0.372 -17.193 2.597 
Q 8586 3.338 46.663 0 1469.958 
SZOC1 8586 0.474 0.499 0 1 
SZOC2 8586 0.348 0.476 0 1 
OPT80 8586 0.195 0.396 0 1 
OPT20 8586 0.182 0.386 0 1 
PURCHASE 8586 0.166 0.372 0 1 
NPR 8586 0.061 0.923 -1 1 
ROA 8586 -2.914 30.936 -45.393 12.782 
Size 8586 4.462 2.451 -4.645 13.547 
Lev 8586 0.118 0.333 0.001 20.485 
Monetary amounts are in GBP(Million). 
Assets are book value of total assets. Investment is defined as capital expenditure. Cashflow calculated as 
earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q is the market 
value of assets divided by the book value of assets. SZOC1, SZOC2, OPT80, PURHCASE and NPR are 
measures of overconfidence. OPT20 is a measure of pessimism. Lev is leverage or total amount of debt divided 
by total assets. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income divided by total assets. Size is calculated as 
the log of market value of equity.
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Table 5.3 Investment and cashflow tabulated by overconfidence measures 
    Egypt 
    Summary of INV Summary of CF 
  Group Mean Std. Dev. Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
SZOC1 0 0.146 8.063 1,303 0.156 1.507 1,230 
  1 0.364 0.992 95 0.223 0.509 94 
SZOC2 0 0.129 7.949 1,342 0.159 1.488 1,269 
  1 0.297 0.269 56 0.200 0.420 55 
OPT80 0 0.059 0.184 1,080 0.158 1.320 1,018 
  1 0.694 16.360 317 0.165 1.853 305 
OPT20 0 0.138 8.558 1,158 0.168 1.544 1,091 
  1 0.014 0.052 240 0.123 0.970 233 
    UK 
    Summary of INV Summary of CF 
  Group Mean Std. Dev. Freq. Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
SZOC1 0 0.069 2.173 5,607 -0.190 26.371 5,507 
  1 0.371 12.458 4,442 -0.081 29.975 4,418 
SZOC2 0 0.198 10.050 6,906 -0.441 33.536 6,794 
  1 0.213 2.432 3,143 0.508 7.066 3,131 
OPT80 0 0.099 2.173 9,234 0.088 18.959 9,111 
  1 1.363 28.715 815 -2.703 74.543 814 
OPT20 0 0.224 9.016 8,804 -0.132 29.604 8,734 
  1 0.051 0.486 1,245 -0.206 11.020 1,191 
PURCHASE 0 0.224 9.158 8,526 -0.160 30.380 8,415 
  1 0.082 0.777 1,523 -0.030 4.633 1,510 
NPR 1 0.073 0.870 682 0.037 5.588 891 
  2 0.142 1.284 2,019 0.285 9.731 1,796 
INV is investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. 
SZOC1, SZOC2, OPT80, PURCHASE and NPR are measures of overconfidence. 
OPT20 is a measure of pessimism.  
Group definition: 0 not overconfident, 1 overconfident 
NPR group definition: 1 negative NPR values signifying lower overconfidence, 2 positive NPR values 
signifying higher degrees of overconfidence.  
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I will now consider how investment may vary by industry or year. Figure 5.1 presents the 
mean level of investment distributed according to industry. It may be important to note that 
the definition of investment employed is capital expenditure divided by lagged property plant 
and equipment. This is because the value of investment in relation to the existing PP&E is 
more meaningful than just the dollar amount of investment. As expected, certain industries14 
have a higher level of capital expenditure than their competitors for both Egypt and the UK. 
This is because some industries, by nature, are more capital intensive than others. Figure 5.1 
indicates that the energy and material industry lead in the level of capital expenditure for the 
UK. In Egypt, while the level of investment is understandably a lot lower than the UK, it 
seems to be led by the materials industry.15  
Figure 5.2 presents the mean industry investment per year, in Egypt. We expect that the 
investment level during certain years may have been affected by the political and economic 
circumstances of the country. In fact, if we look at Figure 5.2, we can see that capital 
expenditure was on a rising trend in Egypt until 2007, then with the global financial crisis it 
started to decrease. It declined even further with the start of the Egyptian turmoil in 2011, 
and was starting to recover in 2013, but then due to continued turmoil with the overthrowing 
of president Morsi and the devaluation of the Egyptian pound, the investment level decreased 
to an all-time low in 2016. Cautioned by this information I will include industry and year 
fixed effects to my regression. 
 
 
14 Industry classifications were made according to GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) obtained 
from Osiris. 
15 There are 3 industries in the Egyptian market with no listed companies, or only one listed company, which 
had to be excluded as overconfidence measures could not be determined. 
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Figure 5.1 Mean investment per industry 
10 – Energy      35 - Healthcare 
15 – Materials      45 – Information Technology 
20 – Industrials      50 - Communication Services   
25 - Consumer Discretionary    55 - Utilities 
30 - Consumer Staples     60 - Real Estate   
 
 
Figure 5.2 Mean investment per year (Egypt) 
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5.4 Regression results and analysis 
Table 5.4 provides the results for the baseline regression against investment for Egypt and 
the UK. The first two columns present the basic relationship between cashflow, Tobin’s Q 
and investment. Cashflow and Tobin’s Q are considered the most popular variables affecting 
investment as established in previous literature.  Since I have panel data, it makes sense to 
utilise the advantages of panel data and use fixed effects analysis. However, the results 
presented in Table 5.4 include both FE and standard OLS regression without FE. As we can 
see for both Egypt and the UK, the relationship between investment and cash flow is positive 
and significant, where firms with higher cash have a better ability to invest. The coefficient 
for cashflow in the fixed effects model without controls is higher in the UK with a coefficient 
of 0.181 than for the Egyptian market with a coefficient 0.024. Signifying that the availability 
of cash has a greater influence on investment for the UK market than for the Egyptian market. 
Nonetheless both coefficients are positive and significant at 1% level. The relationship 
between investment and Tobin’s Q is also positive and significant, where firms with higher 
Tobin’s Q are better able to invest. 
The third column presents the results of a FE regression of investment against cashflow, 
Tobin’s Q and the rest of the control variables. This regression includes controls but excludes 
overconfidence proxies, this to form the basic relationship between investment and control 
variables. The basic regression will be beneficial when making comparisons with models 
where overconfidence proxies are included. Firstly, one can note that as control variables are 
added the coefficient of cashflow increased to 0.452 for Egypt and 0.488 for the UK and 
remains highly significant for both markets at 1%. This is reasonable as cash is not only an 
independent but also a moderator variable making it a crucial variable in the model. As in 
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Malmendier and Tate (2005) we can see from Table 5.4 that the interaction between 
Cashflow (CF) and Tobin’s Q is significant and positive (with a coefficient = 0.047 and p-
value = <0.001 for Egypt and a coefficient = 0.0001 and p-value = 0.015 for the UK), 
indicating that the effect of Q on investment increases with increasing cash flow. This makes 
sense as more successful companies (higher Tobin’s Q) are more responsive to investment 
opportunities especially with increase in cash flow. However, note that while Tobin’s Q 
remains positive with a coefficient of 0.001 for the UK, it is now significant only at 10%.   
Furthermore, as we can see from Table 5.4, the effect of leverage alone on investment is 
negative for both markets. Firms with higher levels of debt will tend to invest less. However, 
also note that, leverage for the UK market is highly significant at 1% level and with a 
coefficient of -0.004. For Egypt, the coefficient for leverage is -0.0001, while that holds the 
expected sign, it is insignificant with a probability of 0.317. However, the interaction between 
cashflow and leverage is positive. This means that firms with higher leverage will tend to 
increase their investment if they have increased cash flow. My interpretation of this is that 
these firms would feel safer paying back their debt, i.e. they are more confident in paying 
back parts of their debt and interest as it comes due. A firm is most concerned with current 
cash needs, driven by short-term debt as it can cause default. Again, the interaction term 
while highly significant for the UK at 1% level, is insignificant for the Egyptian market 
although it presents the expected coefficients sign.  
Size is significant and positive for the UK (coefficient = 0.552, p-value = 0.014) signifying 
that larger firms have higher levels of investment. However, size and cash flow interaction 
term (coefficient = -0.202, p-value = <0.001) while significant has a negative coefficient, 
indicating that larger firms invest less as their cash flow increases. While this result is 
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somewhat puzzling, it may be reasoned that large firms are better able to get leverage at lower 
rates, having already set up their credit worthiness in the market, and thus do not necessarily 
depend on internal cashflow when making investment decision. These results are also in line 
with those presented by Malmendier and Tate (2005). The next subsections discuss the effect 
of each managerial overconfidence measure separately on investment sensitivity to cashflow. 
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Table 5.4 Baseline regression 
Egypt 
Variables No FE, No Controls FE, No Controls FE, Controls 
CF𝑡 0.028 (<0.001) 0.024 (<0.001) 0.452 (<0.001) 
Q𝑡−1 0.053 (0.007) 0.076 (0.002) 0.071 (0.001) 
ROA𝑡 - - 0.698 (0.039) 
SIZE𝑡 - - -0.160 (0.120) 
LEV𝑡  - - -0.0001 (0.137) 
CFt.Q𝑡−1 - - 0.047 (<0.001) 
CFt.ROA𝑡 - - 0.203 (<0.001) 
CFt.SIZE𝑡 - - 0.306 (<0.001) 
CFt.LEV𝑡  - - 0.0001 (0.442) 
Intercept - - 0.164 (0.070) 
Firm FE No Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No No 
R-Sq 0.276 0.277 0.472 
Rho - 0.128 0.229 
UK 
CF𝑡 0.181 (<0.001) 0.181 (<0.001) 0.488 (<0.001) 
Q𝑡−1 0.003 (<0.001) 0.007 (<0.001) 0.001 (0.055) 
ROA𝑡 - - 0.0003 (0.751) 
SIZE𝑡 - - 0.552 (0.014) 
LEV𝑡  - - -0.004 (<0.001) 
CFt.Q𝑡−1 - - 0.0001 (0.015) 
CFt.ROA𝑡 - - 0.0002 (<0.001) 
CFt.SIZE𝑡 - - -0.202 (<0.001) 
CFt.LEV𝑡  - - 0.0002 (0.006) 
Intercept - - 0.212 (0.066) 
Firm FE No Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No No 
R-Sq 0.360 0.359 0.778 
Rho - 0.144 0.153 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵3 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵5 
Regression for Egypt performed in USD and for the UK in GBP. This table presents baseline regression of 
Investment against cashflow, overconfidence and other control variables. The dependent variable in this 
regression is investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q 
is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Lev is leverage or total amount of debt divided 
by total assets. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income divided by total assets. Size is calculated as 
the log of market value of equity. The number of firms 𝑖 for Egypt is 102 is and for the UK is 761, the time 
period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018 for both markets, the number of observations 𝑛 for Egypt is 1321 and 
for the UK is 8586. Expected coefficient signs are described in section 5.2. 
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The 𝑅2 reported in the table above is the overall 𝑅2. When performing panel data analysis, 
it is important to consider the value of rho rather than just the overall 𝑅2. Whereas pooled 
regression often refers to 𝑅2 as the proportion of variance in the dependent variable explained 
by the independent variables, under fixed effects rho refers to the proportion of variation 
explained by the firm-specific term (the term that changes across firms but does not vary with 
time), under random effects rho is used to refer to the fraction of total variance due to 𝜀𝑖 
(variation in the error term that changes across firms and time) 
Rho is known as the intraclass correlation and is measured as: 
𝑟ℎ𝑜 =
(𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎 _ 𝑢)2
(𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎 _ 𝑢)2 + (𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎 _ 𝜀)2
 
Where 
sigma _ u = standard deviation of residuals within groups 𝑢𝑖; 
sigma _ ε = standard deviation of residuals (overall error term) 𝜀𝑖. 
The next subsections will discuss how each of the overconfidence measures and its 
interaction with cashflow affect investment level. 
I. Overconfidence proxies SZOC  
SZOC1 and SZOC2 are composite scores for overconfidence proposed by Schrand and 
Zechman (2012) based on different firm-specific activities and its comparison with all firms 
in the same industry. The activities include investing, acquisition, debt to equity, convertible 
debt or preferred stock, and dividend yield.  They are discussed in Section 5.2 and discussed 
in more detail in Section 4.6. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 present the result of the effect of SZOC1 
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and its interaction with cashflow against investment for Egypt and the UK respectively. 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 present the results of the effect of SZOC2 on investment and its sensitivity 
to cashflow for Egypt and the UK respectively.  
Within the Egyptian market we can note from Table 5.5 that in the first column, SZOC1 has 
a coefficient 0.568 and is significant at a 1% level, while its interaction with cashflow has a 
coefficient of -0.102 and is insignificant. These sign coefficients provide unexpected results, 
as it would mean that overconfidence bias reduces the managers likelihood to invest as more 
cash becomes available. This is contrary to the hypothesis, the findings for the UK market 
and the findings by Malmendier and Tate (2005). Further once controls are added, the value 
of SZOC1 and its interaction with cashflow become insignificant. Thus, SZOC1 is only 
significant when there are no controls, this is probably due to model under-specification, as 
both variables (SZOC1 and the interaction term) are insignificant when controls are added, 
regardless of how serial autocorrelation is controlled for, as can be seen from columns 3 and 
4 of Table 5.5, and therefore I conclude that managerial overconfidence as measured by 
SZOC1 is insignificant. Similarly, in Table 5.7 SZOC2 and its interaction with cashflow 
remain insignificant for the Egyptian market with or without controls and regardless of how 
autocorrelation is controlled for. The results for cashflow, Tobin’s Q and the other control 
variables remain very similar to the baseline regression in terms of signs of coefficients and 
significance levels. For example, cashflow remains significant at a 1% level with the different 
model specifications in Table 5.7. However, once I control for serial autocorrelation, several 
control variables now turn insignificant. I speculate that this may be due to the method used 
to control for serial autocorrelation, which is clustering observations by firm id. I will discuss 
this in more detail in what follows. It is also interesting to note that the model which includes 
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SZOC1 as an overconfidence measure is very similar to the model where SZOC2 is included. 
The results presented in Appendix A5C1 and A5C2, where regression is performed using 
EGP instead of the equivalent USD show similar results. Cashflow and Tobin’s Q behave 
similarly and SZOC1, SZOC2 and their interaction with cashflow are also insignificant.  
On the other hand, and interestingly, the UK market shows a significant negative relationship 
between overconfidence and investment, and a positive significant relationship of the 
interaction between overconfidence, cashflow and investment for both SZOC1 and SZOC2. 
For example, in the first column of Table 5.6, we can see that SZOC1 is significant with a p-
value of 0.04 and a coefficient of -0.361, while the interaction term is highly significant at 
the 1% level with a coefficient of 0.23. I tried testing this model without adding the 
interaction term between SZOC1 and cashflow, and SZOC1 showed a significant positive 
coefficient of 0.024 and a p-value of 0.043. Thus, if we do not consider the effect of cash as 
a moderator variable, the coefficient of the overconfidence variable results positive, 
signifying that overconfident managers will increase investment. However, once cash is 
included as a moderator, one can clearly see that investment increases only due to the 
availability of excess cash. This interaction term in fact is highly significant at 1% level in 
the models where I control for serial autocorrelation. The UK results do give evidence of 
previous theoretical findings in the literature such as Malmendier and Tate (2005), Campbell 
et al. (2011) and Oran (2013) where it is theoretically deduced that overconfident managers 
do not take advantage of investment opportunities unless there is an abundance of internal 
cashflow (retained earnings). If overconfident managers have to tap into the external market 
to finance their investments, they will view any debt as risky, and their company stock as 
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undervalued, and are thus likely to pass on investment opportunities even if they provide 
positive NPV.  
In fact, the SZOC measures of overconfidence remained significant even when standard 
errors were clustered by firm, or when I included interactions of CF and industry. Again, 
both models present very similar results whether SZOC1 or SZOC2 are used. The more 
puzzling element though is that Tobin’s Q turns insignificant when overconfidence proxies 
and controls are added, regardless of how autocorrelation is controlled for. This may be 
because Tobin’s Q is arguably not always the best proxy for measuring firm performance.  
Bartlett and Partnoy (2018) argue that as Tobin’s Q uses the book value of assets 
(denominator) in its measurement, it is likely to produce biased estimates. This is due to 
certain assets being omitted as intangible assets, or other firm-specific details which may 
systematically alter Tobin’s Q (e.g. the level of current assets, depreciation among others). 
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Table 5.5 The effect of the interaction of cashflow and SZOC1 on investment (Egypt) 
 Egypt 
Variables OC, FE, No Controls OC, FE, Controls 
Std. Errors 
Cluster by 
Firm 
Industry-CF 
Interaction, Firm 
FE 
CF𝑡 0.053 (<0.001) 0.504 (<0.001) 0.504 (0.043) 0.050 (0.002) 
Q𝑡−1 0.078 (<0.001) 0.062 (0.007) 0.062 (0.109) - 0.017 (0.362) 
ROA𝑡 - 1.119 (0.011) 1.119 (0.430) 0.333 (0.319) 
SIZE𝑡 - -0.161 (0.145) -0.161 (0.030) 0.041 (0.062) 
LEV𝑡 - -0.0001 (0.680) -0.0001 (0.002) -0.0001 (0.027) 
CF𝑡.Q𝑡−1 - 0.059 (<0.001) 0.059 (0.343) 0.011 (0.798) 
CF𝑡.ROA𝑡 - 0.418(<0.001) 0.418 (0.433) 0.055 (0.267) 
CF𝑡.SIZE𝑡 - 0.303 (<0.001) 0.303 (0.278) -0.005 (0.668) 
CF𝑡 .LEV𝑡 - -0.0001 (0.153) -0.0001 (0.485) -0.0001 (0.297) 
SZOC1𝑡−1 0.568 (<0.001) 0.566 (0.501) 0.566 (0.115) 0.537 (0.123) 
CF𝑡.SZOC1𝑡−1 -0.102 (0.606) -0.059 (0.760) -0.059 (0.973) -0.286 (0.081) 
Intercept 0.012 (0.809) 0.116 (0.226) 0.116 (0.168) 0.120 (0.275) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-CF FE No No No Yes 
R-Sq 0.364 0.399 0.399 0.577 
Rho 0.100 0.126 0.126 0.131 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑍𝑂𝐶1𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 . 𝑆𝑍𝑂𝐶1𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵7 
Regression is performed in USD. This table presents different regression models to study the effect of 
overconfidence, cashflow, control variables and their interaction on investment. The dependent variable in this 
regression is investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q 
is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. SZOC1 is the Schrand and Zechman (2012) 
measure of overconfidence. OC is overconfidence and FE is fixed effects. 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′  in the equation is the vector of 
control variables. Lev is leverage or total amount of debt divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets 
calculated as net income divided by total assets. Size is calculated as the log of market value of equity.  Industry 
classifications were made according to GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard). The number of firms 𝑖 
is 102, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018, the number of observations 𝑛 is 1321. Expected 
coefficient signs are described in section 5.2. 
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Table 5.6 The effect of the interaction of cashflow and SZOC1 on investment (UK) 
Variables OC, FE, No Controls OC, FE, Controls 
Std. Errors 
Cluster by 
Firm 
Industry-CF 
Interaction, Firm 
FE 
CF𝑡 0.243 (<0.001) 0.173 (<0.001) 0.173 (0.001) 0.175 (0.008) 
Q𝑡−1 0.002 (0.020) -0.001 (0.789) -0.001 (0.595) -0.002 (0.797) 
ROA𝑡 - -0.001 (<0.001) -0.001 (0.882) -0.0004 (0.910) 
SIZE𝑡 - 0.151 (<0.001) 0.151 (0.353) 0.159 (0.338) 
LEV𝑡 - -0.0003 (0.079) -0.0003 (0.916) -0.006 (0.922) 
CFt.Q𝑡−1 - 0.0001 (0.617) 0.00001 (0.307) -0.0004 (0.370) 
CFt.ROA𝑡 - 0.0002 (<0.001) 0.0002 (0.450) 1.8E-05 (0.498) 
CFt.SIZE𝑡 - 0.105 (<0.001) 0.105 (<0.001) -0.106 (0.002) 
CFt.LEV𝑡 - -0.0001 (0.660) -0.0001 (0.893) -3.130 (0.902) 
SZOC1𝑡−1 -0.361 (0.040) -0.069 (0.041) -0.069 (0.016) -0.041 (0.059) 
CFt.SZOC1𝑡−1 0.230 (<0.001) 0.316 (0.501) 0.316 (<0.001) 0.099 (<0.001) 
Intercept 0.090 (<0.001) -0.668 (0.046) -0.668 (0.322) -0.029 (0.303) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-CF FE No No No Yes 
R-Sq 0.879 0.914 0.914 0.915 
Rho 0.152 0.156 0.156 0.157 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑍𝑂𝐶1𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 . 𝑆𝑍𝑂𝐶1𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵7 
Regression is performed in GBP. This table presents different regression models to study the effect of 
overconfidence, cashflow, control variables and their interaction on investment. The dependent variable in this 
regression is investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q 
is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. SZOC1 is the Schrand and Zechman (2012) 
measure of overconfidence. OC is overconfidence and FE is fixed effects. 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′  in the equation is a vector of 
control variables. Lev is leverage or total amount of debt divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets 
calculated as net income divided by total assets. Size is calculated as the log of market value of equity. Industry 
classifications were made according to GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard). The number of firms 𝑖 
is 761, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018, the number of observations 𝑛 is 8586. Expected 
coefficient signs are described in section 5.2. 
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Table 5.7 The effect of the interaction of cashflow and SZOC2 on investment (Egypt) 
Variables 
OC, FE, No 
Controls 
OC, Fe, Controls 
Std. Errors 
Clustered by 
Firm 
Industry-CF 
Interaction, Firm 
FE 
CF𝑡 0.053 (<0.001) 0.505 (<0.001) 0.505 (<0.001) 0.049 (<0.001) 
Q𝑡−1 0.073 (0.001) 0.057 (0.014) 0.057 (0.067) -0.008 (0.595) 
ROA𝑡 - 1.019 (0.021) 1.019 (0.136) 0.282 (0.391) 
SIZE𝑡 - 0.165 (0.136) 0.165 (0.041) 0.025 (0.896) 
LEV𝑡 - 0.0002 (0.186) 0.0002 (0.068) 0.0001 (0.036) 
CFt.Q𝑡−1 - 0.059 (<0.001) 0.059 (0.383) 0.001 (0.94) 
CFt.ROA𝑡 - 0.415 (<0.001) 0.415 (0.407) 0.044 (0.328) 
CFt.SIZE𝑡 - 0.304 (<0.001) 0.304 (0.467) -0.004 (0.719) 
CFt.LEV𝑡 - -0.0001 (0.160) -0.0001 (0.251) 0.0001 (0.024) 
SZOC2𝑡−1 0.152 (0.404) 0.069 (0.703) 0.069 (0.194) 0.064 (0.288) 
CFt.SZOC2𝑡−1 -0.071 (0.730) 0.088 (0.661) 0.088 (0.230) -0.148 (0.163) 
Intercept 0.054 (0.261) 0.155 (0.107) 0.155 (0.239) -0.104 (0.428) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-CF F No No No Yes 
R-Sq 0.355 0.387 0.387 0.565 
Rho 0.101 0.129 0.129 0.137 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑍𝑂𝐶2𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 . 𝑆𝑍𝑂𝐶2𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵7 
Regression is performed in USD. This table presents different regression models to study the effect of 
overconfidence, cashflow, control variables and their interaction on investment. The dependent variable in this 
regression is investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q 
is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. SZOC2 is the Schrand and Zechman (2012) 
measure of overconfidence. 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′  in the equation is a vector of control variables. Lev is leverage or total amount 
of debt divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income divided by total assets. Size is 
calculated as the log of market value of equity. OC is overconfidence and FE is fixed effects. Industry 
classifications were made according to GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard). The number of firms 𝑖 
is 102, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018, the number of observations 𝑛 is 1321. Expected 
coefficient signs are described in section 5.2.
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Table 5.8 The effect of the interaction of cashflow and SZOC2 on investment (UK) 
Variables 
OC, FE, No 
Controls 
OC, Fe, Controls 
Std. Errors 
Clustered by 
Firm 
Industry CF 
Interaction, Firm 
FE 
CF𝑡 0.191 (<0.001) 0.630 (<0.001) 0.630 (<0.001) 0.645 (<0.001) 
Q𝑡−1 0.007 (<0.001) 0.001 (0.413) 0.001 (0.433) -0.011 (0.548) 
ROA𝑡 - 0.0001 (0.509) 0.001 (0.809) 0.003 (0.631) 
SIZE𝑡 - 0.064 (0.195) 0.064 (0.496) 0.074 (0.543) 
LEV𝑡 - -0.0003 (<0.001) -0.0003 (0.152) -0.0003 (0.012) 
CFt.Q𝑡−1 - 0.001 (<0.001) 0.001 (0.400) 0.001 (0.214) 
CFt.ROA𝑡 - 4.1E-05 (0.262) 4.1E-05 (0.852) 4.4E-05 (0.748) 
CFt.SIZE𝑡 - 0.309 (<0.001) 0.309 (<0.001) 0.410 (0.001) 
CFt.LEV𝑡 - 7.3E-05 (<0.001) 7.3E-05 (0.159) 5.2E-05 (0.120) 
SZOC2𝑡−1 -0.043 (0.044) -0.232 (0.018) -0.232 (0.022) -0.252 (0.024) 
CFt.SZOC2𝑡−1 0.489 (<0.001) 1.414 (<0.001) 1.414 (<0.001) 1.526 (0.004) 
Intercept -0.108 (0.206) -0.230 (0.280) -0.230 (0.588) -0.253 (0.608) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-CF F No No No Yes 
R-Sq 0.420 0.886 0.886 0.890 
Rho 0.170 0.123 0.123 0.117 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑍𝑂𝐶2𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 . 𝑆𝑍𝑂𝐶2𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵7 
Regression is performed in GBP. This table presents different regression models to study the effect of 
overconfidence, cashflow, control variables and their interaction on investment. The dependent variable in this 
regression is investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of  year PP&E. Q 
is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. SZOC2 is the Schrand and Zechman (2012) 
measure of overconfidence. OC is overconfidence and FE is fixed effects. 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′  in the equation is a vector of 
control variables. Lev is leverage or total amount of debt divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets 
calculated as net income divided by total assets. Size is calculated as the log of market value of equity. Industry 
classifications were made according to GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard). The number of firms 𝑖 
is 761, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018, the number of observations 𝑛 is 8586. Expected 
coefficient signs are described in section 5.2. 
 
II. Overconfidence proxies OPT 
The OPT proxies used in this thesis are based on Campbell et. al (2011) measure of 
overconfidence, they divide their measure into two categories, OPT80 are the overconfident 
managers/firms, while OPT20 are the non-confident or pessimistic managers/firms. An 
overview of the overconfidence measures is presented in Section 5.2 and discussed in more 
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detail in Section 4.6. The regression model testing the effect of the interactions of cashflow 
and OPT on investment is presented in Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 for Egypt and the UK 
respectively. From Table 5.9 we can see that, as with SZOC1, the OPT measures of 
overconfidence for the Egyptian market show that OPT80 turns out significant (coefficient = 
0.362, p-value = <0.001) only when included alone, while OPT20 and the interaction 
between cashflow and OPT80 or OPT20 are all insignificant. Once control variables are 
included in the model, the OPT80 turns insignificant as well (coefficient =0.523, p-value = 
0.510). Again, as with SZOC1, the significant result realized without the addition of controls 
is meaningless, as it may just be a result of frequency data being given an incorrect casual 
interpretation as in the Simpsons paradox (Hernan et al., 2011). As discussed above, under-
specified models produce biased results. Further, one can notice that whether I am using 
OPT, SZOC1 or SZOC2, all variables throughout the three models behave very similar with 
insignificant results for the Egyptian market.  
The results for the UK market, presented in Table 5.10, show that OPT80 is statistically 
significant, even when errors are clustered by firm. For example, in the third column where 
errors are clustered by firm, we can see that OPT80 has a coefficient = -0.213 and a p-value 
= 0.04, similarly CFOPT80 has a coefficient = 0.354 and a p-value = <0.001. These give the 
same results presented when SZOC1 or SZOC2 was included in the model, whereby 
investment by overconfident managers increased due to the availability of cashflow. 
Meanwhile the results for pessimism or lack of confidence, as measured by OPT20, are for 
the most part insignificant. This might signify that overconfidence affects the amount of 
managerial investment, whereas managerial pessimism or lack of confidence does not 
necessarily mean reduced investment levels. It is also interesting to note that the one variable 
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that always remains significant, regardless of the variables included and regardless of 
whether autocorrelation is controlled for or not, is cashflow. This is true for both the Egyptian 
and the UK markets. Perhaps signifying the importance of cashflow as one of the crucial 
factors that impact investment decisions. Although in this section I use a different method of 
measuring managerial overconfidence, the results for Egypt and the UK remain very much 
similar, supporting the results of the previous section.  
We can also notice that other control variables also turn insignificant when controlling for 
autocorrelation. This may be a consequence of the method used to control for serial 
autocorrelation, perhaps a more enhanced method could be used (a different method of 
controlling for serial autocorrelation will be discussed in more detail in the next section of 
the analysis). Nevertheless, these results are in line with the results presented by Malmendier 
and Tate (2005).  
One may argue that the difference in the results between the UK and Egypt, whereby the 
overconfidence measures are consistently insignificant for Egypt but significant for the UK, 
could be due to the Egyptian turmoil. Perhaps, the political instability caused the managers 
to be more risk averse, where public panic induced managerial caution. In such a case, the 
decisions made by overconfident and non-biased managers would be the same. This 
argument may be supported by the UK market being in a state of relative stability, which 
allowed the behaviour of overconfident managers to be more pronounced on investment 
decisions and their sensitivity to cashflow.  
Thus, I argue that the impact of overconfidence on financial decision is an inverted “U” 
shape, that differs with the degree of risk, as modelled in Figure 5.3. That is, the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on decision making is concave to the degree of external/political 
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risk. In an environment where there is no risk, the behaviour of overconfident as well as other 
non-biased managers will be the same. In this case, overconfident managers will not 
underestimate risk, as there is no risk to underestimate. As risk increases so does managerial 
overconfidence and its impact on financial decisions. In an environment where there is 
medium risk, overconfidence has a high impact on decision making. However, when risk 
exceeds a certain level, managerial overconfidence decreases as managers become more 
cautious due to increasingly clearer risk signals by the market. As risk becomes extremely 
high the impact of overconfidence goes to zero, and the behaviours of overconfident and 
other non-biased managers converge. In other words, one would expect that there is a certain 
level of risk, at which managerial overconfidence will have the highest impact on the 
decision-making process.  
 
Figure 5.3 Overconfidence and the degree of political risk 
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Table 5.9 The effect of the interaction of cashflow and OPT on investment (Egypt) 
 Egypt 
Variables OC, FE, No Controls OC, Fe, Controls 
Std. Errors 
Clustered by 
Firm 
Industry-CF 
Interaction, 
Firm FE 
CF𝑡 0.049 (<0.001) 0.600 (<0.001) 0.600 (<0.001) 0.040 (<0.001) 
Q𝑡−1 0.065 (0.001) 0.013 (0.060) 0.013 (0.622) -0.010 (0.504) 
ROA𝑡 - 0.938 (0.036) 0.938 (0.073) 0.322 (0.318) 
SIZE𝑡 - -0.213 (0.055) -0.213 (0.005) -0.026 (0.863) 
LEV𝑡 - 0.0002(0.131) 0.0002 (0.524)  0.0001 (0.487) 
CFt.Q𝑡−1 - 0.054 (<0.001) 0.054 (0.543) 0.001 (0.836) 
CFt.ROA𝑡 - 0.419 (<0.001) 0.419 (0.524) 0.031 (0.460) 
CFt.SIZE𝑡 - 0.440 (<0.001) 0.440 (0.896) 0.044 (0.257) 
CFt.LEV𝑡 - -0.0001 (0.035) -0.0001(0.407) 0.0001 (0.474) 
OPT80𝑡−1  0.362 (<0.001) 0.523 (0.510) 0.523 (0.707) 0.383 (<0.401) 
CFt.OPT80𝑡−1 0.0004 (0.888) -0.081 (0.105) -0.081 (0.764) -0.057 (0.307) 
OPT20𝑡−1 -0.013 (0.888) -0.073 (0.491) -0.073 (0.587) -0.027 (0.266) 
CFt.OPT20𝑡−1 -0.125 (0.275) 0.115 (0.057) 0.115 (0.538) 0.070 (0.103) 
Intercept -0.028 (0.143) 0.201 (0.047) 0.201 (0.459) 0.116 (0.360) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-CF FE No No No Yes 
R-Sq 0.593 0.421 0.421 0.582 
Rho 0.102 0.113 0.113 0.125 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑂𝑃𝑇′𝑖𝑡−1𝛽3 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 . 𝑂𝑃𝑇′𝑖𝑡−1𝐵6 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵7 
Regression is performed in USD. This table presents different regression models to study the effect of 
overconfidence, cashflow, control variables and their interaction on investment. The dependent variable in this 
regression is investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q 
is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. OPT80 is the Campbell et al. (2011) measure 
of overconfidence, similarly OPT20 is a measure of pessimism. 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′  in the equation is a vector of control 
variables. Lev is leverage or total amount of debt divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets calculated as 
net income divided by total assets. Size is calculated as the log of market value of equity. OC is overconfidence 
and FE is fixed effects. Industry classifications were made according to GICS (Global Industry Classification 
Standard). The number of firms 𝑖 is 102, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018, the number of 
observations 𝑛 is 1321. Expected coefficient signs are described in section 5.2. 
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Table 5.10 The effect of the interaction of cashflow and OPT on investment (UK) 
 UK 
Variables 
OC, FE, No 
Controls 
OC, Fe, Controls 
Std. Errors 
Clustered by 
Firm 
Industry-CF 
Interaction, Firm 
FE 
CF𝑡 0.314 (<0.001) 0.117 (<0.001) 0.117 (0.133) 0.129 (0.149) 
Q𝑡−1 0.0001 (0.039) -3.4E-07 (0.730) -3.4E-07 (0.999) -0.001 (0.990) 
ROA𝑡 - -0.0001 (0.201) -0.0001 (0.926) -0.001 (0.947) 
SIZE𝑡 - 0.023 (<0.001) 0.023 (0.442) 0.168 (0.372) 
LEV𝑡 - -1.8E-05 (<0.001) -1.8E-05 (0.601) -1.9E-05 (0.62) 
CFt.Q𝑡−1 - 0.0001 (<0.001) 0.0001 (0.363) 0.0041 (0.438) 
CFt.ROA𝑡 - 0.0001 (<0.001) 0.0001 (0.563) 0.0041 (0.650) 
CFt.SIZE𝑡 - -0.076 (<0.001) -0.076 (0.039) -0.076 (0.036) 
CFt.LEV𝑡 - 0.0004 (<0.001) 0.0004 (0.634) 0.0004 (0.652) 
OPT80𝑡−1  -0.045 (0.010) -0.213 (0.007) -0.213 (0.040) -0.205 (0.014) 
CFt.OPT80𝑡−1 0.026 (0.086) 0.354 (<0.001) 0.354 (<0.001) 0.353 (<0.001) 
OPT20𝑡−1 0.083 (<0.001) -0.022 (0.734) -0.022 (0.432) -0.028 (0.495) 
CFt.OPT20𝑡−1 -0.004 (0.127) -0.092 (<0.001) -0.092 (0.397) -0.097 (0.401) 
Intercept -0.062 (<0.001) -0.120 (<0.001) -0.120 (0.314) -0.726 (0.293) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-CF FE No No No Yes 
R-Sq 0.687 0.925 0.925 0.927 
Rho 0.136 0.184 0.184 0.186 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑂𝑃𝑇′𝑖𝑡−1𝛽3 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 . 𝑂𝑃𝑇′𝑖𝑡−1𝐵6 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵7 
Regression is performed in GBP. This table presents different regression models to study the effect of 
overconfidence, cashflow, control variables and their interaction on investment. The dependent variable in this 
regression is investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q 
is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. OPT80 is the Campbell et al. (2011) measure 
of overconfidence, similarly OPT20 is a measure of pessimism. 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′  in the equation is a vector of control 
variables. Lev is leverage or total amount of debt divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets calculated as 
net income divided by total assets. Size is calculated as the log of market value of equity. OC is overconfidence 
and FE is fixed effects. Industry classifications were made according to GICS (Global Industry Classification 
Standard). The number of firms 𝑖 is 761, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018, the number of 
observations 𝑛 is 8586. Expected coefficient signs are described in section 5.2. 
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III. Overconfidence proxies PURCHASE and NPR 
The PURCHASE and NPR measures define overconfidence by the stock purchasing 
decisions of managers and as such are applicable only in the UK. The results of the regression 
of investment against cashflow, overconfidence, control variables and the interaction 
variables are presented in Table 5.11 and 5.12 for PURCHASE and NPR respectively. As 
shown in Table 5.11, the PURCHASE measure is insignificant across all four models. 
However, interestingly, the interaction term between cashflow and PURCHASE is 
significant and negative in the first two models (coefficient = -0.255, p-value = 0.005 and 
coefficient = 0.120, p-value = 0.008), once errors are clustered by firm, the interaction term 
turns insignificant.  The significant result in the first two models may be a consequence of 
serial autocorrelation which could cause model bias. While both PURCHASE and NPR 
measures of overconfidence are based on stock purchases, the PURCHASE measure is 
relatively very restrictive and thus may not be very efficient in capturing managerial 
overconfidence. Please see detailed discussion in Section 4.6.  
On the other hand, the results for NPR measure, presented in Table 5.12, are significant in 
the first two models. However, once serial autocorrelation is controlled for, NPR has a 
coefficient of 0.029 but is now insignificant with a p-value of 0.506 when clustered by firm, 
this is also true when industry cashflow interaction are included and controlling for 
autocorrelation by firm cluster. The interaction of cashflow with NPR remains significant 
across all four models. One could argue that overconfidence alone, as measured by NPR, has 
no significant relationship on investment. However, once there is an abundance of cash, the 
effects of overconfidence become more pronounced.  
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Again, one can notice, as with the previous two models, that Tobin’s Q is insignificant when 
controls are added (coefficient = 0.0001, p-value = 0.947 under the NPR model). In fact, 
several of the variables turn insignificant when serial autocorrelation is accounted for. The 
method used to control for serial autocorrelation in this study is by clustering observations 
within each firm. While some of the overconfidence measures for the UK remain significant 
and robust to controlling for autocorrelation in this way, PURCHASE and NPR measures of 
overconfidence do not. Alternatively, I used the Prais-Winsten method to control for serial 
correlation. (I present the full table of results in the appendix A5C5.) The Prais-Winsten 
regression method uses a GLS method to estimate the parameters in a model where the errors 
are serially correlated. The regression process assumes that errors follow a first-order 
autoregressive serial correlation. The resulting coefficients and p-values from the Prais-
Winsten regression including controls but excluding firm fixed effects and industry 
interaction with cashflow presented in Table 5C5 show that all the measures of 
overconfidence except PURCHASE and their interaction with cash flow remain highly 
significant at the 5% and 1% level. The signs on the coefficients are also as expected, with 
negative coefficients for overconfidence measures alone, and positive coefficients for the 
interaction terms. Further, the model presented in Table 5C5 tested SZOC2. In order to avoid 
multicollinearity, I tested SZOC1 in a separate model and found SZOC1 to be significant at 
a 5% level with a coefficient of -0.059 while the interaction term CF.SZOC1 was significant 
at the 1% level with a coefficient of 0.187. Further, note from Table 5C5 that by controlling 
for serial autocorrelation in a different manner several of the control variables are now 
significant, except for the Tobin’s Q which remains insignificant for the UK market. I 
performed the Prais-Winsten regression on the Egyptian market and the overconfidence 
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measures remained insignificant; the results are presented in Table 5C5 alongside the UK 
market.  
Thus, the main conclusion for the Egyptian and the UK market remain the same, even when 
using a different method to control for serial autocorrelation. The measures of 
overconfidence against investment are insignificant for the Egyptian market. On the other 
hand, the results for the UK show that there is a significant relationship between the degree 
of overconfidence and the sensitivity of cashflow to investment under all measures of 
overconfidence, except the PURCHASE measure. This means that an overconfident (UK) 
manager is more likely to increase investment when there is more cash available. The results 
for the UK are very comparable to those found by Malmendier and Tate (2005).  
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Table 5.11 The effect of the interaction of cashflow and PURCHASE on investment 
(UK) 
 PURCHASE 
Variables OC, FE, No Controls OC, Fe, Controls 
Std. Errors 
Clustered by 
Firm 
Industry-CF 
Interaction, 
Firm FE 
CF𝑡 0.184 (<0.001) 0.117 (0.078) 0.117 (<0.001) 0.487 (0.001) 
Q𝑡−1 -0.007 (<0.001) 0.003 (0.082) 0.003 (0.440) -0.001 (0.545) 
ROA𝑡 - 0.006 (<0.001) 0.006 (0.868) 0.0004 (0.856) 
SIZE𝑡 - 0.007 (0.7780 0.007 (0.555) 0.067 (0.570) 
LEV𝑡 - 7.9E-06 (0.531) 7.9E-06 (0.254) -0.0001 (0.007) 
CFt.Q𝑡−1 - 0.003 (0.403) 0.003 (0.171) 0.0001 (0.218) 
CFt.ROA𝑡 - 0.0004 (<0.001) 0.0004 (0.267) 0.0002 (0.281) 
CFt.SIZE𝑡 - -0.076 (0.001) -0.076 (0.018) -0.198 (0.024) 
CFt.LEV𝑡 - 4.6E-06 (0.659) 4.6E-06 (0.248) 0.0003 (0.008) 
PURCHASE𝑡−1 0.008 (0.971) 0.008 (0.308) 0.008 (0.743) 0.028 (0.761) 
CF.PURCHASEt-1 
 
-0.255 (0.005) -0.120 (0.008) -0.120 (0.526) -0.203 (0.564) 
Intercept -0.161 (0.041) -0.099 (0.482) -0.099 (0.628) -0.248 (0.646) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-CF FE No No No Yes 
R-Sq 0.377 0.775 0.775 0.781 
Rho 0.171 0.156 0.156 0.147 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 . 𝑃𝑈𝑅𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑆𝐸𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵7 
Regression is performed in GBP. This table presents different regression models to study the effect of 
overconfidence, cashflow, control variables and their interaction on investment. The dependent variable in this 
regression is investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q 
is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. PURCHASE is an overconfidence measure 
based on insider net stock purchases. 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′  in the equation is a vector of control variables. Lev is leverage or total 
amount of debt divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income divided by total assets. 
Size is calculated as the log of market value of equity. OC is overconfidence and FE is fixed effects. Industry 
classifications were made according to GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard). The number of firms 𝑖 
is 761, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018, the number of observations 𝑛 is 8586. Expected 
coefficient signs are described in section 5.2. 
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Table 5.12 The effect of the interaction of cashflow and NPR on investment (UK) 
 NPR 
 
OC, FE, No 
Controls 
OC, Fe, Controls 
Std. Errors 
Clustered by 
Firm 
Industry-CF 
Interaction, Firm 
FE 
CF𝑡 0.118 (<0.001) 0.412 (<0.001) 0.412 (0.124) 0.119 (0.074) 
Q𝑡−1 0.003 (0.020) 0.001 (0.947) 0.001 (0.323) 0.001 (0.994) 
ROA𝑡 - 0.006 (<0.001) 0.006 (<0.001) 0.003 (0.023) 
SIZE𝑡 - 0.007 (0.306) 0.007 (0.763) 0.001 (0.955) 
LEV𝑡 - 7.78E-06 (0.371) 7.78E-06 (0.550) 7.74E-06 (0.332) 
CFt.Q𝑡−1 - 0.0002 (0.766) 0.0002 (0.237) 0.0001 (0.934) 
CFt.ROA𝑡 - -0.002 (<0.001) -0.002 (<0.001) -0.003 (0.005) 
CFt.SIZE𝑡 - -0.012 (0.077) -0.012 (<0.001) 0.033 (0.458) 
CFt.LEV𝑡 - 5.2E-06 (0.072) 5.2E-06 (0.668) -1.6E-06 (0.868) 
NPR𝑡−1 0.031 (0.007) 0.029 (0.025) 0.029 (0.506) 0.038 (0.308) 
CFt.NPRt-1 0.272 (<0.001) 0.068 (<0.001) 0.068 (0.018) 0.120 (0.028) 
Intercept -0.113 (<0.001) -0.041 (0.735) -0.041 (0.438) -0.142 (0.264) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-CF FE No No No Yes 
R-Sq 0.753 0.919 0.919 0.915 
Rho 0.189 0.563 0.563 0.613 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 . 𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵7 
Regression is performed in GBP. This table presents different regression models to study the effect of 
overconfidence, cashflow, control variables and their interaction on investment. The dependent variable in this 
regression is investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q 
is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. NPR is an overconfidence measure based on 
insider net stock purchases. 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′  in the equation is a vector of control variables. Lev is leverage or total amount 
of debt divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income divided by total assets. Size is 
calculated as the log of market value of equity. OC is overconfidence and FE is fixed effects. Industry 
classifications were made according to GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard). The number of firms 𝑖 
is 761, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018, the number of observations 𝑛 is 8586. Expected 
coefficient signs are described in section 5.2.
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5.4.1 Robustness checks 
The results presented in Section 5.3 for the UK show that as long as overconfident managers 
have sufficient amount of internal cashflow they will continue to increase investment. Once 
they are forced to look for external finance, overconfident managers are more likely to dislike 
issuing new equity, believing it to be undervalued. Thus, financing investments should matter 
most for firms that are equity dependent and have depleted their internal cashflow and their 
debt capacity to finance investments. Following the work of Malmendier and Tate (2005) I 
will take an additional step to test this prediction. I use the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index 
which is a relative measure of firm reliance on external financing. The KZ-index classify 
firms as constrained or unconstrained based on five accounting ratios: cashflow to total 
capital, 𝑄, debt to total capital, dividends to total capital, and cash holdings to capital. This 
estimate is presented as follows: 
 
KZit= (-1.001909×
CFit
Kit-1
)+(0.2826389×Q
it
)+(3.139193×Levit) -
(39.3678×
Dividendsit
Kit-1
) -(1.314759×
𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑖𝑡−1
) 
(5.2) 
The lagged value of the KZ index is then divided into 5 quantiles with higher quantiles 
indicating a higher degree of financial constraints. The regression will then be performed 
separately on each quintile. In other words, I performed five separate regressions, one for 
each quintile.  I will use SZOC2, OPT80 and NPR16 as measures of overconfidence, as these 
 
16 I chose to exclude SZOC1 to avoid multicollinearity, as SZOC1 and SZOC2 are highly correlated, and 
SZOC2 is the more comprehensive composite of overconfidence. I also exclude PURCHASE as it was 
consistently insignificant in the previous models.  
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are the main measures that showed significant results in the previous section. The test is 
conducted only on the UK market where significant results were achieved. The results are 
presented in Table 5.13.  
As predicted, and in support of the findings presented in Malmandier and Tate (2005) and 
the effect of SZOC and OPT measures of overconfidence on the sensitivity of investment to 
cashflow was significant mainly for the top quantile of KZ index where firms were most 
severely constrained. In fact, even though the standard errors were clustered by firm, the 
effect remained strong with p-values close to zero. This is especially true for SZOC where 
the coefficient is 0.049 and a p-value of 0.014 and the interaction term CF.SZOC has a 
coefficient of 0.322 with a p-value of <0.001. Also significant but at a lower level is OPT80 
with a coefficient of 0.072 and a p-value of 0.006, and the interaction term CF.OPT80 has a 
coefficient of 0.113 and a p-value of 0.024. We can see though that NPR is not significant 
for highly constrained firms. Only for firms in the 3rd quintile, even though NPR remains 
insignificant, the interaction term CF.NPR is significant (coefficient = 0.230, p-value = 
0.022). 
It is also interesting to note that in the 3rd quintile, where firms are moderately financially 
constrained, all SZOC and OPT measures of overconfidence and its interaction to cashflow 
remain highly significant. I conclude that even when firms are moderately financially 
constrained (may have not depleted sources of riskless debt) they are still more likely to 
overinvest in the presence of an abundance of internal cashflow.  We can also notice that 
firms that are least constrained, have the least significant results. Even cashflow is only 
significant at a 10% level for the least financially constrained firms and surprisingly has a 
negative coefficient of -0.689. Perhaps where firms are least constrained, the level of 
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investment depends on other factors, for example the investment opportunities available to 
the firm rather than the source of funding.  
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Table 5.13 Regression results with KZ index 
 Most Constrained    Least Constrained 
  1 2 3 4 5 
CF𝑡 
0.393 
(0.008) 
0.018 
(0.830) 
1.976 
(<0.001) 
0.007 
(0.960) 
-0.689 
(0.055) 
Q𝑡−1 
0.013 
(0.001) 
-0.01 
(0.047) 
-0.062 
(0.032) 
0.002 
(0.817) 
-0.019 
(0.558) 
 ROA𝑡 
-0.005 
(<0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.225) 
0.027 
(<0.001) 
0.001 
(0.559) 
0.019 
(0.06) 
 SIZE𝑡 
-0.01783 
(0.194) 
-0.0189 
(0.686) 
-0.02521 
(0.310) 
-0.00738 
(0.519) 
0.0441 
(0.721) 
LEV𝑡  
1.7E-05 
(0.951) 
-0.002 
(0.285) 
1.9E-05 
(0.413) 
-3.9E-06 
(0.249) 
1.9E-05 
(0.325) 
CFt.Q𝑡−1 
-0.009 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.102) 
0.107 
(0.007) 
0.014 
(0.058) 
0.051 
(0.006) 
CFt.ROA𝑡 
-0.011 
(<0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.069) 
0.001 
(0.868) 
0.001 
(0.282) 
0.011 
(0.247) 
 CFt.SIZE𝑡 
0.036 
(0.266) 
0.039 
(0.352) 
0.043 
(0.691) 
-0.021 
(0.097) 
0.032 
(0.524) 
CFt.LEV𝑡  
-0.001 
(0.556) 
0.008 
(0.296) 
0.0002 
(0.112) 
4.06E-06 
(0.07) 
-1.24E-05 
(0.419) 
SZOC𝑡  
0.049 
(0.014) 
-0.028 
(0.415) 
-0.066 
(0.002) 
-0.016 
(0.237) 
0.058 
(0.546) 
CFt.SZOC𝑡−1 
0.322 
(<0.001) 
-0.137 
(0.193) 
0.472 
(0.001) 
-0.013 
(0.750) 
-0.123 
(0.247) 
OPT80𝑡−1 
0.072 
(0.006) 
0.087 
(0.500) 
-0.130 
(<0.001) 
-4.5E-05 
(0.999) 
-0.088 
(0.236) 
CFt.OPT80𝑡−1 
0.113 
(0.024) 
-0.115 
(0.066) 
0.464 
(0.001) 
0.088 
(0.375) 
-0.013 
(0.939) 
NPR𝑡−1  
0.013 
(0.241) 
-0.012 
(0.292) 
0.029 
(0.103) 
0.014 
(0.065) 
0.017 
(0.619) 
CFt.NPR𝑡−1 
-0.057 
(0.121) 
0.071 
(0.242) 
0.230 
(0.022) 
-0.045 
(0.082) 
-0.001 
(0.991) 
Intercept 
-2.135 
(<0.001) 
0.027 
(0.889) 
0.242 
(0.026) 
-0.023 
(0.756) 
-0.537 
(0.539) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rho 0.919 0.589 0.983 0.785 0.717 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑂𝐶′𝑖𝑡−1𝛽3 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 . 𝑂𝐶′𝑖𝑡−1𝐵6 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵7 
Regression is performed in GBP. This table presents different regression models to study the effect of 
overconfidence, cashflow, control variables and their interaction on investment. The dependent variable here is 
investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow calculated 
as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q is the market 
value of assets divided by the book value of assets. 𝑂𝐶′𝑖𝑡  in the equation is a vector of the overconfidence 
measures which include SZOC2, OPT80, and NPR. 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′  in the equation is a vector of control variables. Lev is 
leverage or total amount of debt divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income divided 
by total assets. Size is calculated as the log of market value of equity. OC is overconfidence and FE is fixed 
effects. The number of firms 𝑖 is 761, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018, the number of observations 
𝑛 is 8586. Expected coefficient signs are described in section 5.2. 
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Finally, as an extra robustness measure for the Egyptian market, a conditional model is 
proposed. The overconfidence model tested in the above section is unconditional, i.e. it does 
not vary with the episodes of political instability. Alternatively, I propose the following 
conditional model:   
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + (𝛽3 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑈𝑡−1)𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡−1
+ (𝛽5 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑈𝑡−1)𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡−1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ + (𝛽8𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑥𝑡
′)𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 
(5.2) 
where 
𝐷𝑈𝑡 equals 1 for unstable periods and zero otherwise. Unstable periods are taken as the year 
starting with the revolution from 2011 until 2013 with the election of president El Sisi. I also 
include the period of devaluation of the Egyptian pound 2016-2018 which I consider to be a 
crisis, as severe devaluation of the EGP is likely to have affected managerial overconfidence. 
To avoid multicollinearity between SZOC1 and SZOC2 I use only SZOC2 as it is the more 
comprehensive score for managerial overconfidence. I also use OPT80 as an additional 
measure of overconfidence17.  
  
 
17 I also tested another model that included an additional dummy variable for the global financial crisis of 2008-
2009, but as this model did not prove significant, I will not add it in the analysis.  
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Table 5.14 Conditional model for Egypt 
Egypt 
Variables FE Std. Errors Clustered by Firm Prais-Winsten 
CF𝑡 0.511 (<0.001) 0.511 (0.001) 0.496 (<0.001) 
Q𝑡−1 0.059 (<0.001) 0.059 (0.054) 0.035 (<0.001) 
ROA𝑡 0.001 (0.568) 0.001 (0.777) 0.0004 (0.668) 
SIZE𝑡 -0.039 (0.022) -0.039 (0.051) -0.014 (0.151) 
LEV𝑡  -2.3E-06 (0.658) -2.3E-06 (0.768) -3.9E-06 (0.253) 
CFt.Q𝑡−1 -1.5E-05 (0.017) -1.5E-05 (0.118) -1.2E-05 (0.120) 
CFt.ROA𝑡 -0.243 (<0.001) -0.243 (<0.001) -0.245 (<0.001) 
CFt.SIZE𝑡 -0.001 (0.082) -0.001 (0.306) -0.002 (0.004) 
CFt.LEV𝑡  0.057 (<0.001) 0.057 (<0.001) 0.056 (<0.001) 
SZOCt 
 
0.047 (0.485) 0.047 (0.716) 0.038 (0.565) 
DU.SZOCt 
 
-0.049 (0.055) -0.049 (0.835) -0.004 (0.963) 
CF.SZOCt 
 
-0.764 (<0.001) -0.764 (0.002) -0.570 (<0.001) 
DU.CFSZOCt 
 
-0.375 (0.026) -0.375 (0.553) -0.804 (<0.001) 
OPT80t 
 
0.076 (0.149) 0.076 (0.415) 0.061 (0.238) 
DU.OPT80t 
 
-0.118 (0.002) -0.118 (0.324) -0.117 (0.889) 
CF.OPT80t 
 
-0.156 (0.056) -0.156 (0.146) -0.103 (0.199) 
DU.CFOPT80t 
 
-0.346 (0.011) -0.346 (0.444) -0.218 (0.010) 
Intercept
t
 
 
0.101 (0.307) 0.101 (0.396) -0.023 (0.680) 
Rho 0.142 0.142 0.313 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + (𝛽3 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑈𝑡)𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 + (𝛽5 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑈𝑡)𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ + (𝛽8𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑥𝑡
′)𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 
Regression is performed in GBP. This table presents different regression models to study the effect of 
overconfidence, cashflow, control variables and their interaction on investment. The dependent variable here is 
investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow calculated 
as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q is the market 
value of assets divided by the book value of assets. 𝑂𝐶′𝑖𝑡  in the equation is a vector of the overconfidence 
measures which include SZOC2, OPT80, and NPR. 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′  in the equation is a vector of control variables. Lev is 
leverage or total amount of debt divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income divided 
by total assets. Size is calculated as the log of market value of equity. OC is overconfidence and FE is fixed 
effects. The number of firms 𝑖 is 102, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018, the number of observations 
𝑛 is 1321. Expected coefficient signs are described in section 5.2. 
 
Table 5.14 presents the results for the conditional model of overconfidence against 
investment. The first column presents the results using fixed effects analysis, without 
controlling for serial autocorrelation. In the second column I control for serial autocorrelation 
by clustering observations by firm. In the third column I control for serial autocorrelation 
using the Prais-Winsten regression. One can note that regardless of the method used to 
147 
 
control for serial autocorrelation cashflow remains highly significant at a 1% and with a 
coefficient of approximately 0.5. Tobin’s Q is also significant, although when standard errors 
are clustered by firm, it is only significant at a 10% level with a coefficient of 0.059. We can 
see that SZOC on its own is insignificant, however, its interaction with cashflow is significant 
across all three models. Perhaps more puzzling is that they all present a negative coefficient 
value of -0.76 and -0.57, this seems to imply that overconfident managers reduced investment 
with the availability of cash. One can only reason that even with the availability of cash, 
overconfident managers were still cautious and decreased investment due to the environment 
of political instability. This conclusion finds further support since the interaction between the 
dummy political years and CFSZOC is significant under the fixed effects model with a 
coefficient of -0.375 and a p-value of 0.026, and is also significant under the Prais-Winsten 
regression with a coefficient -0.804 of and a p-value of 1%. Similarly, the interaction term 
between the dummy variable and OPT80 was significant with a coefficient of -0.346 and a 
p-value of 0.011 under the fixed effects model; once serial autocorrelation is controlled for 
it turns insignificant, thus concluding that autocorrelation produced a bias. However, again 
note that the interaction between the dummy variable and CFOPT80 is significant and 
negative in the fixed effects and with the Prais-Winsten method. I conclude from the above 
findings that during times of instability, managerial overconfidence does not play a role in 
managerial decision making. I argue that when external or political risk is abnormally high, 
even overconfident managers become cautious, and even with the availability of cash they 
may still choose to decrease investment.  
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on testing the relationship between managerial overconfidence and 
corporate investment decisions contingent on the availability of cashflow. The main 
hypothesis for this chapter is: 
𝐻1= managerial overconfidence increases investment decision sensitivity to cashflow. 
 Empirical testing is performed on both the Egyptian and the UK markets for comparative 
purposes. I included several measures of overconfidence, which use a combination of 
financing and investment activities of the firm. I also considered alternative measures based 
on the stock purchasing/insider trading activity in the firm. The results show that there is no 
significant relationship between managerial overconfidence and investment in Egypt. On the 
other hand, there is a strong positive relationship between the sensitivity of investment to 
cashflow and managerial overconfidence in the UK market. I further supplemented the tests 
on the UK market by using the (1997) KZ index of financial constraint used to separate firms, 
from most to least financially constrained. The results support the findings that overconfident 
managers are sensitive to cashflow and will overinvest only if abundant cash is available. 
This sensitivity becomes even more pronounced for equity dependent firms, where 
overconfident managers view their equity as undervalued by the market and thus curb their 
investments even when it is beneficial for the firm. Furthermore, a conditional model for 
Egypt was introduced, which concentrated on overconfidence during times of turmoil, and 
still found the overconfidence measures results to be insignificant, and where interaction 
terms were found to be significant, the coefficient was still negative. The overall results for 
the UK support the findings presented in Malmendier and Tate (2005) and should be useful 
for firms when setting contractual obligations with managers.   
149 
 
Chapter 6  
Managerial Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk 
6.1 Introduction  
Stock price crash risk is defined as the extreme negative skewness in the distribution of stock 
returns (Chen et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2014). Specifically, Hong and Stein (2003) define 
stock price crash as a large negative movement in stock price. There are many theories as to 
the cause of stock price crash risk. The traditional theories focus on several financial market 
mechanisms such as leverage effects, volatility feedback, and other variables based on an 
investor perspective framework.  
More recent literature leans towards stock price crashes being the effect of managers 
hoarding bad news for an extended period of time. However, bad news can only be withheld 
for some limited time before it begins to stockpile within the firm and reaches a certain 
threshold where it becomes impossible to hide any further. Once the accumulated bad news 
is released to the public this could lead to stock price crashes (Kim et al., 2016). While 
empirical evidence suggests that the reason managers may hoard bad news vary, one of the 
prominent theories is the agency problem. Under the agency theory, stock price crash risk 
could occur because corporate managers have an incentive to withhold bad information, 
while only releasing good news, all the while hoping that poor current performance will be 
masked by strong future performance. The incentives could include career concerns or 
compensations linked to performance.  
Another reason for managers to hoard bad information may be overconfidence bias. In the 
psychology literature, overconfidence has several manifestations: miscalibration, the above-
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average effect, and the illusion of control.  As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, miscalibration is 
defined as excessive confidence about having precise information (Gervais and Odean, 2001; 
Moosa and Ramiah 2017). Where people with miscalibration bias tend to overestimate the 
precision of their own forecasts or underestimate the variance of risky processes. Similarly, 
the above-average bias tends individuals to believe that they are better than their peers within 
a particular group (Weinstein, 1980). Finally, the illusion of control tends individuals to 
overestimate their ability to control events over which they have limited influence (Langer, 
1975). These unrealistic biases can affect the decision of financial managers as they are 
deeply embedded in applied work pertaining to risk perception and risk behaviour (Harris 
and Hahn, 2011). 
In contrast to the agency theory which assumes that managers are aware of bad investments 
and remain intent on hiding negative value projects, for career, reputation or other self-
serving reasons, overconfident managers misperceive the value of their projects. They may 
continue ongoing negative NPV projects believing that they are in fact maximizing firm 
value. 
Kim et al. (2016) argue that overconfident managers misperceive the NPV projects as value 
creating and are highly committed to the investment projects. Therefore, even when the NPV 
of current projects are negative, overconfident managers will continue to stick to them for a 
longer period of time which could lead to price crashes. They stress the importance of 
differentiating between rational managers who intentionally mislead investors to reap private 
benefits, and overconfident managers who are under the illusion of control, and thus 
wrongfully assume that even negative NPV projects will be profitable in the future. Because 
overconfident managers are so adamant on continuing in the hand-selected projects, they are 
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likely to subconsciously ignore any negative feedback they get when in the process of 
operating the selected investment project. Subconsciously ignoring such negative feedback, 
would mean that they would in turn not relay this information to investors. Alternatively, 
they may consciously choose to portray current investment projects in a better light to 
convince investors that those projects have profitable future. Whether overconfident 
managers subconsciously or consciously ignore the relay of negative feedback, this will 
cause stockpiling of bad news, which when released could increase crash risk.   
Based on the information presented above, and in line with the work of Kim et al. (2016), I 
test the regression model where overconfidence increases the likelihood of stock price crash 
risk.  
6.2 Stock price crash risk 
To calculate SPCR we first need to calculate weekly “abnormal” or “firm-specific” returns 
from the following extended market model. 
Let 𝑛𝑡 denote the number of weeks in year 𝑡. For each year 𝑡 and stock 𝑖 we observe 𝑛𝑡 
weekly stock real returns,  𝑟𝑘
(𝑖𝑡)
, 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝑛𝑡; as well as weekly market real returns 𝑚𝑘
(𝑡)
, 𝑘 =
1, … , 𝑛𝑡. The following regression is run for each year and each stock  
 𝑟𝑘
(𝑖𝑡)
= 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑘
(𝑡)
+ 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑘−1
(𝑡)
+ 𝛿𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑘−2
(𝑡)
+ 𝜀𝑘
(𝑖𝑡)
 (6.1) 
𝑘 = 3,… , 𝑛𝑡. 
where 𝜀𝑘
(𝑖𝑡)
 is the residual term in the regression. 
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The market returns are proxied by the weekly real returns on the EGX30/UKX value weighed 
market index. 𝛼𝑖𝑡, 𝛽𝑖𝑡, 𝛾𝑖𝑡, 𝛿𝑖𝑡 are the regression parameters corresponding to year 𝑡 and firm 
𝑖.  
Note that I use the real return 𝑟  instead of a nominal return 𝑣 which is given by 
𝑟 =
1 + 𝑣
1 + inf
− 1 
where inf is the inflation rate. Due to increased inflation rates suffered during my period of 
study in the Egyptian market, exasperated further by the devaluation of the Egyptian pound 
in 2016, real returns are used instead of nominal returns to control for inflation. Whereas 
nominal returns may have increased for a specific firm, real returns could actually be 
negative.  
It is not uncommon to have stocks with missing data in some weeks or even a whole year. 
To deal with this situation in a unified way, I insert a NaN in MATLAB wherever data is 
missing. The MATLAB function regress automatically removes these NaNs as it does the 
regression. As a result, I end up with a residual vector 𝜀(𝑖𝑡) = {𝜀𝑘
(𝑖𝑡)
} of dimension 𝑛𝑖𝑡 ≤
𝑛𝑡 − 2 which depends on whether or not stock 𝑖 is missing any data in year 𝑡. The whole 
year is skipped, of course, if 𝑛𝑖𝑡 < 3. If 𝑛𝑖𝑡 ≥ 3,  the firm abnormal return is then calculated 
as (Kim et al., 2009; 2016) 
𝑊𝑘
(𝑖𝑡)
= log(1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑘
(𝑖𝑡)
), 3 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑘 denote the 𝑘th stock specific return of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. We now have a set 
𝑊𝑖𝑡 = {𝑊𝑘
(𝑖𝑡)
}
𝑘=1
𝑛𝑖𝑡
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𝑊𝑖𝑡 is the set or vector of weekly stock specific returns of stock 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 𝑊𝑖𝑡 is then used 
to measure stock price crash risk through three different approaches. 
The first measure of crash risk is the dual volatility, denoted by DUVOL, and is defined as 
the log of the ratio of the downward volatility to upward volatility of the abnormal return 
data of firm 𝑖 during year 𝑡. 
To calculate DUVOL I introduce two distinct sets  𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑢, 𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑑 as 
𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑢 = {𝑊𝑘
(𝑖𝑡)
≥ average(𝑊𝑖𝑡)}, 
𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑑 = {𝑊𝑘
(𝑖𝑡)
< average(𝑊𝑖𝑡)}. 
Thus 𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑢 is the set of returns which are above the average weekly returns for year 𝑡, and 𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑑 
is the set of those returns which are below the average weekly returns. Next, define the 
volatilities 
𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑢 = stdev(𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑢), 𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑑 = stdev(𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑑). 
Now, the dual volatility is calculated as in Chen et al. (2001) 
 
DUVOL𝑖𝑡 = log (
𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑑
𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑢). (6.2) 
The second measure of stock price crash risk is the negative skewness of firm specific weekly 
returns (Chen et al., 2001), denoted NSKEW, and is calculated as: 
 
NSKEW𝑖𝑡 = −
𝑛𝑡(𝑛𝑡 − 1)
3
2∑ (𝑊𝑘
(𝑖𝑡)
)
3
𝑘
(𝑛𝑡 − 1)(𝑛𝑡 − 2) (∑ (𝑊𝑘
(𝑖𝑡)
)𝑘
2
)
3
2
 (6.3) 
154 
 
The definition in (6.3) is the negative of the usual definition of normalized skewness in 
statistics. This is done so that an increase in negative skewness corresponds to a firm being 
more likely to crash, i.e. having a more left-skewed distribution. This will allow for easier 
interpretation of statistical results.  
Finally, the third measure of stock price crash risk, denoted NCRASH𝑖𝑡, is obtained by 
identifying the total number of weeks in a given year 𝑡 where excessive losses took place  
NCRASH𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝐼[𝑊𝑘
(𝑖𝑡)
< average(𝑊𝑖𝑡) − 3.2stdev(𝑊𝑖𝑡)]
𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑘=1
 
where 𝐼[. ] is the indicator function, and 3.2 standard deviations are chosen to generate an 0.1 
percent frequency in the normal distribution. However, it is necessary to point out that stock 
returns do not typically follow a normal distribution but are usually skewed with fatter tails. 
Fatter tails mean investments are more likely to deviate from the mean, most literature 
measures tail risk as the risk that asset returns move more than 3 standard deviations from 
the mean.  
The crash likelihood indicator, CRASH𝑖𝑡, is defined as 
 CRASH𝑖𝑡 = min(NCRASH𝑖𝑡, 1) (6.4) 
Thus, the CRASH variable will be one for a firm that experiences one or more crash weeks 
during the fiscal year and zero otherwise (Kim et al., 2009; 2016).  
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6.2.1 Control Variables  
As the overconfidence measures may mix information about CEO attributes with information 
about firm performance, measures of past return performance will also be included as 
additional control variables in the regression. Furthermore, controlling for past returns makes 
testing the model more stringent, as it could be argued that CEOs become overconfident as 
a result of experiencing strong past performance. Thus, in addition to the overconfidence 
proxies, following the work of Chen et al. (2001) and Kim et al. (2016) the following 
variables will be controlled for:  
1. Negative return skewness NSKEW𝑖𝑡−1 (see Equation (6.3)), where firms with 
negative return skewness in period 𝑡 − 1 are more likely to crash in current period 𝑡.  
2. Turnover growth denoted DTOit−1, where firms with greater increase in turnover 
relative to trend are expected to have greater stock price crash risk. This is calculated 
as the average weekly share turnover of the current fiscal year minus the average 
weekly share turnover of the previous fiscal year.   
3. Sigma
𝑖𝑡−1
, the annual return volatility of stocks. Firms with higher return volatility 
in period 𝑡 − 1 are more likely to have a higher stock price crash risk in current period 
𝑡. 
4. Average return, denoted AR𝑖𝑡−1. There are two competing views on how average 
return affects stock price crash risk. One view is that firms with higher average 
returns, are doing well, and thus are expected to continue this performance, reducing 
the likelihood of SPCR. Another view is that there may be a reversal in the pattern of 
returns, whereby, firms with higher returns in period 𝑡 − 1 are more likely to reverse 
and crash in current period 𝑡. This is especially true if the higher return in period 𝑡 −
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1 was not built upon true underlying value, rather on psychological influences as herd 
behaviour or other biases. AR𝑖𝑡 is measured as the mean of a firm’s weekly real 
returns over the fiscal year.  
5. Size, denoted Size𝑖𝑡−1. While there is no theory on how firm size affects stock price 
crash risk, Chen et al. (2001) find that  the relationship is significantly positive. They 
explain that this may be due to small firms being under less inspection from outside 
analysts and are thus able to hoard bad information better. Size𝑖𝑡 is measured as the 
log of the market capitalization of firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡.  
6. Market to book ratio, denoted MB𝑖𝑡−1. Firms with high market to book ratios in 
period 𝑡 − 1 are more likely to have higher stock price crash risk in current period 𝑡. 
This is because firms with higher market to book ratio are predominantly growth 
firms and may be considered over valued by the public investors and are thus 
considered riskier.  
7. Return on assets, denoted ROA𝑖𝑡−1, measured as net income divided by total assets. 
Firms with higher ROA in period  𝑡 − 1 are less likely to crash in current period. 
8. Leverage, denoted Lev𝑡−1, measured as total debt divided by total assets. Firms with 
higher leverage in period 𝑡 − 1 may be sending a negative signal to outside investors 
and are thus likely to have increased crash risk in current period 𝑡.  
Finally, due to the political events that took place during this study period one expects that 
systematic variables are likely to have a significant effect on the crash risk. Therefore, the 
following macroeconomic variables will be added to the model: 
1. Gross Domestic Product growth rate, denoted GDP𝑡−1.  where higher growth rate in 
period 𝑡 − 1 means a firm is less likely firms are to crash in current period 𝑡. 
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2. Market return, denoted MR𝑡−1, measured through the return of the EGX30/UKX 
index. Where stocks tend to follow market trend, and where individual stocks tend to 
crash when the market crashes (Harris et al., 2019). Therefore, it is expected that 
higher average real market returns in period 𝑡 − 1 means firms are more likely to 
continue having positive performance in current period 𝑡 and are thus less likely to 
crash. 
3. Exchange-rate, denoted EX𝑡−1, measured as the exchange rate of the EGP (GBP) to 
the USD for Egypt and the UK respectively. The effect of a devaluation of currency 
on SPCR is uncertain. A sudden large devaluation of a currency (as that which 
occurred in Egypt) may cause investors to question economic stability, panic and pull 
out of the market, causing firms to crash. On the other hand, firms which depend 
largely on exports, are now more attractive as they are deemed cheaper, in which case 
I would expect a negative effect between currency devaluation and SPCR.  
While details of the overconfidence measures were given in Section 4.6, a brief overview 
of the overconfidence measures used in this thesis will now be provided. SZOC1 and 
SZOC2 are the Schrand and Zechman (2012) measures of overconfidence. Regarding 
SZOC1, a manager is considered overconfident if the firm meets any two of the following 
four criteria: the rate of investment or the volume of acquisitions or their debt to equity 
ratio are greater than the industry median for that year, or if the firm uses convertible debt 
or preferred stock. Regarding SZOC2 they include another criterion, where dividend 
yields are greater than 0. A manager will then be considered overconfident if the company 
satisfies any three of the five criteria.  
158 
 
Alternatively, I use Campbell et al. (2011) measures of overconfidence OPT80 and 
pessimism or “under confidence” OPT20. Regarding OPT80 a manager is considered 
overconfident if the firm’s investment activities are above the 80th percentile of all firms 
within the same industry for two consecutive years. While for OPT20 a manager is 
considered as pessimistic if their investment activities are below the 20th percentile of all 
firms within the same industry for two consecutive years. 
Finally, for the UK18 specifically I add two other measures of overconfidence that depend 
on net stock purchases of the firm’s stocks. Regarding the PURCHASE measure a 
manager is considered overconfident if net purchases, defined in units of stocks, are in 
the top 80th percentile of net purchases by all CEOs in that year. Further, those purchases 
must increase the CEOs ownership of the firm by 10% during the fiscal year. Regarding 
the NPR measure overconfidence is a value that varies from -1 to 1 and is calculated as     
NPR= (insider purchase - insider selling)/ (insider purchase + insider selling) 
An important consideration in empirical studies is reverse causality. It may be argued that 
firms with higher risk or lower firm value tend to employ overconfident CEOs. Furthermore, 
it may be argued that firms that already experienced a crash will employ overconfident CEOs 
to improve firm performance. It is difficult for firms to predict whether they will experience 
a crash in the future and employ overconfident CEOs in advance. Therefore, to reduce the 
risk of reverse causality, I will lag the measures of overconfidence by one year relative to the 
dependent variables across all three models. Further I expect that it will take one year for 
overconfidence and other control variables to affect stock price crash risk, therefore all 
 
18 Data for this measure is not available for the Egyptian market.  
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control variables will also be lagged in respect to stock price crash risk. This is to allow an 
overconfident manager sufficient amount of time to be able to make non optimal decisions 
and hoard bad news before leaking it all at once leading to stock price crashes. 
6.3 The Regression Model 
The linear model for stock price crash risk can be written as 
 𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
′𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾
′𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜔
′𝑋𝑡−1, (6.5) 
 
where 
SPCR𝑖𝑡 ≔ is Stock Price Crash Risk; taken as one of the three variables DUVOL𝑖𝑡 ,
NSKEW𝑖𝑡  ,CRASH𝑖𝑡 discussed in Section 6.2.1, 
𝐵𝑖𝑡 = [SZOC1𝑖𝑡 SZOC2𝑖𝑡 OPT80𝑖𝑡 OPT20𝑖𝑡 PURCHASE𝑖𝑡 NPR𝑖𝑡 ]
′, 
𝐹𝑖𝑡 = [NSkew𝑖𝑡 DTO𝑖𝑡 Sigma𝑖𝑡 AR𝑖𝑡 ROA𝑖𝑡 Size𝑖𝑡 Lev𝑖𝑡 MVBV𝑖𝑡 ]
′ 
𝑋𝑡 = [GDP𝑡  MR𝑡 EX𝑡 ]
′ 
𝛽 = [𝛽1 𝛽2 𝛽3]
′, 𝛾 = [𝛾1 𝛾2 ⋯ 𝛾8]′,    and 𝜔 = [𝜔1 𝜔2 𝜔3 𝜔4]′ are 
vectors of coefficients. 
Note that the independent variables in the linear model (6.5) are grouped into three 
categories: overconfidence factors 𝐵, firm specific factors 𝐹 and systematic factors 𝑋. The 
measures of overconfidence were discussed in detail in Section 4.6 and summarized in 
section 6.2. To avoid multicollinearity, specifically for the 𝑆𝑍𝑂𝐶 measures which are highly 
correlated, the regression was done twice, the first time excluding SZOC2 from the model 
and the second time excluding SZOC1 from the model. The results for both models, whether 
SZOC1 or SZOC2 are included, were extremely similar in terms of significance levels and 
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coefficients. Therefore, the results presented include only SZOC2 as it is the more 
comprehensive overconfidence index. I will comment on SZOC as a whole.  
6.4 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
The descriptive statistics for the primary and control variables considered in the model are 
presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 for Egypt and the UK, respectively. The first interesting 
discrepancy between Egypt and the UK can be found in the mean values of NSKEW and 
DUVOL; at 0.335 and 0.281 for Egypt and -0.258 and -0.123 for the UK. This reveals that 
the data for the UK have negative skewness i.e. positive mean values of NSKEW and 
DUVOL, while data for Egypt have a positive skewness, i.e. negative mean values.  This 
makes sense as Egypt was going through times of political instability and its data is expected 
to have higher negative mean values in comparison to the UK.  
Similarly, the mean value of CRASH for Egypt is 23.6%, which means that on average, 
23.6% of firm-years experienced at least one weekly return that fell more than 3.2 standard 
deviations below the annual mean. This is more than mean value of 19.2% for the UK, and 
the 17.2% reported by Kim et al. (2016) for firms in the US. Again, this is justified by the 
political instability that the Egyptian market was experiencing during the study period. In 
fact, a more detailed analysis of the percentage of firms that crashed during the year presented 
in Table 6.3, shows that 2008, 2011, and 2017 experienced high crash values. The year 2008 
was the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. The political unrest (the Arab 
Spring) started in 2011 and the country remained fairly unstable for a few years. Furthermore, 
2014 was a year of big change in the political leadership and brought about more 
uncertainties and distress. In 2016, when the economy was just starting to achieve some 
stability, the government announced the EGP floatation late 2016, and the consequences 
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became apparent in 2017. By that time most firms had survived great instability and were 
cash starved. 
The mean value of the overconfidence proxies SZOC1, SZOC2 for the Egyptian market are 
6.6% and 3.9%. These percentages are significantly lower than the 41% and 28.9% for the 
UK market, and are also significantly lower than those reported by both Schrand and 
Zechman (2012) and Kim et al. (2016). Similarly, the mean value of the proxy of high 
optimism OPT80 for the Egyptian and the UK market at 12.6% and 18.4%, respectively, are 
significantly lower than the value reported by Campbell et al. (2011) of 35.5%. Meanwhile, 
the value of low optimism OPT20 at 34.9% for the Egyptian market, is comparable to that 
of Campbell et al. at 34.7% but remains lower for the UK market at 15.44%. These 
differences may be attributed to multiple reasons. Perhaps, they could be due to the ensuing 
political instability in Egypt, where managers were pessimistic rather than optimistic. Or 
perhaps there may exist a more stringent disciplinary environment in Egypt and the UK that 
does not allow managers to exert their personal strategies/preferences on their organizations.  
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Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics for Egypt 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DUVOL 1,392 0.272 0.458 -3.485 2.184 
NSKEW 1,392 0.380 1.062 -6.949003 5.873 
CRASH 1,392 0.141 0.348 0 1 
SZOC1 1,392 0.070 0.256 0 1 
SZOC2 1,392 0.042 0.202 0 1 
OPT80 1,392 0.228 0.420 0 1 
OPT20 1,392 0.317 1.134 0 3 
DTO 1,392 0.001 0.034 0.000 0.070 
AR 1,392 0.003 0.007 -0.025 0.028 
Sigma 1,392 0.025 0.015 0.001 0.081 
Size 1,392 2.752 0.744 0.671 5.064 
MVBV 1,392 1.555 14.765 -511.079 131.333 
LEV 1,392 0.489 0.381 0.002 5.856 
ROA 1,392 7.086 13.440 -15.214 16.857 
GDP 1,392 0.045 0.016 -0.038 0.072 
MR 1,392 0.003 0.008 -0.015 0.018 
EX 1,392 8.808 4.875 5.475 18.122 
Monetary amounts are in EGP.  
DUVOL, NSKEW and CRASH are three measures of crash risk. DUVOL is the annual asymmetric volatility 
of negative over positive returns.  NSKEW is the annual negative skewness in weekly returns data. Crash is a 
dichotomous variable that takes a value of one for firms that experience one or more firm-specific weekly 
returns that fall 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm specific weekly return over the fiscal year. SZOC1, 
SZOC2, OPT80 are measures of overconfidence. OPT20 is a measure of pessimism. DTO is the detrended 
turnover. AR is average annual return. Sigma is the annual standard deviation of weakly returns. Size is the 
market value of equity. MVBV is the market value of equity to book value of equity. ROA is the return on 
assets, calculated as net income divided by total assets. LEV is leverage, calculated as total debt divided by 
total assets. GDP is the annual growth in gross domestic product. MR is the average annual market return. EX 
is the exchange rate at the end of the year. 
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics for the UK 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
NSKEW 9435 -0.237 1.314 -7.001 7.109 
DUVOL 9435 -0.119 0.559 -4.039 4.251 
CRASH 9435 0.208 0.406 0 1 
SZOC1 9435 0.456 0.498 0 1 
SZOC2 9435 0.329 0.470 0 1 
OPT80 9435 0.196 0.397 0 1 
OPT20 9435 0.205 0.404 0 1 
PURCHASE 9435 0.154 0.361 0 1 
NPR 9435 0.179 0.923 -1 1 
DTO 9435 0.003 0.017 -0.001 0.010 
Sigma 9435 0.059 0.048 0.001 1.891 
AR 9435 -0.001 0.063 -0.330 6.005 
ROA 9435 -0.136 1.252 -34.910 13.182 
MVBV 9435 3.655 31.677 -351.151 1622.733 
Size 9435 4.295 2.533 -6.645 13.547 
Lev 9435 0.116 0.329 -0.001 20.485 
GDP 9435 0.014 0.018 -0.042 0.031 
EX 9435 1.596 0.195 1.289 2.002 
MR 9435 0.001 0.003 -0.007 0.004 
Monetary amounts are in GBP. 
DUVOL, NSKEW and CRASH are three measures of crash risk. DUVOL is the annual asymmetric volatility 
of negative over positive returns.  NSKEW is the annual negative skewness in weekly returns data. Crash is a 
dichotomous variable that takes a value of one for firms that experience one or more firm-specific weekly 
returns that fall 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm specific weekly return over the fiscal year. SZOC1, 
SZOC2, OPT80, PURCHASE, and NPR are measures of overconfidence. OPT20 is a measure of pessimism. 
DTO is the detrended turnover. AR is average annual return. Sigma is the annual standard deviation of weakly 
returns. Size is the market value of equity. MVBV is the market value of equity to book value of equity. ROA 
is the return on assets, calculated as net income divided by total assets. LEV is leverage, calculated as total debt 
divided by total assets. GDP is the annual growth in gross domestic product. MR is the average annual market 
return. EX is the exchange rate at the end of the year.  
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Table 6.3 Annual crash percentage Egypt 
Crash/Date Percentage Crash/Date Percentage 
31-12-04 0.145 31-12-12 0.291 
31-12-05 0.116 31-12-13 0.262 
31-12-06 0.106 31-12-14 0.242 
31-12-07 0.145 31-12-15 0.184 
31-12-08 0.291 31-12-16 0.196 
31-12-09 0.201 31-12-17 0.436 
31-12-10 0.194 31-12-18 0.349 
31-12-11 0.339 
  
This table presents the percentage of firms that crashed per year. Crash is a dichotomous variable that takes a 
value of one for firms that experience one or more firm-specific weekly returns that fall 3.2 standard deviations 
below the mean firm specific weekly return over the fiscal year. 
 
Tables A6A1 and A6A2 in the appendix present the correlation matrix of the variables. As 
expected, all three measures of crash risk are positively correlated. NSKEW and DUVOL 
are significantly positively correlated at 0.87 and 0.95 for the Egyptian and the UK markets, 
while only having a moderate correlation with CRASH. This is expected as the crash variable 
only focuses on values that fall below the mean, while NSKEW and DUVOL consider both 
crashes and jumps. The correlation between Sigma and all three measures of crash risk is 
weak for both markets, Chen et al. (2001) point out that this is a positive thing as it signifies 
that modeling crash risk is distinct from modeling volatility.  
Similarly, none of the overconfidence measures are significantly correlated with leverage or 
any of the other firm specific factors included in the model. This is also a positive sign, 
because it means that, while the measures of overconfidence are derived from the financing 
and investment activities of the firm, they are distinct from any specific activity. Finally, the 
two SZOC measures of overconfidence are significantly positively correlated, and positively 
but weakly correlated with the measure of OPT80 and very weakly correlated with the 
measure of PURCHASE and NPR for the UK.  
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The average value for all three measures of SPCR are presented in Figure 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 
for Egypt and the UK. We can see that Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 for NSKEW and DUVOL 
are very similar. This is reasonable as their measurement techniques are similar, where both 
measures of crash consider the down weeks relative to the up weeks. In fact, the correlation 
between both these measures of crash risk were very high, greater than 0.85 for Egypt and 
the UK. We can see that the value of DUVOL and NSKEW for the UK remains relatively 
stable and negative (positive mean values). It only peaks positively in 2008, which is logical 
due to the global financial crisis. We can also see that due to the Brexit referendum in late 
2016, negative skewness in the UK started to move from the negative to the positive area, 
mirroring an instability in the market. The mean values for DUVOL and NSKEW for Egypt, 
on the other hand, are a lot more erratic. They peaked in 2008 due to the financial crisis, was 
starting to recover, but reversed with the start of the political unrest in 2011. The market was 
starting to recover yet again but reversed with the overturn of Morsi’s government that took 
place at the end of 2013. In November 2016, the central bank of Egypt announced the free 
flotation of the Egyptian pound leading to severe inflation and a reduction of real returns. 
Next if we look at the average CRASH values presented in Figure 6.3 we can see that the 
only higher crash point suffered by the UK was during the 2008 financial crisis. Meanwhile, 
in Egypt, the market suffered several crashes during 2008, 2011, 2016-2017, with the highest 
crash point occurring with the devaluation of the Egyptian pound.  
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Figure 6.1 Average DUVOL for Egypt vs. the UK 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Average NSKEW for Egypt vs. the UK 
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Figure 6.3 Average CRASH value for Egypt vs. the UK 
6.5 Results and analysis 
Based on Hausman’s test, discussed in Chapter 4, fixed effects model is found to be the more 
appropriate estimation method for the data. In what follows I report and comment on the 
regression results. The model coefficients are reported with their corresponding 𝑝-values for 
each of the Egyptian and the UK models. The tests performed below are clustered by firm id 
as in Chen et al. (2001) to control for serial autocorrelation. 
Due to the strong correlation between NSKEW and DUVOL, the DUVOL model estimated 
using fixed effects (ordinary least squares) suffers from significant autocorrelation. Even 
though standard errors are already clustered by firm id, as an extra precaution the model is 
re-estimated using random effects (generalized least squares, GLS), which is less restrictive 
in its error assumptions. The results for FE and GLS are presented jointly in Table 6.4. 
Referring to the results in Table 6.4 we can see that the results provided through GLS analysis 
are more reasonable. For example, if we look at NSKEWt−1 for the Egyptian market, while 
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in both cases it is significant at a 1% level, under the OLS, the coefficient is -0.030 whereas 
under GLS the coefficient is 0.022. A positive coefficient would be more reasonable whereby 
an increase in negative skewness in the previous period is likely to increase the likelihood of 
crash in the following period. Nonetheless, we can see that for both models of analysis, none 
of the measures of overconfidence are significant for the Egyptian market.  On the other 
hand, the regression results for the UK show that SZOC, OPT80, and NPR are all significant 
and load positively on DUVOL, supporting the conclusion that as overconfidence increases 
so does stock price crash risk, as measured by DUVOL. In fact, under GLS, SZOC is 
significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of 0.065, OPT80 is also significant at a 1% level 
with a coefficient of 0.083. NPR, on the other hand is significant at a 5% level, with a 
coefficient of 0.02. Note that all mentioned coefficients are positive, signifying that 
managerial overconfidence increases stock price crash risk, thus supporting the hypothesis.   
Only the PURCHASE measure of overconfidence, while also having a positive coefficient 
of 0.010, is insignificant for the UK; and this may be due to the PURCHASE measure being 
the most restrictive of the overconfidence measures. As discussed in Chapter 4, PURCHASE 
is an absolute measure not normalized for firm size or otherwise, and thus may not be as 
flexible in capturing managerial overconfidence. Finally, we can see that the results for the 
FE and GLS estimation methods present very similar results with just one significant 
difference, lagged NSKEW is insignificant for the UK under the GLS while it remains 
significant for Egypt with a positive coefficient of 0.022 and a p-value of 0.003. 
The significant vs. insignificant results presented here are the same as those presented in 
Chapter 5. There may be several reasons for the overconfidence measures turning out as 
insignificant for Egypt. The main argument, as presented in Section 5.3 Figure 5.3, is that 
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there is an optimal level of external risk, at which the effects of overconfidence on managerial 
decisions are most pronounced. Alternative arguments could include, that the Egyptian 
market is not efficient, as discussed in Chapter 4 where investors do not react to excessive 
risk taking of overconfident managers as provided in Kim et al. (2016).19  
The dynamic GMM method discussed in length in Chapter 4 is used to estimate NSKEW in 
the second model. Specifically, the two-step system GMM proposed by Blundell and Bond 
(1999) is used for the estimation. I use system GMM instead of difference GMM as my data 
is unbalanced. Difference GMM widens the gap in unbalanced data as it subtracts the 
previous observation from the contemporaneous one. On the other hand, system GMM 
performs a forward orthogonal deviation, where it subtracts the mean of all future available 
observations from the contemporaneous one. While there is no rule regarding whether a one-
step or two-step procedure should be used, generally the two-step method has been found to 
perform at least as well as the one-step method, if not more efficient (Hwang and Sun, 2018). 
Furthermore, GMM is sensitive to the number of instruments chosen, and can suffer from 
instrument proliferation problems. Roodman (2009) maintains that there is little guidance in 
literature regarding how many instruments will be considered too much, however, as a 
general rule of thumb the number of instruments cannot exceed the number of groups. The 
number of instruments to the number of groups is reported in Table 6.5.  I will rely on two 
main test diagnostics: 1) the Sargan Hansen test which tests for instrument validity, a 
probability greater than 0.05 would mean that we would accept the null hypothesis that the 
 
19 Since the overconfidence proxies for Egypt are based primarily on the increased risk-taking activities of an 
overconfident manager (financial and investment activities), this could provide us a unique insight as to how 
investors react to managerial risk-taking activities. However, here we would have to argue that stock price crash 
risk occurs due to investor reaction to managerial overconfidence, rather than managerial bad news hoarding.  
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instruments used are valid. 2) The AR(2) test which is important to ensure that we do not 
have serial correlation of the second order, and thus have identified the model correctly as 
AR(1). Lagged NSKEW turns out significant for Egypt but insignificant for the UK as 
presented in Table 6.5. While the result for the UK contradicts previous theory, this might 
be rationalized by the UK being a more efficient market, and therefore following a random 
walk. Current values of skewness do not necessarily depend on past values, i.e. the past does 
not reflect the future. This is not true for Egypt, which is not an efficient market.   
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Table 6.4 Regression results for DUVOL for Egypt vs. the UK 
 Egypt UK 
Variables FE GLS FE GLS 
SZOC𝑡−1 0.039 (0.212) 0.035 (0.190) 0.064 (<0.001) 0.065 (<0.001) 
OPT80𝑡−1 -0.034 (0.464) 0.041 (0.278) 0.043 (0.015) 0.083 (<0.001) 
OPT20𝑡−1 0.009 (0.602) -0.001 (0.907) -0.032 (0.067) 0.003 (0.103) 
PURCHASE𝑡−1 - - 0.025 (0.360) 0.010 (0.661) 
NPR𝑡−1  - - 0.027 (0.035) 0.021 (0.042) 
NSKEWt−1 -0.030 (<0.001) 0.022 (0.003) -0.034 (<0.001) 0.004 (0.552) 
DTO𝑡−1 0.005 (0.515) 0.0007 (0.323) -0.0002 (0.941) 0.006 (0.867) 
Sigma𝑡−1 0.151 (0.826) 0.464 (0.578) -0.308 (0.071) -0.504 (0.0120) 
AR𝑡−1  -1.033 (<0.001) -1.099 (0.001) 0.069 (0.028) 0.032 (0.047) 
 ROA𝑡−1 -0.003 (0.082) -0.004 (0.003) -3.7E-05 (0.776) 0.002 (0.892) 
 Size𝑡−1 -0.124 (<0.001) -0.018 (0.079) 0.091 (<0.001) 0.028 (<0.001) 
Lev𝑡−1  -0.170 (0.011) -0.167 (0.008) 0.0001 (0.861) -0.006 (<0.001) 
MVBV𝑡−1  0.0001 (0.540) -0.0002 (0.336) 0.0001 (0.305) 0.0007 (<0.001) 
 EX𝑡−1 0.002 (0.606) -0.002 (0.540) 0.153 (<0.001) 0.070 (<0.001) 
 MR𝑡−1 2.268 (0.124) 2.161 (0.164) 13.071 (<0.001) 13.141 (<0.001) 
 GDPt−1 4.052 (<0.001) 3.606 (0.001) 2.545 (<0.001) 2.570 (<0.001) 
Intercept  0.840 (<0.001) 0.212 (0.015) -0.815 (<0.001) -0.386 (<0.001) 
Rho 0.376 0.153 0.412 0.297 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐷𝑈𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑂𝐶
′
𝑖𝑡−1𝛽1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
′ 𝐵2 
This table presents the results for FE and GLS regression of DUVOL, the dependent variable, against 
overconfidence and other control variables. DUVOL is the annual asymmetric volatility of negative over 
positive returns. 𝑂𝐶′ in the equation is the vector of overconfidence measures which include SZOC2, OPT80, 
PURCHASE and NPR. OPT20 is a measure of pessimism. 𝑥′ in the equation is a vector of control variables 
which include: NSKEW the annual negative skewness in weekly returns. DTO is the detrended turnover. AR 
is average annual return. Sigma is the annual standard deviation of weakly returns. Size is the market value of 
equity. MVBV is the market value of equity to book value of equity. ROA is the return on assets, calculated as 
net income divided by total assets. LEV is leverage, calculated as total debt divided by total assets. GDP is the 
annual growth in gross domestic product. MR is the average annual market return. EX is the exchange rate at 
the end of the year. Regression is performed using real returns and local currency. The number of firms 𝑖 for 
Egypt is 103 and for the UK is 773, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018 for both markets, finally 
the number of observations 𝑛 for Egypt is 1392 and for the UK is 9435. Expected coefficients signs are 
described in section 6.2.1.  
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The insignificant lagged NSKEW result of the UK is supported by the second model. 
Roodman (2009, p. 128) states “If T is large, dynamic panel bias becomes insignificant, and 
a more straightforward fixed effects estimator works. Meanwhile, the number of instruments 
in difference and system GMM tends to explode with T.” This is true where the number of 
instruments for Egypt was 92 and for the UK was 104, which is significantly more than the 
number of parameters to be estimated. Unit root tests were performed for Egypt and the UK, 
the results demonstrate that NSKEW is stationary as theorized.  
The model is thus redefined as static for the UK and estimated with fixed effect panel 
estimation while clustering by id (firm). Wooldridge (2002) test for serial autocorrelation in 
panel data is then performed, and the resulting probability of 0.767 is reassuring that there is 
no serial autocorrelation in the model. The results are presented jointly in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5 Regression results for NSKEW using Arellano-Bond estimator vs. FE 
 Egypt UK 
Variables Dynamic Dynamic Static 
SZOC2𝑡−1 0.064 (0.337) 0.171 (0.007) 0.218 (0.002) 
OPT80𝑡−1 -0.103 (0.247) 0.194 (0.001) 0.185 (0.006) 
OPT20𝑡−1 0.009 (0.719) 0.001 (0.983) 0.003 (0.955) 
PURCHASE𝑡−1 - 0.016 (0.762) 0.059 (0.357) 
NPR𝑡−1  - -0.013 (0.037) 0.066 (0.039) 
NSKEWt−1 0.029 (0.040) -0.053 (0.423) - 
DTO𝑡−1 0.0001 (0.415) 0.0004 (0.644) 0.004 (0.732) 
Sigma𝑡−1 3.806 (0.048) -1.349 (0.008) -0.717 (0.039) 
AR𝑡−1  -2.237 (0.001) 0.088 (0.573) 0.149 (0.080) 
 ROA𝑡−1 -0.011 (0.002) 0.0001(0.819) -0.0003 (0.303) 
 Size𝑡−1 -0.027 (0.355) 0.073 (<0.001) 0.214 (<0.001) 
Lev𝑡−1  -0.399 (0.003) -5.1E-06 (0.004) 5.7E-07 (0.882) 
MVBV𝑡−1  0.0001 (0.843) 0.0002 (0.518) 0.0003 (0.404) 
 EX𝑡−1 -0.002 (0.805) 0.077 (0.275) 0.264 (0.001) 
 MR𝑡−1 1.803(0.008) 26.242 (<0.001) 32.050 (<0.001) 
 GDPt−1 5.803 (0.045) 4.640 (<0.001) 4.557 (<0.001) 
Intercept  0.264 (0.246) -0.740 (<0.001) -1.691(<0.001) 
 
No. of instruments 
/groups: 27/92 
Hansen test: 0.087 
AR (2) test: 0.132 
No. of instruments 
/groups: 117/771 
Hansen test: 0.139 
AR (2) test: 0.564 
Rho = 0.536 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑂𝐶
′
𝑖𝑡−1𝛽1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
′ 𝐵2 
This table presents the results for dynamic GMM and static FE regression of NSKEW, the dependent variable, 
against overconfidence and other control variables. NSKEW is the annual negative skewness in weekly returns. 
𝑂𝐶′ in the equation is the vector of overconfidence measures which include SZOC2, OPT80, PURCHASE and 
NPR. OPT20 is a measure of pessimism. 𝑥′ in the equation is a vector of control variables which include: DTO 
is the detrended turnover. AR is average annual return. Sigma is the annual standard deviation of weakly returns. 
Size is the market value of equity. MVBV is the market value of equity to book value of equity. ROA is the 
return on assets, calculated as net income divided by total assets. LEV is leverage, calculated as total debt 
divided by total assets. GDP is the annual growth in gross domestic product. MR is the average annual market 
return. EX is the exchange rate at the end of the year. Regression is performed using real returns and local 
currency. The number of firms 𝑖 for Egypt is 92 and for the UK is 771, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 
to 2018 for both markets, finally the number of observations 𝑛 for Egypt is 999 and for the UK is 9222. Expected 
coefficients signs are described in section 6.2.1.  
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As with the regression against DUVOL, most of the overconfidence measures for the UK are 
significant. SZOC and OPT80 are highly significant at the 1% level, with coefficient of 0.218 
and 0.185, respectively. NPR is significant at the 5% level, with a coefficient of 0.066. Again, 
note that the positive coefficients across the three measures of overconfidence signify that 
managerial overconfidence leads to an increase in stock price crash risk, supporting my 
hypothesis. Only the PURCHASE measure remains insignificant.  
As predicted AR is positively significant for both the UK and Egypt, indicating that firms 
with previous positive average returns are more likely to crash in the current period. It is 
noteworthy to point out that while Sigma is significant with a p-value of 0.039 for the UK it 
has a negative coefficient of-0.717, signifying that firms with greater volatility in period 𝑡 −
1 are less likely to crash in period 𝑡. Nonetheless, these results are in line with those presented 
by Chen et al. (2001). This is however not true for Egypt, where Sigma has a positive 
coefficient of 3.806 and a p-value of 0.048. 
Furthermore, note that Size comes out as insignificant across NSKEW or DUVOL for Egypt. 
Larger firms are expected to bear better during the political events, but apparently, firms of 
all sizes suffered equally through the political events in Egypt. 
The regression for NSKEW and DUVOL present very similar results. This is predictable 
because, as discussed previously, they have a strong and positive correlation and thus seem 
to be capturing similar information. Those results are quite different though when all 
variables are regressed against CRASH. The results for the regression against CRASH is 
provided in Table 6.6. Given the political events occurring in Egypt, and the general 
atmosphere of instability, the macroeconomic factors are, as expected, significant across all 
three measures of crash risk for Egypt. 
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As we can see from Table 6.6, none of the overconfidence proxies are significant when 
regressing against CRASH for Egypt. This would make sense given the political events 
occurring in Egypt. The variables that result significant under the CRASH model for Egypt 
are mainly the macroeconomic variables as well as some firm specific variables as ROA, AR 
and leverage. For example, market return is significant with a p-value of 0.016 and a 
coefficient of -5.499, similarly GDP growth rate is significant at a 1% level and with a 
coefficient of -22.399. This is reasonable, since one would expect that an increase in average 
market return or an increase in GDP in period t-1 is likely to decrease the likelihood of stock 
price crashes in current period t.  
 The fact that macroeconomic variables turn out to be  the most significant under the CRASH 
model for Egypt is reasonable as the average CRASH value reported in Table 6. seemed to 
vary by year across all firms equivalently, while varying to a much lesser extent by firm. The 
results for the UK market, however, show that SZOC2 (coefficient = 0.391, p-value = 0.024), 
OPT80 (coefficient = 0.592, p-value = 030) and NPR (coefficient (0.129, p-value = 0.049) 
are all significant at 5% level and have positive coefficients, supporting the main hypothesis 
with the third measure of SPCR as well. The PURCHASE measure of overconfidence 
remains insignificant even when regressed against CRASH.  
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Table 6.6 Regression results for CRASH for Egypt and the UK 
Variables Egypt UK 
SZOC2𝑡−1 -0.066 (0.805) 0.391 (0.024) 
OPT80𝑡−1 0.343 (0.328) 0.592 (0.030) 
OPT20𝑡−1 -0.019 (0.886) -0.525 (0.108) 
PURCHASE𝑡−1  - 0.121 (0.448) 
NPR𝑡−1  - 0.129 (0.049) 
NSKEWt−1 -0.037 (0.663) -0.121 (0.036) 
DTO𝑡−1 0.001 (0.57) 0.001 (0.950) 
Sigma𝑡−1 -3.761 (0.323) -8.320 (0.041) 
AR𝑡−1  8.658 (<0.001) -3.770 (0.191) 
 ROA𝑡−1 0.037 (0.010) 0.001 (0.858) 
 Size𝑡−1 -0.102 (0.549) 0.435 (0.015) 
Lev𝑡−1  1.145 (0.036) -0.003 (0.645) 
MVBV𝑡−1  0.001 (0.866) -0.006 (0.298) 
 EX𝑡−1 0.003 (0.082) -1.930 (0.001) 
 MR𝑡−1 -5.499 (0.016) -50.958 (0.208) 
 GDPt−1 -22.399 (<0.001) 18.879 (0.186) 
Intercept  0.083 (0.851) 0.372 (0.029) 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑂𝐶
′
𝑖𝑡−1𝐵1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
′ 𝐵2 
This table presents the results for logistic regression of CRASH, the dependent variable, against overconfidence 
and other control variables. CRASH is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of one for firms that experience 
one or more firm-specific weekly returns that fall 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm specific weekly 
return over the fiscal year. 𝑂𝐶′ in the equation is the vector of overconfidence measures which include SZOC2, 
OPT80, PURCHASE and NPR. OPT20 is a measure of pessimism. 𝑥′ in the equation is a vector of control 
variables which include: NSKEW the annual negative skewness in weekly returns. DTO is the detrended 
turnover. AR is average annual return. Sigma is the annual standard deviation of weakly returns. Size is the 
market value of equity. MVBV is the market value of equity to book value of equity. ROA is the return on 
assets, calculated as net income divided by total assets. LEV is leverage, calculated as total debt divided by 
total assets. GDP is the annual growth in gross domestic product. MR is the average annual market return. EX 
is the exchange rate at the end of the year. Regression is performed using real returns and local currency. The 
number of firms 𝑖 for Egypt is 103 and for the UK is 773, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018 for 
both markets, finally the number of observations 𝑛 for Egypt is 1392 and for the UK is 9435. Expected 
coefficients signs are described in section 6.2.1.  
 
6.5.1 Robustness 
As an extra robustness measure and given that the main area of interest is the political events 
that occurred in Egypt that started mainly in 2011, it might be useful to look at the results of 
this time period separately as that is where overconfidence bias is expected to be exaggerated. 
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The tests were performed again on the dataset, this time from 2011 to 2018 and presented in 
Table 6.8. 
Table 6.7 shows that the mean value of overconfident manager increased in the time period 
2011-2018 from 2005-2010, however, this could be the result of 2nd half of the dataset, 2011-
2018, being a larger time period with a greater number of overconfident managers. Further, 
it may be important to note that in Figure 4.2 of Chapter 4, the trend showed an increase in 
the mean value of managerial overconfidence until 2011, after which this trend reversed, and 
the mean value started to decrease.  
The regression results for the period 2011-2018 are presented in Table 6.8. The results are 
very similar, none of the overconfidence measures are significant during this period either. 
Given that the average value of overconfidence increased during periods of instability while 
its effect on stock price crash risk remains insignificant, and always on the assumption that 
the proxy of overconfidence is an appropriate measure of managerial overconfidence, I am 
led to infer that there is no relationship between managerial overconfidence and stock price 
crash risk for Egypt. As reasoned in Chapter 5, this may be due to the extreme level of 
political risk in Egypt, which caused even overconfident managers to be cautious, thus 
eliminating the discrepancy in decisions of overconfident vs. rational managers.   
The results for the subperiod remain very similar to the results of the whole period, which is 
comforting as it may point to the robustness of my findings. Furthermore, in line with the 
findings above, the systemic variables come out again as the most significant variables across 
all three measures of crash risk. Furthermore, note that the coefficients for the 
macroeconomic factors are higher than for the firm-specific factors. For e.g. under the crash 
measure market return is significant with a p-value of 0.0104 and a coefficient of -19.662, 
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while average return is also significant with a p-value of 0.036 but a coefficient of only 0.051. 
Thus, while both variables are significant, systematic factors have a greater effect as 
measured through the coefficient on crash risk than the firm specific factors.  
A dynamic NSKEW model was also run for the UK from the period 2011-2018 to find out 
whether the insignificant value of lagged NSKEW was due to longer time period. The results 
presented in Table 6.9 show that while lagged NSKEW has a coefficient of 0.006 (positive 
as expected) it does remain insignificant with a p-value of 0.332 even for the shorter period 
of time considered in this test. The results for the overconfidence measures, SZOC, OPT80 
and NPR remain significant and positive even when employing a smaller time period.  
Table 6.7 Mean value of overconfidence across different time periods 
Time Period 2005-2010 2011-2018 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean 
SZOC1 515 0.044 823 0.079 
SZOC2 515 0.031 823 0.046 
OPT80 515 0.122 823 0.130 
OPT20 515 0.326 823 0.364 
This table presents the mean number of overconfident managers divided into two time periods 2005-2010 
(before the Egyptian revolution) and 2011-2018 (after the Egyptian revolution). SZOC1, SZOC2 and OPT80 
are measures of overconfidence. OPT20 is a measure of pessimism.  
 
  
179 
 
Table 6.8 Regression results for Egypt 2011-2018 
Variables DUVOLt NSKEWt CRASHt 
SZOC2𝑡−1 0.053 (0.095) 0.099 (0.177) -0.095 (0.847) 
OPT80𝑡−1 -0.039 (0.310) -0.052 (0.600) -0.040 (0.826) 
OPT20𝑡−1 0.003 (0.759) 0.021 (0.445) 0.025 (0.825) 
NSKEWt−1 0.022 (0.368) 0.029 (0.680) 3.4E-10 (0.690) 
DTO𝑡−1 0.183 (0.052) 0.0004 (0.254) -0.079 (0.920) 
Sigma𝑡−1 2.48 (0.423) 4.376 (0.595) 9.310 (0.001) 
AR𝑡−1  -1.475 (0.005) -3.578 (0.002) 0.051 (0.036) 
 ROA𝑡−1 -0.004 (0.029) -0.010 (0.021) 0.100 (0.719) 
 Size𝑡−1 -0.023 (0.073) -0.053 (0.131) 1.447 (0.121) 
Lev𝑡−1  -0.137 (0.084) -0.251 (0.163) -0.042 (0.631) 
MVBV𝑡−1  -0.002 (0.175) -0.002 (0.677) -0.027 (0.391) 
 EX𝑡−1 -0.007 (0.039) -0.013 (0.021) 18.322 (0.023) 
 MR𝑡−1 5.110 (0.004) 5.884 (0.040) -19.662 (0.014) 
 GDPt−1 3.144 (0.006) 6.471 (0.022) -0.381 (0.018) 
Intercept  0.209 (0.013) 0.466 (0.020) -0.095 (0.847) 
Rho 0.467 0.336 - 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝑆𝑃𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑂𝐶
′
𝑖𝑡−1𝛽1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
′ 𝐵2 
This table presents the regression results for the three SPCR measures: DUVOL/NSKEW/CRASH against 
overconfidence and other control variables. FE regression is used when DUVOL is the dependent variable, 
GMM is used when NSKEW is the dependent variable, and logistic regression is used when CRASH is the 
dependent variable. DUVOL is the annual asymmetric volatility of negative over positive returns.  NSKEW is 
the annual negative skewness in weekly returns data. Crash is a dichotomous variable that takes a value of one 
for firms that experience one or more firm-specific weekly returns that fall 3.2 standard deviations below the 
mean firm specific weekly return over the fiscal year. 𝑂𝐶′ in the equation is the vector of overconfidence 
measures which include SZOC2, OPT80, PURCHASE and NPR. OPT20 is a measure of pessimism. 𝑥′ in the 
equation is a vector of control variables which include: NSKEW the annual negative skewness in weekly 
returns. DTO is the detrended turnover. AR is average annual return. Sigma is the annual standard deviation of 
weakly returns. Size is the market value of equity. MVBV is the market value of equity to book value of equity. 
ROA is the return on assets, calculated as net income divided by total assets. LEV is leverage, calculated as 
total debt divided by total assets. GDP is the annual growth in gross domestic product. MR is the average annual 
market return. EX is the exchange rate at the end of the year. Regression is performed using real returns and 
local currency. The number of firms 𝑖 is 103, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2011 to 2018, finally the number 
of observations 𝑛 for Egypt is 823. Expected coefficients signs are described in section 6.2.1.  
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Table 6.9 Regression results for the UK 2011-2018 using system GMM. 
Variables  Variables  
SZOC2𝑡−1 0.062 (0.002)  ROA𝑡−1 0.001 (0.896) 
OPT80𝑡−1 0.038 (0.019)  Size𝑡−1 0.026 (0.001) 
OPT20𝑡−1 -0.011 (0.474) Lev𝑡−1  -6.4E-06 (0.413) 
PURCHASE𝑡−1 0.007 (0.655) MVBV𝑡−1  0.004 (0.722) 
NPR𝑡−1 1.056 (0.021)  EX𝑡−1 0.059 (0.054) 
NSKEWt−1 0.006 (0.332)  MR𝑡−1 17.933 (<0.001) 
DTO𝑡−1 -0.0002(0.708)  GDPt−1 2.109 (<0.001) 
Sigma𝑡−1 -0.603 (0.010) Intercept  -0.386 (0.002) 
Number of instruments / Number of groups = 47/767 
AR(2) test = 0.673 
Hansen test = 0.234 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑂𝐶
′
𝑖𝑡−1𝐵2 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1
′ 𝐵3 
This table presents the results for GMM regression of the dependent variable NSKEW, against overconfidence 
and other control variables. NSKEW is the annual negative skewness in weekly returns data. 𝑂𝐶′ in the equation 
is the vector of overconfidence measures which include SZOC2, OPT80, PURCHASE and NPR. OPT20 is a 
measure of pessimism. 𝑥′ in the equation is a vector of control variables which include: NSKEW the annual 
negative skewness in weekly returns. DTO is the detrended turnover. AR is average annual return. Sigma is the 
annual standard deviation of weakly returns. Size is the market value of equity. MVBV is the market value of 
equity to book value of equity. ROA is the return on assets, calculated as net income divided by total assets. 
LEV is leverage, calculated as total debt divided by total assets. GDP is the annual growth in gross domestic 
product. MR is the average annual market return. EX is the exchange rate at the end of the year. Regression is 
performed using real returns and local currency. Regression period from 2011-2018. The number of firms 𝑖 is 
767, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2011 to 2018 for both markets, finally the number of observations 𝑛 UK 
is 5369. Expected coefficients signs are described in section 6.2.1.  
 
 
 
6.6 Conclusion  
This chapter studies the effect that managerial overconfidence has on stock price crash risk. 
Overconfidence is defined as an exaggerated sense of control, an overestimation of returns 
and an underestimation of risk. I hypothesize that overconfident managers, fueled by a 
subconscious propensity to hoard bad news and release it all at once, will lead to an increase 
in stock price crash risk. The main hypothesis for this chapter thus is: 
H2: there is a positive relationship between overconfident managers and SPCR 
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This hypothesis is tested on all listed stocks in the Egyptian and the UK market. Three 
separate measures for stock price crash risk are derived, namely DUVOL, NSKEW and 
CRASH. Different measures to proxy for the overconfidence bias are used, and a set of the 
most important determinants to control for external and internal factors are included, thus 
isolating psychological biases from other factors. 
The results indicate that the different overconfidence measures were insignificant to the 
measures of stock price crash risk for the Egyptian market. However, for the UK market most 
of the measures, except for the stock PURCHASE measure were found to be positive and 
significant. The results for the UK market support the conclusion that managerial 
overconfidence does increase stock price crash risk. I attribute the results of the Egyptian 
market to several factors. The main argument, presented in section 5.3, is that there is a 
certain level of external risk, where managers have the greatest propensity to impart their 
psychological bias on firm decisions. Once this level of risk increases, even overconfident 
managers will become more cautious, causing the decisions of overconfident and rational 
managers to converge. Further, note from the analysis that as Egypt went through severe 
distress periods, stock price crashes were more a result of political and macroeconomic 
factors than firm specific factors. Finally, the results of the Egyptian market can also partially 
be attributed to the fact that, the market being relatively not efficient, investors may not 
respond to excessive risk taking of managers. In other words, the market does not respond 
efficiently to news, shocks or signals by the firm. Moreover, even if the market was efficient, 
the extent and frequency of political and economic crises in Egypt could have crowded out 
the effect of management behavior as far as price crash risk is concerned.  
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Chapter 7  
Managerial Overconfidence and Default Risk 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter studied the effect of managerial overconfidence on one form of risk: 
stock price crash risk. This chapter builds on my previous work by considering another form 
of risk, namely the probability of default. The intuition behind using the probability of default 
as a crucial measure of firm risk stems from the fact that the default of an institution has 
negative impacts on all counterparties involved with the firm. These negative impacts may 
be so widespread to cause the failure of other institutions resulting in a crisis that may have 
greater economy wide costs. Further, managers will try to avoid financial distress as much 
as possible to save their own reputation and career paths. Thus, default risk is vital in that not 
only does it affect managers and their firms but also outside parties. The Merton Model 
(MM), will be used to measure the probability of default. This measure provides a reliable 
ordinal rank of companies based on their likelihood to go into default. In fact, Tudela and 
Young (2003) use the Merton-model to estimate the probability of default for a group of 
failed companies vs. a group of surviving companies. They then compare the MM to 
information driven solely from company accounts. They find that Merton-style estimates 
provide more accurate predictions of default than their competing accounting methods.  
Overconfidence can lead managers to underestimate risk while simultaneously 
overestimating profitability and expected return (Goel and Thaker, 2000; Hribar and Yang, 
2010; Ben-David et al. (2010)). Furthermore, overconfidence in managers is associated with 
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overinvestment, even investing in projects with negative NPV, especially when there is 
abundance of free cashflow (Heaton, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2005).  Overconfident 
managers were also found to take on more debt, especially short-term debt (Malmendier et 
al., 2011; Malmendier and Zheng, 2012).  
The empirical evidence of Chapter 6 also shows that overconfident managers, 
unintentionally, stockpile bad news and release it all at once leading to increased stock price 
crash risk and endangering the market value of their firms. Further, overestimating returns, 
means overconfident firms engage in more risky projects, while simultaneously 
underestimating risks of bankruptcy.   
In line with the theoretical and empirical results presented in this section and the previous 
findings, I expect managerial overconfidence to have a positive effect on the probability of 
default. In the study discussed at length in Section 3.4.3, Leng et al. (2018) study the effect 
of managerial overconfidence on the risk of default by using firms that filed for insolvency 
vs. firms that did not as a measure bankruptcy. In contrast, to measure the probability of 
default, this thesis will employ a different methodology, namely, the Merton Model (MM) 
which is one of the most popular measures of default risk. So rather than using a dichotomous 
method of bankruptcy, this thesis focuses on whether the probability of default increases with 
managerial overconfidence.  
7.2 The Merton Model 
The methodology adopted below is based on the KMV Merton Model (2003). Suppose at 
time 𝑡, a firm has asset value 𝑉𝑡, equity value 𝐸𝑡 and zero-coupon debt 𝐷𝑡. The following 
identity holds 
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 𝑉𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡. (7.1) 
 
If 𝑉𝑡 < 𝐷𝑡, then 𝐸𝑡 < 0, which implies that equity holders will walk away, creditors’ claims 
are not fully covered, and the firm is in default. Typically, equity holders wait till time 𝑇 
before they might default. It is then important to be able to estimate the probability that the 
firm will default at time 𝑇. This is called the probability of default and denoted PD. The 
situation may be rephrased in the following inequality  
 PD = 𝑃(𝑉𝑇 < 𝐷𝑇). (7.2) 
 
Obviously, to determine PD we need the firm’s liabilities 𝐷𝑇 and the probability distribution 
𝑃 of the asset value 𝑉𝑇 at time 𝑇. Liabilities are obtained from the firm’s balance sheet, as it 
is reasonable to assume that the book value of liabilities are similar to its market value. As 
for the probability distribution, a reasonable assumption is to model asset values by a 
stochastic process with time drift around which fluctuations occur in the form of Brownian 
motion. Merton assumed that both components are proportional to the current asset values, 
i.e. a geometric Brownian motion. We then have the stochastic differential equation (SDE) 
(Duan and Wang, 2012) 
 𝑑𝑉𝑡 = 𝜇𝑉𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑉𝑡𝑑𝑊𝑡, 
 
(7.3) 
 
where 𝜇 is the drift coefficient, 𝜎 is the volatility coefficient and {𝑊𝑡}𝑡≤𝑇 is a Brownian 
motion. Therefore, 
 
𝑑𝑉𝑡
𝑉𝑡
= 𝜇𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑡. 
 
(7.4) 
 
To simplify, assume that 𝜇, 𝜎 are independent of time (at least over the period of study). 
Applying Itô’s formula to the process ln 𝑉𝑡 and using the SDE above, we get 
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 𝑑(ln𝑉𝑡) = (𝜇 −
1
2
𝜎2) 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑡. (7.5) 
 
It follows that the process ln 𝑉𝑡 is an Itô process. The solution of this SDE is given by 
 ln 𝑉𝑇 = ln𝑉𝑡 +(𝜇 −
1
2
𝜎2) (𝑇 − 𝑡) + 𝜎(𝑊𝑇 −𝑊𝑡).    (7.6) 
 
Thus,  
 ln 𝑉𝑇 ~𝑁(ln𝑉𝑡 +(𝜇 −
1
2
𝜎2) (𝑇 − 𝑡), 𝜎2(𝑇 − 𝑡)). (7.7) 
 
This fact is usually expressed by saying that the process 𝑉𝑡 is log-normal. In practice, we 
usually take 𝑇 = 𝑡 + 1, or 𝑇 − 𝑡 = 1. Denoting the standard cumulative normal distribution 
function by Φ(⋅), we get 
 
PD = 𝑃(𝑉𝑇 < 𝐷𝑇) 
= 𝑃(ln𝑉𝑇 < ln𝐷𝑇) 
= 𝑃(ln𝐷𝑇 − ln𝑉𝑇 > 0) 
      = Φ(
ln𝐷𝑡 − ln𝑉𝑡 − (𝜇 −
1
2𝜎
2) (𝑇 − 𝑡)
𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡
) 
= Φ(−DD), 
 
             (7.8) 
 
where  
 DD =
ln𝑉𝑡 + (𝜇 −
1
2𝜎
2) (𝑇 − 𝑡) − ln𝐷𝑇
𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡
  (7.9) 
 
represents the distance to default.  
186 
 
Figure 7.1 shows a possible sample path for ln 𝑉𝜏 , 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏 ≤ 𝑇 together with its expected 
values, i.e. 𝐸(ln𝑉𝜏). Figure 7.2 shows the (normal) probability distribution of ln 𝑉𝑡  which is 
centred at its expected value. The probability of default (PD) is the shaded area below the 
normal distribution starting from ln𝐷𝑇. The distance to default may be regarded as the 
distance between 𝐸(ln𝑉𝑡) and ln𝐷𝑇 as shown in the Figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.1 A sample path of log Vt and its expected values 
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Figure 7.2 Probability distribution of log Vt 
 
Thus, in order to calculate the probability of default, we need to know 𝑉𝑡, 𝐷𝑇 , 𝜇, 𝜎. The 
problem now is that 𝑉𝑡 is unobservable, as 𝑉𝑡 is the market value of assets which cannot be 
obtained from the balance sheet. In order to deal with this problem, we observe the following 
payoff at time 𝑇 shown in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1 Payoffs for equity holders and creditors 
 Equity holders Creditors 
𝑉𝑇 ≥ 𝐷𝑇 𝑉𝑇 − 𝐷𝑇 𝐷𝑇 
𝑉𝑇 < 𝐷𝑇 0 𝑉𝑇 
 
 In other words, the equity holders payoff is given by 
𝐸𝑇 = max(0, 𝑉𝑇 − 𝐷𝑇) 
and the creditors payoff is given by  
𝐶𝑇 = min(𝐷𝑇 , 𝑉𝑇) 
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Figure 7.3 illustrates these two types of payoffs. 
Figure 7.3 Equity holder payoff vs. credit holder payoff 
 
 
In particular, 𝐸𝑇 is similar to a call option. Hence, if no dividends are paid, we may model 
the equity value by the Black-Scholes call option formula (1973) 
 𝐸𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡Φ(𝑑1) − 𝐷𝑇𝑒
−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)Φ(𝑑2),    (7.10) 
where 
𝑑1 =
ln𝑉𝑡 + (𝜇 +
1
2𝜎
2) (𝑇 − 𝑡) − ln𝐷𝑇
𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡
, 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡, 
𝑟 = logarithmic risk-free rate of return. 
Further equity volatility and asset volatility can be related by the following expression 
 
𝜎𝐸 =
𝑉𝑡
𝐸𝑡
∆𝜎𝑉 
 
   (7.11) 
P
ay
o
ff
E_T C_T 𝑉𝑇𝐷𝑇
𝐷𝑇
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Equation (7.10) has two unknowns, 𝑉𝑡 and 𝜎.  
MATLAB is used to solve for the unknowns simultaneously through an iterative numerical 
technique for (𝑉𝑡, 𝜎) as shown in Ronn and Verma (1986). 𝐸𝑡 is equal to the total market 
value of equity obtained from the closing price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the firm’s fiscal year. 𝜎𝐸  is estimated using the annualized standard 
deviation of logarithm of weekly stock returns for the prior fiscal year. Here real returns are 
used rather than nominal returns, because Egypt specifically suffered from accelerated 
inflation with the turmoil and the devaluation of the Egyptian pound. 𝑇 − 𝑡 is one year. 𝐿𝑡 is 
taken as the book value of short-term debt plus one half of long-term debt. Finally, 𝜇 is taken 
as the risk-free rate of return.  
7.3 The Regression Model 
To test the prediction, I will start with a simple model, presented in equation (7.11), to test 
the probability of default against managerial overconfidence. This will form a benchmark 
model. Further, I expect firms within the same industry, to have similar probabilities of 
default. Firms with excess probability of default than the industry may be explained by 
managerial overconfidence. This prediction is tested using the linear model presented in 
equation (7.12).  
 PD𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
′ 𝛽,   (7.12) 
and 
 APD𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
′ 𝛽, 
APD𝑖𝑡 = PD𝑖𝑡 − IPD𝑖𝑡, 
  (7.13) 
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where  
APD𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal probability of default of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡, adjusted for industry average;  
PD𝑖𝑡 is the probability of default of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑇;  
IPD𝑖𝑡 is the average probability of default of industry 𝑖 at time 𝑡; 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 = [SZOC1𝑖𝑡 SZOC2𝑖𝑡 OPT80𝑖𝑡  OPT20𝑖𝑡 PURCHASE𝑖𝑡 NPR𝑖𝑡]
′. 
The measures of overconfidence SZOC1, SZOC2, OPT80, OPT20 PURCHASE and NPR 
were all discussed in detail in Section 4.6 of Chapter 4. A brief overview of the measures 
will be provided as they are important to this study. SZOC1 and SZOC2 are the Schrand and 
Zechman (2012) measures of overconfidence. In regard to SZOC1, a manager is considered 
overconfident if the firm meets any two of the following four criteria: (i) the firm’s rate of 
investment is greater than the industry median (ii) the volume of a firm’s acquisitions are 
greater than the industry median (iii) a firm’s debt to equity ratio is greater than the industry 
median (iv) the firm uses convertible debt or preferred stock. Regarding SZOC2, a manager 
will be considered overconfident if the company satisfies any three of five criteria with the 
fifth criterion being (v) a firm’s dividend yield is greater than 0.  
Likewise, I use Campbell et al. (2011) measures of overconfidence and pessimism or lack of 
confidence. Regarding OPT80, a manager is considered overconfident if the firm’s 
investment activities are above the 80th percentile of all firms within the same industry for 
two consecutive years. Regarding OPT20, a manager is considered as pessimistic if their 
investment activities are below the 20th percentile of all firms within the same industry for 
two consecutive years. 
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Finally, two other measures of overconfidence are added that depend on net stock purchases 
of the firm’s stocks. These measures are applicable only for the UK.20 Under the 
PURCHASE measure a manager is considered overconfident if net purchases, defined in 
units of stocks, are in the top 80th percentile of net purchases by all CEOs in that year. Further, 
those purchases must increase the CEOs ownership of the firm by 10% during the fiscal year. 
The NPR measure of overconfidence is a variable with a value that ranges from -1 to 1 and 
is calculated as:  
 NPR= (insider purchase - insider selling)/(insider purchase + insider selling). 
 Following the discussion of stock price crash risk in Chapter 6 all measures of managerial 
overconfidence are lagged. This is to avoid reverse causality, where it may be argued that 
firms with higher probability of default will employ overconfident managers. Additionally, 
the overconfidence measures are lagged by one year to allow the effect of activities of 
overconfident managers to be discernible in firm risk in the following year.  Furthermore, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, because the overconfidence factors SZOC1 and SZOC2, are highly 
correlated, the regression is run twice to avoid multicollinearity problem, each time including 
only one of the variables. The coefficients and significance levels in both cases presented 
almost identical results. The results presented are for the models where only SZOC2 is 
included, as it is the more comprehensive overconfidence measure. Panel data techniques 
explained in Chapter 4 will be used to analyse the data.  
 
20 Data for this measure is not available for the Egyptian market.  
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7.4 Descriptive Statistics 
The expected probability of default, PD, with one-year horizon has a mean of 1.6% and 
ranges between 0% and 98.4% for Egypt and has a mean of 2.5% and ranges between 0% 
and 96.9% for the UK as shown in Table 7.2. Probabilities of default that range above 90% 
were suffered by a few companies during the financial crisis for both the UK and Egypt, as 
well as other periods of unrest in Egypt. A clearer picture of the average probability of default 
across firms is presented in Figure 7.4 for Egypt and the UK. In Egypt, the cross-section 
average PD peaked in 2008 at almost 7% and was starting to recover before it increased again 
sharply in 2011, which is when the Egyptian political unrest started. As the market started to 
recover from the political turmoil, we can see an increase in the probability of default in 2017 
which is most likely attributable to the devaluation of the Egyptian pound in late 2016. 
Similarly, the average probability of default in the UK, presented in Figure 7.4, shows that 
PD peaked in 2008-2009, at approximately 5.5%, in relation to the global financial crisis. It 
then decreased and increased again slightly around 2016, which is probably attributed to the 
announcement of Brexit. I feel it is necessary to stress that the requirement of a complete 
data set for firms biases the data towards the surviving firms, which explains why the average 
probability of default tends towards 0. 
Table 7.2 Average probability of default Egypt vs. the UK 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PD𝐸𝑔 1,324 0.016 0.055 0 0.984 
PD𝑈𝐾 10,456 0.025 0.082 0 0.969 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the probability of default in Egypt and the UK. Probability of 
default is measures using the Merton Model and using real returns.  
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Figure 7.4 Average probability of default (Egypt vs. the UK) 
A breakdown of the average probability of default by industry in the Egyptian market is 
shown in Table 7.3. The data is graphed in Figures 7.5, 7.6. 
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Table 7.3 Average industry probability of default for Egypt 
  15 20 25 30 35 45 50 60 
2004 0.007 0.081 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.052 
2005 0.007 0.024 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.054 
2006 0.005 0.025 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.022 
2007 0.004 0.043 0.011 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.028 
2008 0.061 0.124 0.047 0.110 0.113 0.041 0.005 0.055 
2009 0.010 0.030 0.004 0.010 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.025 
2010 0.010 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.003 
2011 0.059 0.052 0.054 0.055 0.025 0.000 0.015 0.076 
2012 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.012 
2013 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.038 0.001 
2014 0.000 0.017 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
2015 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 
2016 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.005 
2017 0.007 0.074 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.014 0.024 0.000 
2018 0.032 0.053 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.002 
This table presents annual average probability of default for firms in the Egyptian market divided according 
to industry segment.  
*10 - Energy 
  15 - Materials 
  20 - Industrials  
  25 - Consumer Discretionary 
  30 - Consumer Staples 
35 - Healthcare 
45 - IT 
50 - Communication Services  
55 - Utilities 
60 - Real Estate 
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Figure 7.5 PD by Industry in the Egyptian market 
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Figure 7.6 Collective PD in the Egyptian Market 
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It can be seen from Figure 7.5 that there was a collective move towards default during the 
global financial crisis in 2008. This collective move is reinforced by the lower collective PD 
in Figure 7.6. The move was led by the “Industrials” while “Communication Services” was 
the least affected. Most (but not all) industries moved towards default again in 2011, this 
time led by “Real Estate” while “Communication Services” remained the least affected. The 
move towards default in 2013 and 2017 was industry specific with “Communication 
Services” the most affected in 2013 and “Industrials” most affected by the devaluation of the 
EGP in 2017. The upper collective PD in Figure 7.6 shares the same features with the average 
PD graph of Figure 7.5.  
A breakdown of the average probability of default by industry in the UK market is shown in 
Table 7.4. The data is graphed in Figures 7.7, 7.8. 
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Table 7.4 Average industry probability of default for the UK 
  10 15 20 25 30 35 45 50 55 60 
2004 0.037 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.008 0.000 0.000 
2005 0.046 0.014 0.009 0.003 0.035 0.013 0.011 0.005 0.000 0.001 
2006 0.032 0.016 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.026 0.006 0.000 0.001 
2007 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.022 0.005 0.000 0.000 
2008 0.104 0.102 0.038 0.055 0.056 0.026 0.056 0.054 0.003 0.041 
2009 0.127 0.116 0.060 0.036 0.036 0.059 0.059 0.042 0.011 0.022 
2010 0.031 0.037 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.017 0.020 0.026 0.007 0.002 
2011 0.041 0.013 0.022 0.011 0.016 0.016 0.020 0.029 0.047 0.021 
2012 0.038 0.016 0.020 0.005 0.010 0.019 0.016 0.025 0.003 0.014 
2013 0.016 0.044 0.019 0.006 0.008 0.019 0.037 0.013 0.005 0.019 
2014 0.053 0.035 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.021 0.007 0.010 
2015 0.071 0.060 0.007 0.005 0.009 0.010 0.016 0.028 0.047 0.001 
2016 0.104 0.064 0.009 0.016 0.008 0.007 0.020 0.032 0.021 0.002 
2017 0.057 0.043 0.012 0.007 0.009 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.031 0.001 
2018 0.056 0.011 0.008 0.024 0.004 0.022 0.019 0.036 0.007 0.005 
This table presents annual average probability of default for firms in the UK market divided according to 
industry segment. 
*10 - Energy 
  15 - Materials 
  20 - Industrials  
  25 - Consumer Discretionary 
  30 - Consumer Staples 
35 - Healthcare 
45 - IT 
50 - Communication Services  
55 - Utilities 
60 - Real Estate 
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Figure 7.7 PD by Industry in the UK Market 
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Figure 7.8 Collective PD in the UK Market 
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It can be seen from Figure 7.7 that there was a collective move towards default during the 
global financial crisis. In comparison with the Egyptian market, the response of the UK 
market was relatively delayed, with peak appearing in 2009 as seen in Figure 7.8. This could 
mean, as would be anticipated, that the Egyptian market is more prone to economic crises 
with erratic movements up and down.  The 2008-2009 move was led by “Energy” while 
“Utilities” being the least affected. This is curious as the effect on utilities should be more 
pronounced because of its dependence on energy.  My best explanation for this phenomenon 
is that the 2008 crisis was a true “bubble” fuelled by virtual trading rather than actual 
economic factors. The “Energy” industry leads again the move towards default in 2016 with 
“Real Estate” being the least affected. Figure 7.8 reveals that there was a ‘smaller’ collective 
push towards default in 2011. There are several events that occurred in 2011 that may have 
caused this push. Several countries in the Eurozone were suffering from expanding debt and 
had to be “bailed out” putting stress on all countries in the European union, meanwhile 
inflation was rising in the UK. Further the tsunami earthquake that occurred in Japan had 
effects which were felt in financial markets across the world.  The collective push towards 
default in 2016 was not as strong as the one in 2008-2009 as is conveyed by the lower 
collective PD. 
Finally, Tables 7.5 and 7.6 present the correlation matrix for the abnormal probability of 
default APD against measures of overconfidence. Notice that the APD for both Egypt and 
the UK is negatively correlated with all overconfidence measures, and positively correlated 
with measures of “lack” of confidence or pessimism. For example, we can see under the 
Egyptian market that SZOC1, SZOC2, and OPT80 are correlated negatively with APD at       
-0.029, -0.039 and -0.019 respectively, while OPT20 is positively correlated with APD at 
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0.020. This does not seem to support my prevailing argument of a risk increasing effects 
from CEO overconfidence in favour of the alternative argument that overconfidence is 
actually more beneficial to firms. More on this in the next subsection. 
Table 7.5 Correlation matrix for APD against overconfidence measures (Egypt) 
 Variables APD SZOC1 SZOC2 OPT80 OPT20 
APD 1 
    
SZOC1 -0.029 1 
   
SZOC2 -0.039 0.753 1 
  
OPT80 -0.019 0.205 0.156 1 
 
OPT20 0.020 -0.089 -0.086 -0.253 1 
This table provides the correlation matrix between Abnormal Probability of Default (APD) and the measures 
of overconfidence SZOC1 SZOC2 OPT80 and OPT20. 
  
Table 7.6 Correlation matrix for APD against overconfidence measures (UK) 
Variables APD SZOC1 SZOC2 OPT80 OPT20 PURCHASE NPR 
APD  1 
     
 
SZOC1 -0.066 1 
    
 
SZOC2 -0.114 0.826 1 
   
 
OPT80 -0.031 0.134 0.075 1 
  
 
OPT20 0.072 -0.215 -0.192 -0.087 1 
 
 
PURCHASE -0.003 0.049 0.045 0.008 -0.041 1  
NPR -0.094 0.094 0.161 0.025 -0.014 0.020 1 
This table provides the correlation matrix between Abnormal Probability of Default (APD) and the measures 
of overconfidence SZOC1 SZOC2 OPT80 and OPT20 PURCHASE and NPR. 
7.5 Regression Results: 
The estimation of the models will be performed in two steps. First, bivariate testing of PD 
and APD against overconfidence measures will be performed. Then, as a precaution, the 
same control variables used in the previous chapter are used here to control for external 
factors that may be affecting the probability of default. This is because the Merton Model is 
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dependent largely on the market value and volatility of equity, I expect that anything that 
affects risk of stock price crashes is likely to also affect its probability of default. The 
following is a brief overview of the control factors used:   
1. Sigma
𝑖𝑡−1
 the annual return volatility of stocks. Firms with higher return volatility in 
period 𝑡 − 1 are more likely to have higher probability of default in period 𝑡.  
2. Average return, denoted AR𝑖𝑡, where firms with higher average returns, are doing 
well, and thus are expected to continue this performance, reducing the probability of 
default. AR𝑖𝑡−1 is measured as the mean of a firm’s weekly real returns over the fiscal 
year.  
3. Size, denoted Size𝑖𝑡−1, where larger firms are expected to have more connections and 
better lines of credit with reduced rates, thereby reducing the risk of default. Size𝑖𝑡 is 
measured as the log of the market capitalization of firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡.  
4. Market to book ratio, denoted MB𝑖𝑡−1. Firms with high market to book ratios in 
period 𝑡 − 1 are predominantly growth firms and may be considered over valued by 
the public investors and are thus considered riskier. As I expect that they are more 
likely to crash, this could increase their risk of default.  
5. Return on assets, denoted ROA𝑖𝑡−1, measured as net income divided by total assets. 
Where firms with higher ROA in period 𝑡 − 1 are preforming well and thus less likely 
to default.  
6. Leverage, denoted Lev𝑡−1, measured as total debt divided by total assets. Firms with 
higher leverage in period 𝑡 − 1 may be sending a negative signal to outside investors 
and are thus increasing their probability of default.  
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Finally, I will also consider the macroeconomic variables that are deemed necessary due 
to the political events that took place during the study period.  
1. Gross Domestic Product, denoted GDP𝑡−1, is the GDP growth rate. Where an 
economy is flourishing a firm is less likely to default and the opposite is also true.  
2. Market return, denoted MR𝑡−1, measured through the return of the EGX30/UKX 
index. The average market return gives an indication of how the stock market is 
performing, the higher this performance the less likely firms are to default.  
3. Finally, exchange-rate, denoted EX𝑡−1, measured as the exchange rate of the 
EGP/GBP to the USD. Specifically, for Egypt I expect that the extreme 
devaluation for the EGP could have put the companies at increased risk of default, 
where investors may have panicked and pulled out of the market, causing firm 
value to fall and brining a firm closer to default.  
7.5.1 Bivariate Testing 
The bivariate test results for Egypt and the UK presented in Table 7.7 offer very similar 
results to those tested against stock price crash risk. At the outlook, none of the 
overconfidence measures are significant for Egypt. The SZOC, OPT80, OPT20 and NPR are 
all significant for the UK, when regressing against PD or APD. It is very important to note 
the signs of coefficients, for example we can see that under APD, SZOC2 has a coefficient 
of -0.005, OPT80 has a coefficient of -0.006, OPT20 has a coefficient of 0.006 and NPR has 
a coefficient of -0.002. This very important distinction from the stock price crash risk model 
presented in Chapter 6 signifies that activities of overconfident managers reduce probability 
of default rather than increase it. Even, SZOC2, for Egypt while insignificant with a p-value 
of 0.498, still had a negative coefficient of -0.003. These results are contrary to my 
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hypothesis, where I argued that managerial overconfidence increases the risk of default. 
Furthermore, whilst the regression against PD and APD are very comparable, the 
PURCHASE measure of overconfidence is significant against PD (coefficient = -0.005, p-
value = <0.001) but insignificant against APD (coefficient = 0.001, p-value = 0.557). Again, 
note that where PURCHASE was significant the coefficient was negative. 
The dissimilarity between the stock price crash risk and probability of default risk may be 
rationalized as a difference in the type of defined risk as well as the time horizon prospect. 
While stock price crash risk looks only at the data that occurred in the past, the probability 
of default is a forward-looking measure of risk. Thus, one may reason that while managerial 
overconfidence may increase risk in the short run it might be more beneficial for firms in the 
long run. While investors may react negatively to the increased risk-taking activities of 
overconfident managers leading to an increase in stock price crash risk, these risk-taking 
activities are actually beneficial for the firms and help to reduce its probability of default in 
the future. In line with the MM clarifying diagram presented in Figure 7.9, as long as the 
market value of assets is at a safe distance from 𝐷𝑇 and does not suffer from erratic 
volatilities, it may very well be beneficial for the firm to take on more debt and increase the 
level of investments. This is a typical behaviour of an overconfident manager.  A pessimistic 
manager who plays it safe, may not be able to increase the market value of assets, bringing 
his firm closer to default.  
  
204 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.7 Bivariate test results against PD vs. APD 
 Egypt UK 
Variables PD APD PD APD 
SZOC2𝑡−1 -0.007 (0.418) -0.003 (0.498) -0.010 (<0.001) -0.005 (0.001) 
OPT80𝑡−1 0.007 (0.405) 0.002 (0.801) -0.004 (0.012) -0.006 (0.012) 
OPT20𝑡−1 0.002 (0.110) 0.002 (0.103) 0.011 (0.002) 0.006 (0.017) 
PURCHASE𝑡−1  - - -0.005 (<0.001) 0.001 (0.557) 
NPR𝑡−1  - - 0.002 (0.022) -0.002 (0.027) 
 p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑇 = 𝑂𝐶
′
𝑖𝑡𝛽1 
This table presents the bivariate results for FE regression of the dependent variable PD/APD, against the 
overconfidence measures. returns data. PD is the probability of default measured using the Merton Model. APD 
is the abnormal probability of default, adjusted for industry average. 𝑂𝐶′ in the equation is the vector of 
overconfidence measures which include SZOC2, OPT80, PURCHASE and NPR. OPT20 is a measure of 
pessimism. Regression is performed using real returns and local currency. The number of firms 𝑖 for Egypt is 
103 and for the UK is 770, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018 for both markets, finally the number 
of observations 𝑛 for Egypt is 1220 and for the UK is 9600. Expected coefficient signs are described in section 
7.5. 
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Figure 7.9 Probability of default 
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7.5.2 Regression Results with Control Variables 
Before commenting on the regression results with the added control variables, it is worth 
mentioning that the correlation matrix provided in the appendix A7A1 and A7A2, shows that 
there are no significant correlations between APD and any of the independent variables. This 
signifies that modelling APD is distinct from modelling risk, leverage or even size. This 
provides us with reassurance that none of the variables are being regressed against itself and 
we need not worry about multicollinearity.  
It is reasonable to expect that past PD is likely to affect a firm’s present PD value. I therefore 
perform a dynamic panel data testing, using two-step system GMM as explained in section 
6.5, including lagged PD and lagged APD as an additional control variable. The results are 
compared with those obtained by a standard fixed effects model in order to assess whether 
there is a significant change. The results presented in Table 7.8 show that, while static and 
dynamic panel data analysis do not show much difference in terms of significance levels and 
sign of coefficient, PDt−1 is significant in both markets (with a coefficient = 0.12 and p-value 
= 0.019 for Egypt, and a coefficient of 0.302 and p-value = <0.001 for the UK), supporting 
the assumption of a dynamic model. Thus, while I present both models, the focus of 
references are mainly regarding the dynamic model in the analysis. The main discrepancy 
when controls are added under the Egyptian market is that OPT80 is significant with a 
coefficient of 0.131 and p-value 0.040 when regressed against PD. However, it is significant 
at a 1% level with a coefficient of -0.058 when regressed against APD. So far, the results for 
overconfidence have not shown any significant results when regressed against any variable 
for the Egyptian market. I am inclined to believe that there is no true causal relationship, and 
that these results may have been caused by the choice of instruments. OPT80 remains 
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insignificant under the static model when regressed against PD or APD. Regarding the other 
overconfidence measures for the UK, we can see that all the overconfidence remains 
significant with negative coefficients when regressed against PD. Except for the 
PURCHASE measure which while is significant at 5% in the static model turns insignificant 
under the dynamic model (coefficient -0.001, p-value = 0.609). Thus, even when the control 
variables are added, the conclusions remain the same (managerial overconfidence reduces 
the probability of default), supporting the robustness of the results.  
If we look next at the regression results presented in Table 7.9 against APD we can see that 
the results remain very similar, except that PURCHASE is not significant under both the 
dynamic and static models. Further, OPT80 which was significant at a 1% level with a 
coefficient of -0.007 when regressed against PD, is now only significant at a 10% level with 
a coefficient of -0.001 when regressed against APD. Under the static model OPT80 is 
significant at the 1% level against PD, and at the 5% level against APD. 
 Additionally, the control variables results are in line with expectations. The coefficients of 
AR (coefficient = -1.154, p-value = 0.011 for Egypt, and coefficient = -0.114, p-value 0.026 
for the UK) and Sigma (coefficient = 0.609, p-value = 0.004 for Egypt, and coefficient = 
0.427, p-value = <0.001) are negative and positive, respectively, across both markets. In other 
words, as average return increases, APD decreases, and as sigma increases, APD increases. 
We can see that leverage is not significant. This makes sense because its maturity value is 
one of the variables that determine PD. Thus, it is not expected that the delayed leverage 
should explain any excess PD. Furthermore, while in the SPCR model in Chapter 6 most of 
the macroeconomic factors came out as significant in Egypt, this is the not the case for the 
APD. A possible explanation again is that interest rate, a systemic factor, already determines 
207 
 
PD and thus any excess PD should only be a result of external factors that are not 
incorporated in the measure of default.  
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Table 7.8 Regression against PD, GMM vs FE for Egypt and the UK 
 Egypt UK 
Variables Dynamic Static Dynamic Static 
SZOC2𝑡−1 -0.254 (0.432) -0.014 (0.091) -0.005 (0.006) -0.009 (0.001) 
OPT80𝑡−1 0.131 (0.040) 0.011 (0.131) -0.007 (0.006) -0.017 (0.008) 
OPT20𝑡−1 -0.035 (0.268) 0.001 (0.674) 0.006 (0.038) 0.006 (0.021) 
PURCHASE𝑡−1 - - -0.001 (0.609) 0.002 (0.021) 
NPR𝑡−1  - - -0.002 (0.036) -0.003 (0.018) 
PDt−1 0.120 (0.019) - 0.302 (<0.001) - 
Sigma𝑡−1 -0.007 (0.107) 0.409 (0.022) 0.275 (0.001) 0.167 (0.006) 
AR𝑡−1  -0.429 (0.035) -3.430 (<0.001) -0.067 (0.040) -0.054 (0.053) 
 ROA𝑡−1 -3.031 (<0.001) -0.0005 (0.138) -0.001 (0.250) -0.001 (0.125) 
 Size𝑡−1 -0.001 (0.002) -0.005 (0.066) 0.004 (0.067) 0.005 (0.044) 
Lev𝑡−1  -0.005 (0.085) -8.58 (0.931) 7.4E-08 (0.832) -6.4E-08 (0.873) 
MVBV𝑡−1  -0.005 (0.901) -0.0065 (<0.001) 0.001 (0.004) -0.005 (0.003) 
 EX𝑡−1 -5.8E-08 (0.821) -0.002 (0.475) 0.035 (<0.001) 0.035 (<0.001) 
 MR𝑡−1 -0.001 (0.438) -0.880 (<0.001) -2.404 (<0.001) -2.643 (<0.001) 
 GDPt−1 -1.1E-06 (0.028) -0.032 (0.497) -0.027 (0.526) -0.048 (0.323) 
Intercept  0.044 (0.536) 0.087 (<0.001) 0.041(0.021) -0.056 (0.006) 
 
Instruments/groups
= 
93/103 
Hansen test= 0.152 
AR (2) test = 0.192 
Rho=0.297 Instruments/groups
= 
27/768 
Hansen test= 0.566 
AR (2) test = 0.438 
Rho=0.545 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑇 = 𝛼 + 𝑂𝐶
′
𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′ 𝐵2 
This table presents the dynamic GMM and static FE regression of the dependent variable PD, against the 
overconfidence measures and control variables. PD is the probability of default measured using the Merton 
Model. 𝑂𝐶′ in the equation is the vector of overconfidence measures which include SZOC2, OPT80, 
PURCHASE and NPR. OPT20 is a measure of pessimism. 𝑥′ in the equation is a vector of control variables 
which include: AR is average annual return. Sigma is the annual standard deviation of weakly returns. Size is 
the market value of equity. MVBV is the market value of equity to book value of equity. ROA is the return on 
assets, calculated as net income divided by total assets. LEV is leverage, calculated as total debt divided by 
total assets. GDP is the annual growth in gross domestic product. MR is the average annual market return. EX 
is the exchange rate at the end of the year. Regression is performed using real returns and local currency. The 
number of firms 𝑖 for Egypt is 103 and for the UK is 770, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018 for 
both markets, finally the number of observations 𝑛 for Egypt is 1220 and for the UK is 9600. Expected 
coefficient signs are described in section 7.5. 
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Table 7.9 Regression against APD, GMM vs FE for Egypt and the UK 
 Egypt UK 
Variables Dynamic Static Dynamic Static 
SZOC2𝑡−1 -0.007 (0.843) -0.006 (0.081) -0.007 (<0.001) -0.005 (0.004) 
OPT80𝑡−1 -0.058 (0.001) -0.005 (0.490) -0.001 (0.061) -0.005 (0.027) 
OPT20𝑡−1 0.003 (0.603) 0.002 (0.064) 0.006 (0.046) 0.006 (0.014) 
PURCHASE𝑡−1 - - 0.0001 (0.937) -0.002 (0.490) 
NPR𝑡−1  - - -0.004 (<0.001) 0.004 (<0.001) 
APDt−1 0.225 (0.001) - 0.093 (0.075) - 
Sigma𝑡−1 0.609 (0.004) 0.546 (0.01) 0.427 (<0.001) 0.169 (0.007) 
AR𝑡−1  -1.154 (0.011) -0.763 (0.042) -0.114 (0.026) -0.055 (0.029) 
 ROA𝑡−1 0.0005 (0.425) -0.003 (0.282) 4.5E-05 (0.103) -0.0001 (0.103) 
 Size𝑡−1 -0.01 (0.015) -0.003 (0.323) -0.003 (0.495) 0.002 (0.262) 
Lev𝑡−1  0.028 (0.348) -0.002 (0.766) 1.87E-09 (0.993) -3.4E-07 (0.145) 
MVBV𝑡−1  -0.001 (0.676) -0.0003 (0.041) -0.0003 (0.004) -4.6E-07 (0.015) 
 EX𝑡−1 -0.001 (0.291) 0.048 (0.59) -0.002 (0.668) 0.004 (0.501) 
 MR𝑡−1 -1.71 (0.001) -0.001 (0.035) 1.363 (0.001) 1.229 (0.001) 
GDPt−1 -0.015 (0.650) -6.3E-08 (0.028) 0.201 (0.002) 0.102 (0.066) 
Intercept  0.057 (0.020) 0.008 (0.710) -0.025 (0.032) -0.03 (0.119) 
 
Instruments/groups
= 
93/103 
Hansen test= 0.171 
AR (2) test = 0.087 
Rho=0.272 Instruments/groups
= 
27/768 
Hansen test= 0.330 
AR (2) test = 0.886 
Rho=0.4747 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐴𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑇 = 𝛼 + 𝑂𝐶
′
𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′ 𝐵2 
This table presents the dynamic GMM and static FE regression of the dependent variable APD, against the 
overconfidence measures and control variables. APD is the abnormal probability of default, adjusted for 
industry average, probability of default is measured using the Merton Model. 𝑂𝐶′ in the equation is the vector 
of overconfidence measures which include SZOC2, OPT80, PURCHASE and NPR. OPT20 is a measure of 
pessimism. 𝑥′ in the equation is a vector of control variables which include: AR is average annual return. Sigma 
is the annual standard deviation of weakly returns. Size is the market value of equity. MVBV is the market 
value of equity to book value of equity. ROA is the return on assets, calculated as net income divided by total 
assets. LEV is leverage, calculated as total debt divded by total assets.GDP is the annual growth in gross 
domestic product. MR is the average annual market return. EX is the exchange rate at the end of the year. 
Regression is performed using real returns and local currency. The number of firms 𝑖 for Egypt is 103 and for 
the UK is 770, the time period 𝑡 is from the year 2005 to 2018 for both markets, finally the number of 
observations 𝑛 for Egypt is 1220 and for the UK is 9600. Expected coefficient signs are described in section 
7.5. 
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From the first second and third empirical study presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the main 
results of overconfidence remain insignificant for Egypt. The rationale behind this is 
explained in Section 5.3, where I postulate that there is a certain level of external risk where 
managerial overconfidence is likely to have the greatest effect on decision making, as the 
level of risk increases the managers start to become more cautious and the behaviour of both 
overconfident and rational mangers converges. Thus, as Egypt was going through periods of 
turmoil and extreme instability, managerial overconfidence was not significant, managers 
were becoming more cautious. For the UK, being relatively more stable, we could see a 
significant effect of managerial overconfidence across all three models. In fact, the 
consistency of the results across all three models supports my argument even further.  
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter studies the effect of managerial overconfidence on default risk as measured by 
the Merton-Model probability of default. In contrast to other models, structural models as the 
MM have a major strength; they incorporate market data as a key component in the model 
and are thus more responsive to changing market conditions (Allen and Powell, 2011). I start 
out with the hypothesis that overconfident managers, having been found to consistently 
underestimate risk while simultaneously overestimating returns, often engaging in risky and 
sometimes value destroying activities for the firm, that are likely to increase the probability 
of default. The main hypothesis for this chapter is: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and firm probability 
of default. 
The model is applied both to the Egyptian and the UK market. The results for the Egyptian 
market are insignificant. This may be due to the political events that were ensuing during the 
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period of study, causing managerial-specific factors to be for the most part insignificant, as 
compared to firm-specific and systematic or country-wide factors. The results for the UK 
however were more interesting. Where contrary to my hypothesis, managerial 
overconfidence (pessimism) is found to reduce (increase) the probability of default. 
Signifying that overconfident managers are better able to create value for the firm21, moving 
the firm further away from default. I reason that while in the previous chapter overconfident 
managers were found to increase stock price crash risk, this may be due to investors reacting 
negatively to the increased risk-taking activities of overconfident managers in the short run. 
However, I reason that in the long run the activities of the overconfident managers are 
actually more efficient in reducing the forward-looking probability of default for the firm.  
These results are valuable to HR committees, government regulators, academics and other 
interested parties. The results convey a positive view of hiring overconfident managers to 
reduce firm default risk. In fact, it may be useful to repeat this study against firm value, to 
discover whether overconfident managers help to increase firm value while simultaneously 
reducing its probability of default.  
 
 
  
 
21 That is overconfident managers are better able to increase the market value of equity, a main component in 
the Merton Model.  
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
Complementing traditional theory of finance by the inclusion of behavioural biases has 
proved to be important in providing a comprehensive understanding of how firms behave. 
Managers are humans and as such are influenced by a number of biases that affect how they 
run their firms. While traditional theory of finance and investment, such as the pecking order 
theory or the market timing theory are prominent and successful, they fall short of capturing 
human emotion. This turns out to be a paramount limitation. 
This thesis aimed at contributing to the research effort directed at the integration of the 
traditional theory of finance and human behaviour theory. In particular, I considered how 
managerial overconfidence can affect managerial decision making, and how this translates 
in terms of firm risk. The specific objectives intended in this thesis were approached in two 
main directions, a theoretical direction and an empirical direction.  
Panel data analysis was applied to all firms listed in the Egyptian and the UK market 
(excluding the finance industry) over the period 2005-2018.  Special attention is paid to the 
effects of human behaviour during periods of turmoil or abnormal events. The Egyptian 
market, with its recent political turmoil was the main market of interest, and it was where I 
expected to see exaggerated effects of the psychological bias. The UK market was chosen as 
a comparative market. While the UK was also affected by the global financial crisis of 2007-
2008 and the Brexit referendum passed in 2016, it remains relatively more stable and better 
developed than the Egyptian market.  
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 In what follows a review of the results achieved are provided under each empirical model 
discussing whether the results conformed or deviated from the hypotheses and providing 
justification for the apparent deviations. In the Section 9.3 recommendations will be provided 
regarding what firms should be wary of when employing overconfident managers, and the 
area where I believe future research would be of value. 
8.2 Research Objectives: Summary of Findings and Conclusion 
The objectives of this thesis can be categorised as theoretical and empirical. First, prior 
literature on the effects of managerial overconfidence on firm decision making and risk is 
reviewed. This helped to build the theoretical background on which testable hypotheses are 
formed. Then, the hypotheses are empirically tested on the Egyptian and the UK markets.  
8.2.1 Research limitation 
Before a summary of the findings are presented, it is necessary to discuss the limitations of 
this research, as it affects the results and conclusion. The main limitation of this thesis are 
the proxies used to measure managerial overconfidence. The overconfidence measure used 
for the Egyptian and the UK markets was just one of several proxies proposed in literature 
for measuring overconfidence. While these are the best measures available for use in both 
markets for the study, they may not be fully representative of the overconfidence bias of 
managers. Not all commonly adopted measures of overconfidence could be applied to Egypt 
or the Egyptian market due to data unavailability as well as practical considerations. For 
example, the partial payment of managers through firm shares is not a common practice in 
Egypt, neither does Egypt have an options market. This meant that I had limited choices for 
measures of overconfidence. Due to the aforementioned data limitation, managerial 
overconfidence was measured mainly through the exaggerated financing and investment 
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activities of the firm. Further, under this proxy the measurement technique developed by 
Schrand and Zechman (2012), which is a composite overconfidence index based on several 
investment and financing activities of the firm (see section 4.6.1 for more information) is 
biased towards developed markets. Where some of the activities included in the score, as 
mergers and acquisitions, convertible debt or preferred stock were very low or non-existent 
for the Egyptian market, which may have in part caused the mean value of overconfidence 
to be so low. Nonetheless, other proxies were also used, as the measure developed by 
Campbell et al. (2011) which relied only on firm investment activities. Additionally, stock 
purchases and insider trading information were used as a proxy for overconfidence for the 
UK market, however data for this proxy was not available for Egypt. Given this limitation 
conclusions are presented with caution.  
8.2.2 Summary of findings and contribution 
The overconfidence measures across all three models resulted insignificant for the Egyptian 
market. This seems to signify that overconfidence has no impact on managerial decision 
making or firm risk in Egypt. Subject to the applicability of my measures of choice, I 
proposed an argument to explain the insignificant results achieved for the Egyptian market, 
vs. the significant results achieved for the UK market. The level of external/political risk may 
have a direct effect on managerial overconfidence and its impact on decision making. In 
Figure 5.3 I propose that there could exist a certain (mid) level of risk, where the effects of 
overconfidence on decision making would be most pronounced. As external/political risk 
increases, managers become more cautious and the behaviour of overconfident and rational 
manager converge. This argument would support the findings for the three empirical study 
chapters. As the overconfidence measures for Egypt resulted consistently insignificant, while 
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the same overconfidence measures for the UK resulted consistently significant. Further, it is 
found that for the Egyptian market the systematic factors played a prominent role across the 
SPCR model, signifying that the political instability that Egypt went through during the 
period of study left very little room to human factors. Where market-wide factors explained 
overwhelmingly most of the variation in the Egyptian market during the period of study. This 
may be a point for further investigation in Egyptian as well as similar markets. While other 
arguments were considered, this was the main argument that proved consistency across all 
three models.  
In contrast, the results for the UK market produced by the first model did support the findings 
of Malmendier and Tate (2005) where managers were likely to invest depending on the 
availability of internal cashflow (retained earnings). Specifically, the interaction between 
SZOC, OPT and NPR measures of overconfidence turn out to be significant and positive. 
Supporting the hypothesis that managerial overconfidence does affect investment sensitivity 
to cashflow. Only the PURCHASE measure of overconfidence results insignificant, this 
might be due to the measure being built on conditions that are a bit excessive and so do not 
capture managerial overconfidence effectively.  Further, the KZ index test was performed on 
the UK market, and found that the SZOC and OPT measures of overconfidence are 
significant, indicating that the magnitude of investment sensitivity to cashflow of 
overconfident managers is particularly important when a firm is financially constrained.  
The results produced by the second model also supported the findings of Kim et al. (2016). 
In the UK market, SZOC, OPT and NPR measures of overconfidence are all significant and 
positive. Supporting the hypothesis that managerial overconfidence does lead to increased 
stock price crash risk. Again, the measure of PURCHASE remains insignificant for the UK 
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market. 
The results for the third model, which is a novel model in this thesis, were unexpected. Risk 
of default is measured through the Merton Model, which is a forward-looking method used 
to predict future probability of default. In Chapter 8, I expected overconfident managers 
characteristic of taking on riskier decisions, ignoring negative signals, and believing that they 
are in control even during negative circumstances, to increase firm probability of default. 
However, the empirical results show a significant negative relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and both the probability of default and the abnormal probability of default 
(in excess of industry average). In other words, firms with overconfident managers were 
better able to reduce their firm’s future probability of default. A possible explanation is that 
overconfident managers are more likely to invest in innovative and promising projects, and 
thus succeed in reducing the future risk of default. This is in spite of the fact that the short-
term effects of managerial overconfidence may be negative, as represented by an increase in 
stock price crash risk. In the long-term they may prove beneficial in reducing firm probability 
of default. This result lead us to believe that, guarded with a few precautionary steps, 
managerial overconfidence may be more beneficial to the firm than harmful.  The matter was 
discussed in more detail in Section 7.5. 
Gervais et al. (2007) and Goel and Thakor (2008) find that although managerial 
overconfidence may cause a manager to overinvest, this can increase the value of the firm if 
compensation contracts properly adjust for managerial bias. Overconfident managers are 
willing to take on more risk. Thus, less incentive compensation is required to make them 
pursue risky investment opportunities that are valuable to shareholder wealth. They argue 
that if a manager is rational and risk-averse, then he may forego some risky projects that are 
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valuable to the firm. More compensation must be offered to such a risk-averse manager for 
him to consider undertaking risky projects with a positive net present value (NPV). However, 
an overconfident manager believes that he is more precise in predicting the likely outcome 
of risky projects because of his information set. Therefore, overconfidence creates two 
potential sources of value for the firm. First, a manager’s overconfidence compels him to 
follow a beneficial risky investment with a flatter compensation schedule. Second, a 
manager’s overconfidence commits him to exert effort to gather more information that 
improves the success rate and value of the firm investment policy. 
8.3 Recommendations and Areas of Future Research 
Firms should be aware of the implications of hiring or retaining overconfident managers and 
adjusting their policies accordingly. For example, traditional solutions to investment 
distortions included timely disclosure of corporate accounts or higher incentives. These 
potential remedies may be inappropriate for overconfident managers, and it may be beneficial 
for the firms to reconsider their incentive scheme in light of my findings.  
An overconfident manager whose incentive is perfectly aligned and does not have any 
information asymmetry may still invest sub optimally. He does not need any increased 
incentive because he already believes that he is acting in the best interest of shareholders. 
Thus, the focus of firms with overconfident CEOs should be to leash in overconfident 
managers when there is an abundance of internal cashflow (retained earnings) to ensure that 
they will invest only when it is beneficial for the firm.  They may need to redefine their 
corporate governance structures or add more active board of directors to reign a few specific 
negative consequences that may result from having an overconfident manager.  
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Recommendations for further research include further investigation in identifying whether 
managerial overconfidence is beneficial or detrimental to the firm. It may be necessary to 
hypothesize differently, that there is an optimal level of overconfidence that would be 
beneficial to the firm. So rather than assuming a linear relationship between overconfidence 
and firm value or risk, we may assume a quadratic relationship. Furthermore, in this thesis, 
by comparing the Egyptian and the UK market, I conclude that the impact of managerial 
overconfidence on decision making is sensitive to the degree of external/political risk. It may 
be more meaningful to see whether this conclusion holds true by making an intra-market 
comparison. Now that the UK has left the European Union (EU) as of 31st of January, 2020, 
and the consequences of  Brexit being more clear, as well as the consequences suffered from 
Covid-19, it may be beneficial to study the impact of managerial overconfidence on decision 
making in the UK market during times of stability (2010-2015) vs. times of instability 2016 
onwards (when the Brexit referendum was passed and up until now with the consequences 
of the UK leaving the EU and Covid-19 still underway).  
Furthermore, while there are numerous results that describe how agency problems can be 
mitigated, recent research has only begun looking into governance methods that can be used 
to mitigate managerial biases as well. Given the novel interest in behavioural corporate 
finance, this line of research should be promising.  
I also feel that human behavioural factors affecting firms in underdeveloped and emerging 
markets may need to be identified. Currently accepted factors for investors should be 
developed for managers in corporation as well. We may find that managers were following 
herd behaviour or may have been in a state of panic, such biases maybe more appropriate for 
study in a crisis period.   
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Appendices 
A3A: Theoretical framework  
The theoretical framework below is a derivation of the work of Heaton (2002) Malmendier 
and Tate (2005) Baker and Wurgler (2013). 
The true fundamental value of a firm is 
 𝑓(𝐾,⋅) − 𝑐𝐾, (1) 
where 𝑓 is increasing and concave in new investment 𝐾 and 𝑐 is the cost of capital. 
The asset function 𝑓 can consist of two parts:  
 𝑓(𝐾,⋅) = 𝑓1(𝐾,⋅) + 𝐴, (2) 
where the constant term constant term 𝐴 reflects the value of the assets in place and the 
function 𝑓1(𝐾,⋅), also concave and increasing, represents assets value due to new investment. 
From Equation (1), the maximum firm value is obtained (using calculus) when 
 𝑓𝐾 = 𝑐, (3) 
or when the marginal value created from investment is equal the cost of capital. 
The optimistic manager perceives the fundamental value as 
 (1 + 𝛾)𝑓(𝐾,⋅) − 𝑐𝐾 = 𝑓(𝐾,⋅) − 𝑐𝐾 + 𝛾𝑓(𝐾,⋅), (4) 
where 𝛾 is the optimism parameter. This perceived value is to be maximized by the manager. 
Note that, in view of (2), the manager is optimistic about the assets in place as well as the 
new investment.  
The RHS of (4) reveals that the optimistic manager thinks that the firm is undervalued by  
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 𝛾𝑓(𝐾,⋅). (5) 
Selling a fraction 𝑒 of the firm, the optimistic manager perceives that the shareholders are 
losing  
 𝑒𝛾𝑓(𝐾,⋅). (6) 
This value is to be minimized by the optimistic manager. 
Putting the above two objectives together, the job of the optimistic manager is to find an 
investment level 𝐾 and an equity percentage 𝑒 that will solve the problem 
 max
𝐾,𝑒
{(1 + 𝛾)𝑓(𝐾,⋅) − 𝑐𝐾 − 𝑒𝛾𝑓(𝐾,⋅)}. (7) 
This can be done by taking partial derivatives and equating to zero. To obtain 
 𝑓𝐾 =
𝑐
1 + (1 − 𝑒)𝛾
, 
𝑓𝑒 =
𝛾
1 + (1 − 𝑒)𝛾
𝑓 
=
𝛾
𝑐
𝑓𝐾𝑓. 
 
 
 
(8) 
Implications for Financial Policy, Investment Policy and Firm Value: 
From the RHS of Equation (4) we can see that an overconfident manager overestimates the 
returns on future investments by the percentage 𝛾.  
Provided the firm has sufficient internal funds, a manager will always invest in projects that 
have positive NPV. Equation (4) also implies that an optimistic manager may perceive a 
project with negative NPV as actually having positive NPV (𝑓 − 𝑐𝐾 may be negative 
while 𝑓 − 𝑐𝐾 + 𝛾𝑓 may be positive). Hence, an optimistic manager will tend to reduce the 
firm value (Heaton, 2002). 
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As stated above an overconfident manager believes that the market undervalues his equity 
by 𝑒𝛾𝑓(𝐾,⋅)  (see Equation (6)).  He thus believes that issuing equity is unduly costly. If 
issuing equity is the only source of financing, this may lead a firm to underinvest. An 
overconfident manager may refuse to undertake positive NPV projects believing external 
financing is too costly, even if these projects are in the best interest of shareholders.  
Equation (8) means that the marginal value created from investment is always less than the 
cost of capital 𝑐. Since 𝑓𝐾 = 𝑐 corresponds to the first-best investment level 𝐾𝐹𝐵 for 
maximum asset value (𝑓 − 𝑐𝐾), an optimistic manager will always be operating at a value 𝐾 
higher than the optimal value 𝐾𝐹𝐵. In other words, he will always have 𝐾 > 𝐾𝐹𝐵. Although 
in this case 𝑓(𝐾,⋅) > 𝑓(𝐾𝐹𝐵,⋅), the true asset return value 𝑓(𝐾,⋅) − 𝑐𝐾 is not at its maximum 
value. Thus, although optimistic managers tend to overinvest (𝐾 > 𝐾𝐹𝐵), they are operating 
at less than optimal returns.  
Furthermore, as is also revealed by Equation (8), the discrepancy between 𝑓𝐾 and 𝑐 worsens 
as 𝛾 increases and 𝑒 decreases, both are characteristics of overconfident managers. This, as 
we saw, is reflected in heightened overinvestment. 
Since overconfident managers are reluctant to issue equity, believing that it is undervalued by the 
market, they tend to operate under reduced marginal values of 𝑓𝑒 and, hence, under lower values of 
𝑒. 𝑓 is increasing, convex function of 𝑒. Thus, increasing 𝑓𝑒 will increase 𝑒. In view of 
equation (8) This will result in a higher value of 𝑓𝐾 which becomes closer to the cost of 
capital 𝑐. The effect is a reduced level of overinvestment 𝐾. However, an overconfident 
manager tends to issue lower equity 𝑒 which has the counter effect of reducing  𝐾. If a 
manager needs to invest using equity so that 𝑓𝑒 > 0 the degree of overinvestment will fall. 
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Finally, an overconfident manager, who wants to maximize the perceived value of the firm 
and has no optimal capital structure (no upper bound on debt), will perceive debt as more 
undervalued than equity and set 𝑒 to zero. As such he will issue higher levels of debt than a 
rational manager (Hackbarth, 2002). Overconfident managers who overestimate project 
returns while underestimating the risk of high debt financing, may result in excessive use of 
welfare-reducing debt projects, and increase the probability of firm default, (Malmendier and 
Tate, 2005). On the other hand, if there is an upper bound on debt, so that 𝑓𝑒 > 0 the pecking 
order theory is expected to prevail, where the manager will issue equity but only as a last 
resort.  
 
A4A: Variable Definition 
 
SZOC1 Schrand and Zechman composite of overconfidence index (see section 
4.6.1 for more information). 
SZOC2 Schrand and Zechman composite of overconfidence index (see section 
4.6.1 for more information). 
OPT80 Dichotomous measure of overconfidence whereby firms are considered 
overconfident if investment level is above the 80th percentile of all firms in 
the same industry for two consecutive years. 
OPT20 Dichotomous measure of overconfidence whereby firms are considered not 
confident if investment level is below the 20th percentile of all firms in the 
same industry for two consecutive years. 
PURCHASE Dichotomous measure of overconfidence based on net purchases of stocks 
by the firm, overconfidence is 1 if net stock purchases are in the top 80th 
percentile of net purchases by all firms for a given industry in that year. 
Further, those purchases must increase the CEOs ownership of the firm by 
10% during the fiscal year, zero otherwise 
NPR  Proxy for overconfidence measured as:  
(insider purchase-insider selling)/(insider purchase + insider selling) 
 
 
 
 
232 
 
A5A Correlation Table for Egypt and the UK 
Table A5A1 Correlation Table for Egypt 
 
Table A5A2 Correlation Table for the UK 
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A5B: Variable Definition 
 
I Investment; measured as capital expenditures normalized by the beginning of the 
year PP&E. 
CF Cashflow before extraordinary items plus depreciation; normalized by the 
beginning of the year PP&E. 
Q Market value of assets over book value of assets 
K Total PP&E 
Lev Total debt divided by total assets. 
ROA Net income divided by total assets. 
Size Natural logarithm of market capitalization. 
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A5C1: Baseline regression for Egypt in EGP 
Egypt 
Variables No FE, No Controls FE, No Controls FE, Controls 
CF𝑡 3.203 (<0.001) 3.215 (<0.001) 3.701 (<0.001) 
Q𝑡−1 0.279 (0.008) 0.33 (0.001) 0.374 (<0.001) 
ROA𝑡 - - -0.003 (0.500) 
SIZE𝑡 - - 0.036 (0.649) 
LEV𝑡  - - -0.0004 (<0.001) 
CF.Q𝑡−1 - - 2.229 (<0.001) 
CF.ROA𝑡 - - -0.006 (0.03) 
CF.SIZE𝑡 - - -0.028 (0.511) 
CF.LEV𝑡  - - 0.0005 (<0.001) 
Intercept - - -0.524 (0.290) 
Firm FE No Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No No 
R-Sq 0.344 0.342 0.957 
Rho - - 0.229 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑇 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′ 𝐵3 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′ 𝐵5 
Regression performed in EGP. This table presents baseline regression of Investment against cashflow, 
overconfidence and other control variables. The dependent variable in this regression is investment, defined as 
capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow calculated as earnings before 
extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q is the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets. Lev is leverage or total amount of debt divided by total assets. ROA is 
return on assets calculated as net income divided by total assets. Size is calculated as the log of market value 
of equity. Regression period 2005-2018. 
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A5C2: The effect of the interaction of cashflow and SZOC1 on investment for Egypt 
in EGP 
 Egypt 
Variables 
OC, FE, No 
Controls 
OC, FE, 
Controls 
Std. Errors 
Cluster by Firm 
Industry-CF 
Interaction, Firm 
FE 
CF𝑡 1.900 (<0.001) 0.249 (<0.001) 0.249 (0.003) 1.267 (0.004) 
Q𝑡−1 3.324 (<0.001) 0.042 (<0.001) 0.042 (0.033) 0.06 (0.167) 
ROA𝑡  0.0004 (0.658) 0.0004(0.823) -0.0004 (0.982) 
SIZE𝑡  -0.010 (0.006) -0.010 (0.254) -0.051 (0.103) 
LEV𝑡  -6.5E-06 (0.615) -6.5E-06 (0.622) -9.8E-06 (0.792) 
CF.Q𝑡−1  -0.242 (<0.001) -0.242 (<0.001) -0.242 (<0.001) 
CF.ROA𝑡  -0.003 (<0.001) -0.003 (<0.001) -0.003 (<0.001) 
CF.SIZE𝑡  0.036 (<0.001) 0.036 (0.026) 0.032 (0.077) 
CF.LEV𝑡  -2.4E-05 (0.128) -2.4E05 (0.645) 9.7E-06 (0.901) 
SZOC1𝑡−1 0.926 (0.144) 0.025 (0.939) -0.025 (0.819) 0.054 (0.797) 
CF.SZOC1𝑡−1 -0.369 (0.733) -1.053 (<0.001) -1.053 (0.041) -1.475 (0.026) 
Intercept -4.948 (<0.001) 0.138 (0.170) 0.138 (0.104) 0.167 (0.214) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-CF FE No No No Yes 
R-Sq 0.523 0.998 0.998 0.956 
Rho 0.33 0.181 0.181 0.189 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑇 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑍𝑂𝐶1𝑖𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′ 𝐵4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 . 𝑆𝑍𝑂𝐶1𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′ 𝐵7 
Regression is performed in EGP. This table presents different regression models to study the effect of 
overconfidence, cashflow, control variables and their interaction on investment. The dependent variable in this 
regression is investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q 
is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. SZOC1 is the Schrand and Zechman (2012) 
measure of overconfidence. OC is overconfidence and FE is fixed effects. 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′  in the equation is the vector of 
control variables. Lev is leverage or total amount of debt divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets 
calculated as net income divided by total assets. Size is calculated as the log of market value of equity.  Industry 
classifications were made according to GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard).   Regression period 
2005-2018. 
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A5C3: The effect of the interaction of cashflow and SZOC2 on investment for Egypt 
in EGP 
Variables 
OC, FE, No 
Controls 
OC, Fe, Controls 
Std. Errors 
Clustered by 
Firm 
Industry-CF 
Interaction, Firm 
FE 
CF𝑡 1.9 (<0.001) 0.307 (<0.001) 0.307 (0.021) 0.324 (0.053) 
Q𝑡−1 3.315 (<0.001) 0.040 (<0.001) 0.040 (0.038) 0.057 (0.191) 
ROA𝑡  -0.0003 (0.801) -0.0003 (0.82) -0.001 (0.979) 
SIZE𝑡  0.007 (0.049) 0.007 (0.439) -0.039 (0.193) 
LEV𝑡  1.3E-05 (0.410) 1.3E-05 (0.378) -0.0001 (0.834) 
CF.Q𝑡−1  0.242 (<0.001) 0.242 (<0.001) 0.242 (<0.001) 
CF.ROA𝑡  -0.002 (<0.001) -0.002 (0.037) -0.003 (0.066) 
CF.SIZE𝑡  0.030 (0.004) 0.030 (0.222) 0.025 (0.398) 
CF.LEV𝑡  -0.0001 (<0.001) -0.0001 (<0.001) -0.0001 (0.024) 
SZOC2𝑡−1 0.478 (0.572) -0.203 (0.001) -0.203 (<0.001) -0.232 (0.001) 
CF.SZOC2𝑡−1 -0.138 (0.932) 0.015 (0.558) 0.015 (0.892) 0.162 (0.365) 
Intercept -4.891 (<0.001) 0.089 (0.436) -0.089 (0.045) 0.098 (0.428) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-CF F No No No Yes 
R-Sq 0.328 0.998 0.998 0.979 
Rho 0.552 0.152 0.152 0.149 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑇 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑍𝑂𝐶2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′ 𝐵4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 . 𝑆𝑍𝑂𝐶1𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′ 𝐵7 
Regression is performed in EGP. This table presents different regression models to study the effect of 
overconfidence, cashflow, control variables and their interaction on investment. The dependent variable in this 
regression is investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of  year PP&E. Q 
is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. SZOC2 is the Schrand and Zechman (2012) 
measure of overconfidence. OC is overconfidence and FE is fixed effects. 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′  in the equation is the vector of 
control variables. Lev is leverage or total amount of debt divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets 
calculated as net income divided by total assets. Size is calculated as the log of market value of equity.  Industry 
classifications were made according to GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard).  Regression period 
2005-2018. 
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A5C4: The effect of the interaction of cashflow and OPT on investment for Egypt in 
EGP 
Variables 
OC, FE, No 
Controls 
OC, Fe, Controls 
Std. Errors 
Clustered by 
Firm 
Industry-CF 
Interaction, Firm 
FE 
CF𝑡 0.013 (0.08) 0.357 (<0.001) 0.357 (0.004) 0.389 (0.018) 
Q𝑡−1 0.523 (<0.001) 0.053 (<0.001) 0.053 (0.031) 0.05 (0.205) 
ROA𝑡  -0.001 (0.568) -0.001 (0.882) -0.001 (0.556) 
SIZE𝑡  -0.026 (0.145) -0.026 (0.161) -0.012 (0.304) 
LEV𝑡  -0.0003 (0.022) -0.0003 (0.488) 0.0001 (0.565) 
CF.Q𝑡−1  -0.232 (<0.001) -0.232 (<0.001) -0.23 (<0.001) 
CF.ROA𝑡  0.001 (0.085) 0.001 (0.669) 0.002 (0.542) 
CF.SIZE𝑡  0.033 (<0.001) 0.033 (0.064) 0.04 (0.082) 
CF.LEV𝑡  -0.001 (<0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.0001 (0.118) 
OPT80𝑡−1  2.032 (<0.001) -0.03 (0.072) -0.03 (0.707) -0.029 (0.806) 
CF.OPT80𝑡−1 -8.14 (<0.001) -0.533 (<0.001) -0.533 (0.152) -0.656 (0.170) 
OPT20𝑡−1 0.179 (0.322) 0.052 (0.741) 0.052 (0.002) 0.009 (0.720) 
CF.OPT20𝑡−1 -0.125 (0.377) 0.056 (0.004) 0.056 (0.335) 0.075 (0.184) 
Intercept -0.896 (<0.001) 0.069 (0.746) 0.069 (0.087) 0.029 (0.761) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-CF FE No No No Yes 
R-Sq 0.945 0.998 0.998 0.979 
Rho 0.152 0.161 0.161 0.164 
p-values are shown in parentheses 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑇 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝑂𝑃𝑇′𝑖𝑡𝛽3 + 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′ 𝐵4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 . 𝑂𝑃𝑇′𝑖𝑡𝐵6 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′ 𝐵7 
Regression is performed in EGP. This table presents different regression models to study the effect of 
overconfidence, cashflow, control variables and their interaction on investment. The dependent variable in this 
regression is investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of  year PP&E. Q 
is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. OPT80 is the Campbell et al. (2011) measure 
of overconfidence, similarly OPT20 is a measure of pessimism. 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′  in the equation is a vector of control 
variables. Lev is leverage or total amount of debt divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets calculated as 
net income divided by total assets. Size is calculated as the log of market value of equity. OC is overconfidence 
and FE is fixed effects. Industry classifications were made according to GICS (Global Industry Classification 
Standard). Regression period 2005-2018. 
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A5C5: The Prais-Winsten regression 
 Variables Egypt UK 
CF𝑡 0.285 (<0.001) 0.172 (<0.001) 
Q𝑡−1 0.031 (0.001) 0.004 (0.441) 
 ROA𝑡 0.0002 (0.082) 0.003 (<0.001) 
 SIZE𝑡 -0.008 (0.379) -0.014 (0.001) 
LEV𝑡  -0.0002 (0.008) 0.0001 (0.545) 
C.Q𝑡−1 0.239 (<0.001) 0.006 (0.056) 
CF.ROA𝑡 -0.002 (0.006) 0.0002 (0.087) 
 CF.SIZE𝑡 0.035 (<0.001) -0.010 (0.008) 
CF.LEV𝑡  0.0001 (0.69) 0.0001 (<0.001) 
SZOC2𝑡  0.050 (0.219) -0.211 (<0.001) 
CF.SZOC2𝑡−1 -1.066 (0.506) 1.84 (<0.001) 
OPT80𝑡−1 -0.108 (0.670) -0.062 (0.005) 
CF.OPT80𝑡−1 -0.245 (0.080) 0.338 (<0.001) 
NPR𝑡−1  - -0.027 (0.005) 
CF.NPR𝑡−1 - 0.100 (<0.001) 
PURCHASE𝑡−1  - 0.017 (0.877) 
CF.PURCHASE𝑡−1 - 0.024 (0.619) 
Intercept -0.050 (0.328) 0.015 (0.565) 
Adj. R2 0.998 0.845 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑇 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝑂𝐶′𝑖𝑡𝛽3 + 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′ 𝐵4 + 𝛽5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 ⋅ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 . 𝑂𝐶′𝑖𝑡𝐵6 + 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑇 ⋅ 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′ 𝐵7 
Regression is performed in local currency. This table presents different Prais-Winsten regression model to study 
the effect of overconfidence, cashflow, control variables and their interaction on investment. The Prais-Winsten 
regression is a different method of controlling for serial autocorrelation. The dependent variable here is 
investment, defined as capital expenditure normalized by beginning of year PP&E. CF is cashflow calculated 
as earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by beginning of year PP&E. Q is the market 
value of assets divided by the book value of assets. 𝑂𝐶′𝑖𝑡  in the equation is a vector of the overconfidence 
measures which include SZOC2, OPT80 and NPR. 𝑥𝑖𝑇
′  in the equation is a vector of control variables. Lev is 
leverage or total amount of debt divided by total assets. ROA is return on assets calculated as net income divided 
by total assets. Size is calculated as the log of market value of equity. OC is overconfidence and FE is fixed 
effects. Regression period 2005-2018. 
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A6A: Correlation Table for Egypt and the UK 
Table A6A1 Correlation Table for Egypt 
 
Table A6A2 Correlation Table for the UK 
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A6B: Variable Definition 
 
DUVOL Log of the ratio of the downward volatility to upward volatility. 
NSKEW Negative of the usual definition of normalized skewness. 
CRASH A dichotomous variable defined by whether a firm made excessive losses during 
a given year. Excessive losses are defined as firm-specific weekly returns that 
are 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns over 
the entire fiscal year. 
DTO Average weekly share turnover of the current fiscal year minus the average 
weekly share turnover of the previous fiscal year.   
SIGMA Annual return volatility of stocks. 
AR Mean of a firm’s weekly real returns over the fiscal year. 
MB Market value of equity to book value of equity.  
ROA Net income divided by total assets. 
Size Natural logarithm of market capitalization . 
Lev Total debt divided by total assets. 
GDP Annual growth in GDP in the local currency. 
MR Average annual market return measured through market index. 
EX Year end exchange rate of EGP/GBP vs. USD. 
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A7A: Correlation Table for Egypt and the UK 
Table A7A1 Correlation Table for Egypt 
 
Table A7A2 Correlation Table for the UK 
   
A
PD
SZ
O
C1
SZ
O
C2
O
PT
80
O
PT
20
N
Sk
ew
A
R
Si
gm
a
Si
ze
Le
ve
ra
ge
RO
A
M
V
BV
G
D
P
EX
M
R
A
PD
1.
00
0
SZ
O
C1
-0
.0
29
1.
00
0
SZ
O
C2
-0
.0
39
0.
75
3
1.
00
0
O
PT
80
-0
.0
19
0.
20
5
0.
15
6
1.
00
0
O
PT
20
0.
02
0
-0
.0
89
-0
.0
86
-0
.2
53
1.
00
0
A
R
-0
.0
94
-0
.0
08
0.
00
5
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
62
-0
.4
01
1.
00
0
Si
gm
a
0.
15
0
-0
.0
48
-0
.0
31
-0
.0
39
0.
04
5
0.
15
8
-0
.2
10
1.
00
0
Si
ze
-0
.1
24
0.
03
6
0.
17
0
-0
.0
05
0.
00
5
0.
01
6
0.
00
7
0.
00
9
1.
00
0
Le
ve
ra
ge
0.
03
6
0.
08
3
0.
06
4
-0
.0
60
0.
18
2
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
52
0.
16
5
0.
08
2
1.
00
0
RO
A
-0
.1
37
-0
.0
38
0.
07
1
0.
10
7
-0
.1
43
0.
06
7
-0
.0
40
-0
.1
67
0.
23
9
-0
.4
13
1.
00
0
M
V
BV
-0
.0
11
0.
00
5
0.
02
5
0.
00
8
0.
00
4
0.
01
1
-0
.0
22
-0
.0
03
0.
04
7
0.
01
9
0.
09
3
1.
00
0
G
D
P
0.
02
1
-0
.1
02
-0
.0
40
0.
00
1
-0
.0
35
0.
23
4
-0
.0
83
0.
03
4
0.
08
7
0.
03
6
0.
10
7
0.
01
9
1.
00
0
EX
-0
.0
85
-0
.0
61
-0
.0
03
0.
03
1
0.
07
8
-0
.4
15
0.
20
0
-0
.1
32
0.
02
8
0.
06
6
-0
.1
50
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
44
1.
00
0
M
R
-0
.0
78
-0
.0
01
0.
01
1
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
23
-0
.4
45
0.
86
9
-0
.1
41
0.
04
6
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
85
-0
.0
30
-0
.0
81
0.
21
1
1.
00
0
A
P
D
S
Z
O
C
1
S
Z
O
C
2
O
P
T
8
0
O
P
T
2
0
P
U
R
C
H
A
S
E
N
P
R
A
R
S
ig
m
a
S
iz
e
L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
R
O
A
M
V
B
V
G
D
P
E
X
M
R
A
P
D
1
.0
0
0
S
Z
O
C
1
-0
.0
6
6
1
.0
0
0
S
Z
O
C
2
-0
.1
1
4
0
.8
2
6
1
.0
0
0
O
P
T
8
0
-0
.0
3
1
0
.1
3
4
0
.0
7
5
1
.0
0
0
O
P
T
2
0
0
.0
7
2
-0
.2
1
5
-0
.1
9
2
-0
.0
8
7
1
.0
0
0
P
U
R
C
H
A
S
E
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
4
9
0
.0
4
5
0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
4
1
1
.0
0
0
N
P
R
-0
.0
9
4
0
.0
9
4
0
.1
6
1
0
.0
2
5
-0
.0
1
4
0
.0
2
0
1
.0
0
0
A
R
-0
.0
3
9
0
.0
2
4
0
.0
1
1
0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
7
1
.0
0
0
S
ig
m
a
0
.6
1
6
-0
.1
2
8
-0
.2
5
3
0
.1
0
1
0
.0
8
6
-0
.0
2
7
-0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
7
1
1
.0
0
0
S
iz
e
-0
.1
4
0
0
.2
2
3
0
.3
5
7
-0
.1
4
1
-0
.1
7
7
-0
.0
0
3
0
.1
2
7
0
.1
3
5
-0
.4
6
7
1
.0
0
0
L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
-0
.0
2
1
0
.0
6
9
0
.0
9
4
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
3
4
-0
.0
1
1
0
.0
2
9
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
5
6
0
.4
7
2
1
.0
0
0
R
O
A
-0
.1
0
4
0
.0
8
4
0
.1
7
8
-0
.0
3
5
-0
.1
0
7
-0
.0
1
9
0
.0
2
7
0
.0
1
9
-0
.2
5
2
0
.2
6
4
0
.0
2
5
1
.0
0
0
M
V
B
V
0
.0
1
9
0
.0
3
8
0
.0
2
3
0
.0
2
4
0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
2
1
0
.0
1
7
-0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
2
7
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
1
.0
0
0
G
D
P
0
.0
2
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
4
0
.1
3
1
-0
.1
0
0
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.1
6
8
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
7
1
.0
0
0
E
X
0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
2
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
4
-0
.1
8
9
-0
.0
1
8
-0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
4
-0
.0
6
1
-0
.0
3
3
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
1
4
0
.0
1
7
1
.0
0
0
M
R
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
2
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
4
4
-0
.0
3
2
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
2
4
0
.0
0
1
-0
.1
1
9
-0
.2
7
7
1
.0
0
0
242 
 
A7B: Variable Definition 
PD Probability of default measured through the Merton Model (see section 7.2 for 
more information) 
APD Probability of default adjusted for industry average. 
SIGMA Annual return volatility of stocks. 
AR Mean of a firm’s weekly real returns over the fiscal year. 
MB Market value of equity to book value of equity.  
ROA Net income divided by total assets. 
Size Natural logarithm of market capitalization. 
Lev Total debt divided by total assets. 
GDP Annual growth in GDP in the local currency. 
MR Average annual market return measured through market index. 
EX Year-end exchange rate of EGP/GBP vs. USD. 
 
